Haynes v. City of Clarksville & Mayor Kim Mcmillan
| Decision Date | 03 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:17-cv-01267,3:17-cv-01267 |
| Parties | SHAWN HAYNES, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CLARKSVILLE and MAYOR KIM MCMILLAN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 24), to which no response has been timely filed, despite extensions of time granted to Plaintiff Haynes' counsel. See Doc. Nos. 32, 36 and 39. No timely response having been filed, the Motion for Summary Judgment shall be deemed to be unopposed. Local Rule 7.01(a)(3). Plaintiff has also failed to file a timely response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts, as required by Local Rule 56.01(b). Therefore, the asserted facts shall be deemed undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. Local Rule 56.01(f).
The Court may not grant Defendants' Motion solely because Plaintiff failed to respond, however. LeMaster v. Alternative Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (citing Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Schools, 138 F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1998)). The Court, at a minimum, is required to examine Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to ensure that they have discharged their initial burden. Id.
The facts, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. No. 26), which are deemed undisputed for purposes of this Motion. Plaintiff is an African-American male veteran and suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). He was hired by the City of Clarksville as a water distribution and wastewater collection assistant on February 4, 2016. The City of Clarksville hired Plaintiff as a probationary employee, in accordance with the probationary employee policy stated in the City of Clarksville Employee Handbook. Plaintiff claims that the managers who hired him knew that he was African-American, was a veteran, and had PTSD.
Under the City's probationary employee policy, each new employee (except firefighters and police officers) is required to serve a probationary period of at least 12 months. Doc. No. 24-4 at 21. The policy expressly states that "at any time during the probationary period, the department head may terminate the employment of any probationary employee within their department, with or without just cause, and said probationary employee shall not be entitled to the due process procedures afforded non-probationary employees." Id. The probationary period gives the supervisor or department head an opportunity to observe the employee on the job, so a determination may be made as to whether the employee is capable and willing to perform the required duties in a satisfactory manner. Id.
As part of his job duties, Plaintiff had to be lowered down into the sewer on a hoist (or harness) and detach himself from the hoist to service the needed area. Plaintiff was unable to detach himself from the hoist because of a pre-existing shoulder injury. Plaintiff's inability to detach himself from the hoist was a big safety issue for the City because the job of performing maintenance in confined spaces required two employees, and if something happened to the other employee, Plaintiff could not detach himself from the hoist to help that employee.
Plaintiff complained to management about certain "pranks" of the other employees on his team that he did not like. Once he complained, the pranks stopped. Plaintiff also complained aboutloud noises on the job that triggered his PTSD. He asked for some kind of warning, if possible, before such noises occurred. Plaintiff's supervisor offered him earplugs and earmuffs to help with the noise, and sometimes Plaintiff wore the ear protection. On March 29, 2016, the City fired Plaintiff, who was still a probationary employee, for lack of initiative, failure to catch on to simple tasks, failure to follow instructions, and being on his cell phone instead of doing the job he was being paid to do. Plaintiff's supervisor observed all these things while he and Plaintiff were on the job.
During his employment, Plaintiff never complained that the pranks being played were played because he was black, because he was a veteran, or because he has PSTD. No one employed by the City made any derogatory remarks to Plaintiff about his race, his veteran status, or his PTSD. In a letter written to the City's Human Resources Manager after his termination, Plaintiff stated that he believed the underlying basis of his termination was his refusal to participate in the team's pranks. He did not state that he believed he was fired because of his race, veteran status, or PTSD.
Plaintiff now alleges (in the Amended Complaint) that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against him based on his race, in violation of 42 U.S. C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"); discriminated and retaliated against him because of his PTSD, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA");1 and violated 38 U.S.C. § 4301, et seq. ("USERRA").2
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "By its very terms,this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In other words, even if genuine, a factual dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 248. On the other hand, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine[.]'" Id.
A fact is "material" within the meaning of Rule 56(c) "if its proof or disproof might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Harris v. Klare, 902 F.3d 630, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2018).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Pittman v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2018). If the summary judgment movant meets that burden, then in response the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 628.
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or genuinely is disputed—i.e., a party seeking summary judgment and a party opposing summary judgment, respectively—must support the assertion by citing to materials in the record, including, but not limited to, depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). On a motion for summary judgment, a party may object that the supporting materials\ specified by its opponent "cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Upon such an objection, the proponent of the supporting material must show that the material is admissible as presented orexplain how it could be presented in a form that would be admissible. Thomas v. Haslam, 303 F. Supp. 3d 585, 624 (M.D. Tenn. 2018); Mangum v. Repp, 2017 WL 57792 at ** 5 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2017) ().
The court should view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Pittman, 901 F.3d at 628. Credibility judgments and weighing of evidence are improper. Hostettler v. College of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir. 2018). As noted above, where there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment is not appropriate. Id. The court determines whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position will be insufficient to survive summary judgment; rather, there must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003).
A plaintiff may use either direct or circumstantial evidence to bring a discrimination claim. Direct evidence is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. Rock v. T.N.H.D. Partners, LLC, 833 F. Supp. 2d 802, 815 (M.D. Tenn. 2011). If the plaintiff has credible direct evidence of discrimination, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to show that it would have terminated the employee even if it had not been motivated by impermissible discrimination. Id.; see also McGee v. Food Warming Equipment, No. 3-14-cv-01776, 2017 WL 587856 at * 2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2017). Plaintiff has presented no direct evidence of discrimination.
If the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, he or she must establish a prima facie case.3 Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If it does so, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's reason was a pretext for discrimination. Sybrandt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 560 F.3d 553, 557-58 (6th Cir. 2009); Monce v. Marshall Cty. Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 3d 805, 814 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). To show pretext, Plaintiff may show that: (1) the proffered reason had no basis in fact, (2) the proffered reason did not actually motivate the action, or (3) the proffered reason was insufficient to warrant the adverse action. Sybrandt, 560 F.3d at 558. Throughout this burden-shifting approach, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving,...
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