Haynes v. Coleman, No. 2070959 (Ala. Civ. App. 4/10/2009)
Decision Date | 10 April 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 2070959.,2070959. |
Parties | Arthur Haynes v. Ron Coleman. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court, (CV-07-900949)
Arthur Haynes appeals from a judgment dismissing his claims against Ron Coleman alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. We affirm.
Haynes was employed as a public-school teacher in Mobile County. The Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County terminated Haynes's employment, pursuant to § 16-24-9, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Teacher Tenure Act, § 16-24-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Pursuant to § 16-24-10, Ala. Code 1975, Haynes appealed his dismissal to a hearing officer, and, following a hearing, the hearing officer reinstated Haynes's employment.
Haynes subsequently sued Coleman, alleging claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, among other claims. The complaint, as amended, alleged that Coleman was an employee of the Mobile County public-school system.1 Haynes's complaint alleged, in pertinent part, that Coleman had "impart[ed] false information to investigators, co-workers, and supervisors, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that the information imparted was false and that it would lead to administrative actions or proceedings being held against [Haynes]."
Coleman moved to dismiss all Haynes's claims on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations barred each of those claims. With the exception of the claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, the trial court dismissed Haynes's claims on the ground that they were time-barred. Regarding the claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, Coleman filed a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss on the ground that those claims could not be based on an administrative proceeding. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and entered a judgment dismissing those two claims. Haynes appealed to supreme court, and that court transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.
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Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1017 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257, 260 (Ala. 2003)).
On appeal, Haynes first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his malicious-prosecution claim because, he says, a malicious-prosecution claim may be based on an administrative proceeding initiated pursuant to the Teacher Tenure Act. "The elements of malicious prosecution are: (1) a judicial proceeding initiated by the defendant, (2) the lack of probable cause, (3) malice, (4) termination in favor of the plaintiff, and (5) damage." Cutts v. American United Life Ins. Co., 505 So. 2d 1211, 1214 (Ala. 1987). Our research reveals no Alabama case recognizing a malicious-prosecution claim premised on an administrative proceeding. Heretofore, it appears that claims of malicious prosecution in Alabama have been based on judicial proceedings only. Haynes argues that this court should recognize a malicious-prosecution claim based on a administrative proceeding. Several jurisdictions have decided that a malicious-prosecution claim may be based on an administrative proceeding under certain circumstances. See Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 425-27 (D.C. Cir. 1942); National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1932); Hillside Assocs. v. Stravato, 642 A.2d 664, 666-69 (R.I. 1994); Lindenman v. Umscheid, 255 Kan. 610, 633, 875 P.2d 964, 979 (1994); DeLaurentis v. City of New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 248-49, 597 A.2d 807, 819 (1991); American Credit Card Tel. Co. v. National Pay Tel. Corp., 504 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Groat v. Town Bd. of Glenville, 73 A.D.2d 426, 428-30, 426 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340-41 (1980); McGuire v. Armitage, 184 Mont. 407, 410-11, 603 P.2d 253, 255 (1979); Donovan v. Barnes, 274 Or. 701, 703-06, 548 P.2d 980, 982-83 (1976); Cassidy v. Cain, 145 Ind. App. 581, 588-89, 251 N.E.2d 852, 856-57 (1969); Kauffman v. A.H. Robins Co., 223 Tenn. 515, 520-27, 448 S.W.2d 400, 402-05 (1969); Carver v. Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 352-54, 137 S.E.2d 139, 145-46 (1964); Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 580-81, 311 P.2d 494, 495-96 (1957); Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 564-66, 117 A.2d 889, 895-96 (1955); and Dixie Broad. Corp. v. Rivers, 209 Ga. 98, 105-06, 70 S.E.2d 734, 740-41 (1952).
We decline to decide whether a malicious-prosecution claim in Alabama may be based on an administrative proceeding because, even if we were to recognize such a claim, Coleman did not initiate the administrative proceeding in this case. As noted, a malicious-prosecution action must be based on a proceeding "initiated by the defendant." Cutts, 505 So. 2d at 1214. We find Davis v. Board of Education of St. Louis, 963 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), to be instructive regarding whether Coleman initiated the administrative proceeding in this case. In Davis, pursuant to Missouri state law, a superintendent of a public-school system suspended a teacher and filed charges against that teacher to a board of education. Id. at 683. Following a hearing, the board of education reinstated the teacher's employment. Id. The teacher subsequently sued, among others, two public-school employees, alleging malicious prosecution. Id. at 684. Before the superintendent filed charges against the teacher, the two school employees had interviewed students, had taken the students' statements, had given those statements to the superintendent, and had made a recommendation to the superintendent. Id. at 686-87.
In Davis, the Missouri Court of Appeals discussed whether the two school-employee defendants had initiated the administrative proceeding against the teacher:
The court in Davis then concluded that the teacher had not established a malicious-prosecution claim against the two school employees because those employees had not instigated the proceedings against the teacher:
963 S.W.2d at 686-87. See also Vandall v. Trinity Hosps., 676 N.W.2d 88, 96 (N.D. 2004) ( ).
In this case, the administrative proceeding regarding Haynes's dismissal was initiated pursuant to § 16-24-9, Ala. Code 1975, which provides, in pertinent part: "(a) An employment contract with a teacher on continuing service status may be cancelled only in the following manner: The superintendent shall give written notice to the employing board and the teacher of the superintendent's intention to recommend a cancellation as provided in Section 16-24-8[, Ala. Code 1975]." The remainder of § 16-24-9 and § 16-24-10, Ala. Code 1975...
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