Haynes v. Cain, 00-31012
| Citation | 272 F.3d 757 |
| Decision Date | 27 November 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-31012,00-31012 |
| Parties | (5th Cir. 2001) BRANDON HAYNES, Petitioner-Appellee, v. BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
Before POLITZ and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and KAZEN,* Chief District Judge.
Burl Cain, as warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary appeals the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus to Brandon Haynes. For the reasons assigned we affirm.
Haynes was convicted of first degree murder for causing the death of a graduate medical student in 1993. The evidence adduced at trial disclosed that the victim had been last seen late at night working in a research laboratory. The next morning her body was found at the foot of an adjacent 10 story biomedical research building, then under construction. The medical examiner ruled that she died from injuries resulting from the fall. The autopsy disclosed that in addition to the death-dealing injuries the victim had several non-fatal cuts which the medical examiner believed were likely intended to cause torture or compliance, some bruising around her arm, and semen residue in her vagina and rectum.
The evidence pointing to Haynes' involvement in the abduction and death of the student was substantial. Haynes was part of the construction crew working on the biomedical research building. Although he had gone home after completing his shift, eyewitness testimony established that he had returned to the building later that evening. Video surveillance cameras in the biomedical research building recorded him on the upper floors of the building and taped him climbing up to unplug the cameras. DNA analysis established that it was his semen found in the victim. The victim's wallet was found secreted in a wall in his home. A knife that could have caused the cuts on the victim was found in his car, as were blood stains matching the victim. Similar blood stains were found on his pants.
The State brought first degree murder charges against Haynes, contending that he abducted, raped, robbed, and tortured the victim before he either threw her or forced her off the roof. Haynes pleaded not guilty and consistently maintained his innocence.1
Haynes was assigned two experienced public defenders. In their judgment the evidence against Haynes would result in his conviction. They decided that the best trial strategy would be to acknowledge that Haynes did abduct, rob, rape and torture the deceased student, but that the State could not prove that he caused or otherwise intended for her to fall from the building. Absent that element Haynes could only be found guilty of second degree felony murder and could not be given a death sentence.
In their opening statement counsel for Haynes stated:
The evidence will show that the victim, Fang Yang, died during the commission of a felony. It will not show that Brandon Haynes specifically intended to kill her. It will not show that he even caused her death. In essence, the evidence will show that Brandon Haynes is guilty of second degree murder. Nothing more. We are not going to say anything less, just that, second degree murder.
We are not going to contest that Brandon Haynes raped the victim. It was a terrible thing he did, but he did it. We are not going to contest that. Likewise we are not going to contest the fact that he abducted her first and brought her up to the roof. We are not contesting that. We are not going to contest the fact that at some point he possibly robbed her.
Counsel then told the jury that the only issue in the case was whether Haynes intended to cause the woman's death, and that absent such proof they could not convict him of first degree murder. Counsel concluded by saying "[The evidence] is enough for second degree murder and that's what we are going to ask you to do at the end of the trial, come back with a verdict of second degree murder, no more, no less."
At the conclusion of defense counsel's opening statement Haynes told the trial judge that he wanted to address the court. The judge sent the jurors out, and Haynes' counsel stated that anything Haynes said was against the advice of counsel. Haynes then declared:
I don't agree with what these lawyers are doing, talking about I'm guilty of second degree murder. I'm not guilty of second degree or first degree. If that is the way they are going to represent me, they need to just jump over there with the D.A.'s. They ain't representing me. Telling jurors that I'm guilty of second degree murder ain't trying to represent me in no kind of way. I disagree with what they are doing.
Haynes' counsel responded that in their judgment the evidence precluded hope of a not-guilty verdict and that this approach was in his best interest. Haynes told the judge that he had previously complained of their trial strategy and had requested that they not represent him. He repeated that request. He also stated
The trial judge stated that Haynes was being represented by excellent lawyers and his request for different lawyers was denied. When Haynes protested that he was "stuck" with the appointed counsel and with their trial strategy, the judge stated that Haynes could testify at the appointed time if he desired to. He thereupon brought the jury back in and resumed the trial.
Haynes did not testify, and in closing argument Haynes' counsel returned to the strategy established in the opening statement, saying:
In our opening, I said pay close attention not only to what all the evidence is going to show. I said there would be only one issue and only one issue; that is, intent to kill. Look at all the evidence. . . . It proves a lot of things. It proves a lot of things we didn't contest. It proves he intentionally raped her. It proves he intentionally cut her. Did I say otherwise? I conceded that. It proves that he abducted and possibly robbed her. He did take the wallet; we don't know when. We did not contest that. We did not cross examine any witness regarding the source of semen. The only issue we are contesting is whether or not Mr. Haynes intentionally killed the victim, Fang Yang. That is it. It is the only issue.
The jury found Haynes guilty of first degree murder but could not agree on the punishment, and under Louisiana law the trial judge sentenced Haynes to life without possibility of parole. Haynes filed a pro se brief in his direct appeal contending that his counsel had been ineffective by conceding his guilt on the underlying felonies. The state court of appeals affirmed his conviction. Haynes' counsel filed for writs of review in the Louisiana Supreme Court, which were denied; however, Haynes did not file any pro se brief in that effort and his ineffective assistance claim was not reviewed by that court.
Haynes then filed applications for post-conviction collateral relief in state court, again raising the ineffective assistance claim. Finding that the trial strategy employed by Haynes' counsel was a well-considered effort to avoid a death sentence, the state court denied his application. After a premature federal application, Haynes sought a writ from the Louisiana Supreme Court which considered his ineffective assistance claim for the first time and denied same. Haynes then refiled in the court a quo.
The district court referred Haynes' writ application to a magistrate judge who filed a report recommending that it be denied. In his report the magistrate judge reviewed the state court opinions, which had examined Haynes' assertion using the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington2 for determining whether counsel was ineffective, and found that those opinions were not an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard.3
The district court rejected the recommendation of the magistrate judge, finding that the state courts and the magistrate judge used the wrong standard in evaluating Haynes' claim. According to the district judge, the actions of Haynes' counsel in conceding partial guilt over Haynes' express objection resulted in the constructive denial of counsel, causing per se prejudice under the standard set forth in U.S. v. Cronic.4 The district judge then granted Haynes a conditional writ of habeas corpus, stating that he is to be freed unless the State, within 180 days, initiates a new prosecution. That order was stayed pending the instant appeal.
We are presented with the typical question faced in considering an ineffective assistance claim, i.e., whether the applicant must establish both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland, or whether the second "prejudice" prong is presumed under the exception set forth in Cronic. This is a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo.5 Where, as here, the claim has been reviewed on the merits and denied by the state courts, we will grant the application only where "the state court's conclusions involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court."6
In Strickland the Supreme Court established the test that is generally to be applied in evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; namely, whether the applicant has established that (1) the performance of counsel was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the applicant.7 In Cronic, however, the Court opined that there are some circumstances where the absence, actions, or inactions of counsel compromise the very reliability of the trial process. In such circumstances prejudice to the applicant is presumed because the defendant's sixth amendment...
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