Hayner v. People

• Decision Date: 22 December 1904
• Citation: 72 N.E. 792,213 Ill. 142
• Parties: HAYNER v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

213 Ill. 142

72 N.E. 792

HAYNER

v.PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1904.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Axel Chytraus, Judge.

Amaziah Hayner was convicted of manslaughter, and brings error. Reversed.

W. P. Black and C. D. F. Smith, for plaintiff in error.

H. J. Hamlin, Atty. Gen., C. S. Deneen, State's Atty., and Harry Olson, Asst. State's Atty., for the People.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

Amaziah Hayner, plaintiff in error, was indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for the murder of Henry Martin. A trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury, but on a second trial a verdict was returned finding the defendantguilty of manslaughter, and fixing his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of one year. The court disregarded that part of the verdict fixing the term of imprisonment, and sentenced him to confinement in the penitentiary for an indeterminate period, in accordance with the statute.

The death of Henry Martin resulted from a shot from a revolver fired by the defendant in defendant's kitchen in the rear flat on the second floor of No. 4433 State street, in Chicago. The only persons present in the room at the time were Martin and the defendant, and the evidence, except the testimony of the defendant, was confined to what occurred previously. The buildings numbered 4431 and 4433 State street were occupied on the lower floors by storerooms. Above the storerooms in each building were three floors finished as flats, and divided into front and rear flats. Above the storeroom in No. 4433 the rear flat was occupied by the defendant, Hayner, a widower, and his daughter, a stenographer and typewriter, and he had charge of the flats in that building as janitor. The next flat above was occupied by Mrs. Lawson, and the rear top flat by Mrs. Clay. Above the storeroom of No. 4431 the rear flat was occupied by Mrs. Kenny, the next by Mrs. Draper, and the top flat by Mrs. Beard. There were rear porches and stairways, above each other, to both buildings, with an outer railing, and a railing extending across the porches separating the buildings. On the afternoon of September 4, 1902, the defendant called upon Mrs. Beard at her flat on the top floor of No. 4431 for the key of a front flat in No. 4433, from which she had recently removed. He sat for a time on the railing or banister between the porches of Mrs. Clay and Mrs. Beard, talking with the latter. Martin was a business agent or walking delegate of a carpenters' union, and at that time came up the stairway to Mrs. Beard's porch. He was intoxicated, and, when asked what he wanted, said he was looking for a carpenter by the name of Garlof. Mrs. Beard told him that Garlof did not live there, and requested him to go downstairs. He inquired the name of the building, and she replied that she did not think it had any, and referred the question to the defendant, who said he had lived there 14 years, and that it had no name, and he informed Martin that Garlof had moved farther south on State street. Mrs. Beard requested Martin to go downstairs, and he replied with profane and obscene language, and refused to go. Mrs. Beard and defendant tried to persuade him to leave, but he would not. He walked to the dividing railing where the defendant sat and stepped over it to Mrs. Clay's porch, and as he went over he called Mrs. Beard the vilest name that can be applied to a woman, accompanied with an oath. The defendant became very much excited, and took hold of a stepladder, saying to Martin that he had insulted the woman as long as he could stand it, and pushed the ladder sideways against Martin. Defendant then dropped the ladder and picked up a broom. The evidence was contradictory as to whether at this time Martin struck the defendant or said that he did not want to fight. Defendant attempted to strike Martin with the broom, but did not hit him, and the broom went out of his hands across the porch. Mrs. Clay then tried to get Martin to go downstairs, and agreed to go with him. They started to go down together, and when they had gone three or four steps Martin stopped and wanted to go back, but she persuaded him to go on. When they reached the bottom of that flight of stairs they turned on the porch between the railing and the brick wall and went to the head of the next stairway, which descended to the porch on the second floor, where defendant's apartments were. The defendant came downstairs, and, as Mrs. Clay and Martin stood at the head of that stairway, defendant laid his hand on the railing near the door and jumped over, reaching the stairway three or four steps farther down in front of them. Martin then kicked the defendant twice in the back as he went down the stairs, Martin following him to the bottom of the stairs, when Mrs. Clay went back to her own flat above. The defendant went to his own door and went into his kitchen, opening a screen door, which shut behind him. He went on into the bedroom and got a revolver which he kept there, and returned to the kitchen door and pused the screen open. When Martin reached the bottom of the stairs on that floor he was near a passageway leading to State street, by which he could go out the way he came in. Instead of doing that, he turned back a few steps to the door of the defendant and took hold of the screen door with his left hand, holding it partly open. Defendant asked him what he was doing there, and told him to get out-that he did not want any further trouble with him. Defendant had the revolver in his hand, hanging by his side and swinging it around. As Martin stood there he said to the defendant, ‘Shoot, damn you! shoot!’ The defendant thereupon fired a shot, which made a flesh wound on the upper part of Martin's arm with which he was holding the door. Martin's arm slipped down the door, and, as a witness described it, he lunged forward into the kitchen, the screen door closing behind him. Nothing was seen from the outside after that, except through the screen door, and the only witness who saw anything testified that he saw Martin's arm going back and forth, but was unable to state what he was doing. The first shot was followed very soon by another, which severed the femoral artery in the left leg and proved fatal. There was a great quantity of blood on the floor near the middle of the kitchen, and about the time of the shots Martin was heard to say: ‘You have shot me; give me a rag.’ There was testimony that the defendant, as he went down the stairs, said: ‘I will show you; I will shoot you;’ but this was contradicted. The defendant was 73 years of age, and weighed about 147 pounds. Martin was 36 years old, and weighed, according to the testimony of his widow, 180 pounds. The coroner's physician testified that he weighed 210 pounds. The parties had not been acquainted with each other, and there was no hostility between them, except such as was aroused by the conduct of Martin on this occasion. The defendant testified that he fired the first shot when Martin said ‘Shoot,’ not intending to injure him, but only to frighten him, and the wound in the arm would have had no serious effect. He testified that, following that first shot, Martin came into the room towards him, and he backed up, and Martin attempted to strike him; that Martin was close to him, and he was holding the pistol down; that it was an automatic revolver, and he thought that in his excitement he pulled the trigger without knowing it.

The first error assigned is that the court permitted W. S. Elliott, Jr., an attorney not connected with the office of the state's attorney, but hired and paid by the carpenters' union, to assist the state's attorney and take a prominent part in the trial. When the objection was made it was agreed that Mr. Elliott would testify that the carpenters' union had paid him a retainer, amounting to several hundred dollars, for his services in the prosecution of the defendant, and had become liable to pay him a considerable sum as fees in such prosecution. It is not the right of an attorney to appear as assistant of the state's attorney, whether his services are gratuitous or paid for by private parties, but the state's attorney, as a public officer, must have the direction and assume the responsibility of the prosecution. It would be manifestly improper to permit counsel paid by private parties to supplant the constituted officer of the law and to assume the management of the case, but we do not think it is beyond the power of the court to permit counsel paid by private parties to assist the state's attorney where there is no oppression of the defendant or injustice to him. In granting such permission, the court should see that the criminal law is not peing used to gratify malice or personal ends, but cases frequently arise where the administration of public justice requires that the state's attorney should have assistance. There are cases where the state's attorney is clearly outclassed and overmatchedby counsel for the defendant. Such matters must be left largely to the discretion of the court, whose duty it is to prevent oppression of the defendant, and to permit such assistance as fairness and justice may require. It might be a wrong and oppression to a defendant to permit able and experienced counsel employed by private parties to assist a competent state's attorney in a contest with inexperienced or inefficient counsel for the defense.

Counsel for plaintiff in error call attention to the new section added in 1903 to the act in regard to...