Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospital

• Decision Date: 24 February 1927
• Citation: 254 P. 528,43 Idaho 661
• Parties: NATHAN HAYHURST, Respondent, v. BOYD HOSPITAL, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

254 P. 528

43 Idaho 661

NATHAN HAYHURST, Respondent, v. BOYD HOSPITAL, a Corporation, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 24, 1927

HOSPITALS-DUTY OF PRIVATE HOSPITAL TO PATIENT-EVIDENCE-EXAMINATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES-HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS-OBJECTIONS-SUFFICIENCY-CROSS-EXAMINATION AND REDIRECT EXAMINATIONS-LIABILITY OF HOSPITAL-NEGLIGENCE OF NURSE-INSTRUCTION TO JURY-QUOTIENT VERDICT-DAMAGES NOT EXCESSIVE.

1. The duty of a private hospital through its nurses to a patient outside of treatment of a professional nature, as in leaving him sitting up for the first time after a fever, is to give him such reasonable care and attention for his safety as his known conditions require.

2. Physicians, qualified as experts, may on hypothetical questions be asked whether they would consider certain treatment by nurse of a convalescing patient to be proper care and attention, and whether in their opinion the exposure and fatigue resulting from such treatment were the causes of the patient's subsequent complications, as against objection of questions calling for opinion of witnesses on the issues to be determined by the jury and usurping the province of the jury.

3. Objection to hypothetical question on the ground that it does not fairly reflect the facts in evidence is insufficient where it does not point out wherein the facts assumed do not properly reflect the facts proved.

4. Plaintiff's witness, his physician, who had given hospital nurse the order "chair to-morrow," having on cross-examination been asked if he did not expect his order to be carried out, the question on his redirect "What did you expect the nurse to do in carrying out that order, placing this patient in the chair?" was proper as permitting him to explain his answer to the question on cross-examination.

5. Negligence of hospital nurse in leaving patient sitting up a long time without proper wraps, whereby from exposure and fatigue he contracted pneumonia, held within the rule that negligent acts producing an injury are actionable, though in themselves they would not produce the injury had the patient's physical condition-he being up for the first time after a fever-not been such as to render him susceptible to the injury.

6. Prejudice from instruction warning jury against quotient verdict, in not stating as essential of such a verdict that the jury in advance of making computation agree that the result will be their verdict, held improbable.

7. Though several of the instructions as to probable cause were objectionable and improper standing alone, it was enough that the subject was so fully covered by a number of instructions given at defendant's request that the jury could not have been misled.

8. Verdict for $15,250 for negligence of hospital nurse resulting in fever patient, an able-bodied farm laborer, contracting pneumonia and tuberculosis, in view of future mental and physical suffering and impairment of earning capacity, held not excessive.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, for Twin Falls County. Hon. William A. Babcock, Judge.

Action for damages. Judgment for plaintiff. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Petition for rehearing denied.

Walters & Parry and Homer C. Mills, for Appellant.

Hypothetical questions must be submitted to the jury in such a way as to preclude the witness or witnesses from stating as their conclusions the ultimate fact which the jury must determine. (Cochran v. Gritman, 34 Idaho 654, 203 P. 289; 2 Jones' Com. on Evidence, sec. 377, p. 926; Patterson v. Howe, 102 Ore. 275, 202 P. 225; Sever v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. Co., 156 Iowa 664, 137 N.W. 937, 44 L. R. A., N. S., 1200; Kaw Boiler Works v. Frymyer, 100 Okla. 81, 227 P. 453; Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Davis, 196 Iowa 1349, 195 N.W. 337; McNulty v. Atlas Portland Cement Co. (Mo. App.), 249 S.W. 730.).

Defendant hospital was only required to furnish plaintiff with the usual and ordinary care and attention furnished by hospitals situated as defendant's hospital was in its vicinity, under the conditions shown to exist at the time of the alleged negligence. (Davis v. Springfield Hospital, 204 Mo.App. 626, 218 S.W. 696; Lehman v. Knott, 100 Ore. 59, 196 P. 476.)

The neglect complained of must be the proximate cause of the injury. (Ruble v. Busby, 27 Idaho 486, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 665, 149 P. 722; City of Shawnee v. Jeter, 96 Okla. 272, 221 P. 758; Marovich v. Central Cal. Traction Co., 191 Cal. 295, 216 P. 595; Glasco v. Green, 273 Pa. 353, 117 A. 79; Mayor etc. of Nashville v. Reese, 138 Tenn. 471, 197 S.W. 492, L. R. A. 1918B, 349; Fort Worth & R. G. Ry. Co. v. McMurray (Tex. Civ. App.), 173 S.W. 929; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Perkins, Admr., 177 Ky. 88, 197 S.W. 526; Texas Traction Co. v. Nenney (Tex. Civ. App.), 178 S.W. 797.)

One is not liable for acts of negligence where an injury is occasioned by an independent intervening act, which he could not have reasonably anticipated would be the result of his negligence, if any, though the injury would not have occurred except for such negligence. (Town of Lyons v. Watt, 43 Colo. 238, 95 P. 949, 18 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; Schwartz v. California Gas & Elec. Corp., 163 Cal. 398, 125 P. 1044; Houston E. N.W. T. R. Co. v. Hough (Tex. Civ. App.), 260 S.W. 233; Basey v. Louisiana R. & Nav. Co., 137 La. 451, 68 So. 824, L. R. A. 1915E, 964.)

It is error to group certain facts claimed to have been testified to by witnesses for plaintiff, and advise the jury that if such facts be properly proven they constitute negligence. By so doing the court invades the province of the jury. (Blum v. Southern Ry. Co., 187 N.C. 640, 122 S.E. 562; Elberton & E. R. Co. v. Thornton, 32 Ga.App. 259, 122 S.E. 795; A. J. Anderson & Co., Inc., v. Reich (Tex.), 260 S.W. 162; Harper v. Oregon Elec. Ry. Co., 111 Ore. 71, 224 P. 1096; Bone v. Yellow Cab Co., 129 Wash. 503, 225 P. 440; Goodrich v. City of Tulsa, 102 Okla. 90, 227 P. 91; Williams v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 177 Cal. 235, 170 P. 423; Jansson v. National S. S. Co., 189 Cal. 187, 208 P. 90.)

It is error to improperly define proximate cause and error to refuse an instruction properly defining such term. Also error to fail to instruct that even though negligence was found, jury must further find that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. (Freeborn v. Holt, 100 Okla. 50, 227 P. 136.)

It is error for the court to group certain facts claimed to have been established by the testimony of plaintiff, and instruct the jury that if properly established such facts constitute proximate cause. By so doing the court invades the province of the jury. (Molitor v. Blackwell Motor Co., 112 Wash. 279, 191 P. 1103; Borough v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 198 Iowa 130, 197 N.W. 312.)

Damages awarded are excessive--especially where the testimony discloses that plaintiff's future earning capacity was not impaired--and are supported only by pain suffered. (McAlinden v. St. Maries Hospital Assn., 28 Idaho 657, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 380, 156 P. 115.)

Bothwell & Chapman, for Respondent.

"The rule that a physician is bound to bestow such reasonable ordinary care, skill and diligence as physicians in the same neighborhood in the same general line of practice ordinarily have and exercise in like cases, is not applicable to a hospital." (Hogan v. Clarksburg, 63 W.Va. 84, 59 S.E. 943.)

"A hypothetical question which contains facts that are proved or claimed to be proved by either party may be put to an expert for the purpose of obtaining his opinion upon such facts, and by so doing such expert witness does not usurp the province of the jury, as the jury is not compelled to accept the opinions of such expert witness against their will, but will weigh such expert opinions as other evidence is weighed by them." (Jones v. City of Caldwell, 20 Idaho 5, 116 P. 110, 48 L. R. A., N. S., 119; Cochran v. Gritman, 34 Idaho 654, 203 P. 289; Eastern Transp. Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297, 24 L.Ed. 477.)

"An objection to a hypothetical question as not correctly stating the facts in the case should point out wherein it is defective." (Prosser v. Montana Cent. Ry. Co., 17 Mont. 372, 43 P. 81, 30 L. R. A. 814; Jackson v. Kansas City Rys. Co. (Mo. App.), 232 S.W. 752; Pennington v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 201 Mo.App. 483, 213 S.W. 137.)

"Evidence of good health prior to the injury, and of suffering or ailments immediately or shortly thereafter, which are shown by competent testimony to be reasonably imputed to it, and are not shown by expert testimony to be an impossible effect of the injury, is sufficient to carry the question to the jury." (13 Cyc. 216; Bailey v. Long, 175 N.C. 687, 94 S.E. 675; Quackenbush v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 73 Iowa 458, 35 N.W. 523; Hansman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 144 Minn. 56, 174 N.W. 434; Young v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 142 Minn. 10, 170 N.W. 845.)

"A person injured by negligence is entitled to recover to the full extent of the injury so caused, without regard to whether, owing to his previous condition of health, he is more or less liable to injury." (Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034, 16 L. R. A. 203; Wendt v. Bowman & Libby, 126 Minn. 509, 148 N.W. 568; Malcolm v. Evangelical Lutheran Hospital Assn., 107 Neb. 101, 185 N.W. 331.)

"An instruction should not be selected from a mass of instructions and considered alone. The instructions given must be all taken and considered together, and if they, as a whole, state the law applicable to the facts in the case that is sufficient and the case should not be reversed." (Barrow v. B. R. Lewis Lumber Co., 14 Idaho 698, 95 P. 682; Lufkins v. Collins, 2 Idaho 256, 10 P. 300; State v. Corcoran, 7 Idaho 220, 61 P. 1034; Hansen v. Haley, 11 Idaho 278, 81 P. 935; State v. Bond, 12 Idaho 424, ...