Haymon v. Pettit, 151.

• Citation: 9 N.Y.3d 324,880 N.E.2d 416
• Decision Date: 20 November 2007
• Docket Number: 151.
• Parties: Joan HAYMON, Individually and as Mother and Natural Guardian of L.H., an Infant, Appellant, v. Donald J. PETTIT et al., Defendants, and Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc., Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

880 N.E.2d 416

9 N.Y.3d 324

Joan HAYMON, Individually and as Mother and Natural Guardian of L.H., an Infant, Appellant, v. Donald J. PETTIT et al., Defendants, and Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc., Respondent.

151.

Court of Appeals of New York.

November 20, 2007.

Damon & Morey LLP, Buffalo (Michael J. Willett and Steven M. Zweig of counsel), for appellant.

Roemer Wallens & Mineaux, LLP, Albany (Matthew J. Kelly and Amanda Davis Twinam of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, J.

In this appeal we are asked to decide whether a baseball park operator owes a duty to warn or protect nonpatron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls that are hit out of the stadium. Under the circumstances presented, we conclude that no duty exists.

Plaintiff's then 14-year-old son, L.H., was injured when he was struck by an automobile driven by defendant, Donald Pettit. Specifically, L.H. chased a foul ball into traffic. The record indicates that he was wearing headphones while chasing the ball and failed to look both ways before crossing the street. L.H. apparently neither saw nor heard the oncoming vehicle. Pettit was operating his vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .11%. At the time, L.H. had congregated with friends outside of Falcon Park, a baseball stadium owned by the City of Auburn and operated by defendant Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc. (Ball Club). Adjoining the stadium on the third base side is a two-way public street across from which is a parking lot owned by the City of Auburn and utilized by fans during games. At the time of the incident, the Ball Club offered free baseball tickets to nonpatrons outside of the park who retrieved foul, balls and returned them to the ticket window. Further, the record indicates that L.H. visited the stadium regularly to, retrieve and collect foul balls hit out of the stadium.^*

L.H.'s, mother commenced this negligence action individually and on L.H.'s behalf against defendants Ball Club, Donald Pettit and the City of Auburn, Among others. The Ball Club moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it owed no duty to plaintiff's son. Supreme. Court denied the motion, finding that the Ball Club owed a duty to its fans outside the stadium "to prevent them from chasing foul balls into the nearby public street, a foreseeably dangerous condition it took part in creating." The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint as to the Ball Club. The court determined that the Ball Club, "as an adjoining landowner [of a public street], owed no legal duty to plaintiffs son under the circumstances" despite the foreseeability that someone might run into the street to chase a foul ball (Haymon v. Pettit, 37 A.D.3d 1194, 1195, 829 N.Y.S.2d 766 [4th Dept.2007]). Two Justices dissented and voted to affirm on the ground that a duty existed due to the Ball Club's foul ball promotion, which "played a significant role in creating the danger" (id.).

Plaintiff argues that the Ball Club's foul ball promotion gave rise to a duty to warn or protect its participants. Specifically, plaintiff posits that a duty arose under these circumstances because the Ball Club provided an incentive to fans outside of the stadium to retrieve errant foul balls— namely, the prospect of free tickets. In short, plaintiff argues that the foreseeability of children chasing balls into the street, coupled with defendant's incentive for them to do so, required the Ball Club to provide some measure of protection or warning. We disagree.

An owner or occupier of land generally owes no duty to warn or protect others from a dangerous condition on adjacent property unless the owner created or contributed to such a condition (see Galindo v. Town of Clarkstown, 2 N.Y.3d 633, 636, 781 N.Y.S.2d 249, 814 N.E.2d 419 [2004] ). "The reason for such a rule is obvious—a person who lacks ownership or control of property cannot fairly be held accountable for injuries resulting from a hazard" on neighboring property (id.). Thus, in fixing the duty point, our analysis is tempered by considerations such as "the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation" (Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 232, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055 [2001]; see also Darby v. Compagnie Natl. Air France, 96 N.Y.2d 343, 347, 728 N.Y.S.2d 731, 753 N.E.2d 160 [2001] [duty must "comport with what is socially, culturally and economically acceptable"]).

In Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 N.E.2d 531 (1981) we limited the duty of a baseball field owner/operator to provide screening for errant baseballs around "the most dangerous section of the field—the area behind home plate—and the screening that is provided must be sufficient for those spectators who may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats on an ordinary occasion" (id. at 330, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 N.E.2d 531; see also Davidoff v. Metropolitan Baseball Club, 61 N.Y.2d 996, 997-998, 475 N.Y.S.2d 367, 463 N.E.2d 1219 [1984] ). Although in Akins the injury occurred inside the baseball park, it is instructive nonetheless. Akins is premised on "the practical realities" (id. at 331, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 N.E.2d 531) of the game—namely, that errant balls of any sort are an inherent part of the sport and that a baseball stadium owner/operator "is not an insurer of the safety of its spectators" and can only be held to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances (id. at 329, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 N.E.2d 531). Even inside the park, screening of the area behind home, plate offers the most protection spectators could reasonably expect. The nature of the game—and the spectators' involvement in it—is such that absolute protection around the entire stadium would be impractical. Any other formulation would defy a reasonable point at which duty can be fixed (see Darby, 96 N.Y.2d at 349-350, 728 N.Y.S.2d 731, 753 N.E.2d 160; Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 786, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 358 N.E.2d 1019 [1976]).

The same considerations govern this case. Here, plaintiff's theory rests upon defendant's "foul ball return for tickets" promotion. Plaintiff insists that this incentive foreseeably exposed fans—mostly children—to the hazard of chasing foul balls into the street. This argument, however, is one of foreseeability presupposing that a duty exists (see. Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 232, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055). The dangers of crossing the street—and individuals electing to cross it in pursuit of foul balls—exist independent of the Ball Club's promotion. This, coupled with the fact that the Ball Club could control neither the public street nor third persons who use it, strongly militates against a finding of duty.

Darby is also...