Haynes v. Crenshaw
| Decision Date | 22 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-437 |
| Citation | 166 F.Supp.3d 764 |
| Parties | Jessie Haynes, Plaintiff, v. Cory Crenshaw, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Maria-Vittoria Galli Carminati, Carminati Law PLLC, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.
Kathleen Marie Kennedy, David Vann de Cordova, Jr, Attorney at Law, Beaumont, TX Christopher Blewer Gilbert, Thompson & Horton LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendants.
Jerry Jordan, Lumberton, TX. pro se.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON WAYNE REAUD'S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001 et. seq.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, on November 10, 2015, the District Court referred this matter to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial management. See Order (doc. # 22). Pending before the Court for purposes of this report is Defendant Wayne Reaud's (“Reaud”) Motion to Dismiss Under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001 et seq. (doc. # 12). Having reviewed the pleadings and the submissions of the parties, the Court recommends that Reaud's motion be GRANTED .
Plaintiff Jessie Haynes (“Haynes” or “Plaintiff”) filed suit on July 30, 2015, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Marshall Division. Original Complaint (doc. # 1). Since her original filing, Haynes has amended twice, with the last occurring on September 9, 2015. Amended Complaint Corrected (doc. # 4). Upon defendants' motion, United States Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne transferred the case from Marshall to the Beaumont Division on November 6, 2015.
Haynes asserts claims of assault, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), and RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) against Defendants Mike Neil (“Neil”), Cory Crenshaw (“Crenshaw”), Jerry Jordan (“Jordan”), Michael Getz (“Getz”), and Reaud.1 Specifically against Reaud, Haynes asserts claims of RICO racketeering and RICO conspiracy. Reaud is the only defendant to file a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, Section 27.001, et seq. (“TCPA”). Accordingly, only Haynes' claims asserted against Reaud are at issue for purposes of this report.
Before the case was transferred to Beaumont, Reaud timely filed the present motion, asking the Court to dismiss Haynes' claims against him under the TCPA. The Court held an oral hearing on the issue on January 14, 2016. Haynes' claims in the present action are largely identical to her claims in another case before the Court, Walker et al. v. Beaumont Independent School District et al., Civil Action No. 1:15–CV–379, filed on July 30, 2015, and referred to the undersigned for pretrial management. Both parties have incorporated their arguments and responses from Walker in their submissions regarding the present motion to dismiss.
Haynes contends that she was assaulted by Neil in a hallway outside of a Beaumont Independent School District (“BISD”) press conference on August 1, 2015.2 At the time, Haynes served as BISD's Communications Director. Haynes states that, during the press conference, she attempted to prevent Jordan, a local reporter, from entering the conference because Haynes believed that her superiors at BISD did not want Jordan to attend. In response, Getz called Haynes a number of derogatory terms, and Neil physically forced Haynes away from the doorway. When Haynes attempted to press charges for the incident, she herself was charged with obstruction of a public passage. She was convicted of this offense at trial, during which Getz, Jordan, and Neil testified. Reaud attended Haynes' trial and sat next to Crenshaw, his purported godson. Crenshaw allegedly spoke with the judge and prosecutor during Haynes' trial and was heard making statements that he had told the prosecutor what to say or do during the prosecution.
Haynes claims that her conviction for obstruction is the result of a RICO enterprise comprised of Jordan, Neil, Getz, Crenshaw, and Reaud created to “further racketeering activities” against her. She asserts that this enterprise and related conspiracy “engaged in a concerted campaign to harass Ms. Haynes, tarnish her reputation, attack her integrity, and threats [sic] of criminal and/or administrative repercussions.” Other alleged actions of the enterprise include Getz and Jordan posting defamatory articles online, Getz's attorney attending a protest at BISD where participants chanted “Fire Jessie now,” and Neil posting false and “hateful” information about Haynes on social media. She also states without factual specifics that the enterprise made threats and committed coercion, witness tampering, and informant tampering.
In 2011, the Texas Legislature enacted the TCPA to “encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” Tex. Civ Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.002 (West 2015). To that end, the TCPA creates an expedited process so defendants can quickly obtain dismissal of “retaliatory lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence them on matters of public concern.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex.2015). A defendant who prevails on a motion to dismiss under the TCPA shall recover court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, expenses, and possible sanctions against the party who brought the claim. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.009(a). Likewise, a plaintiff who prevails against a TCPA motion to dismiss is entitled to recover court costs and attorney's fees if a court finds that the motion to dismiss was frivolous or filed solely to delay. Id. at § 27.009(b). Other federal district courts have concluded that the TCPA is enforceable in a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction3 . See Williams v. Cordillera Commc'ns Inc., No. 2:13–CV–124, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79584, 2014 WL 2611746, at *2 (S.D.Tex. June 11, 2014) ; see also NC D R, L.L.C. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir.2014) (applying TCPA).
A TCPA motion triggers a two-step process; the first step requires the moving defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's claims are “based on, relate to, or [are] in response to the [defendant's] exercise of (1) the right of free speech; (2) the right to petition; or (3) the right of association.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(b) (West 2015); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 586–87 (internal footnotes and citations omitted). Haynes has conceded that the TCPA applies to all of her claims against Reaud and that, additionally, she is a public figure according to the TCPA. Nonetheless, the Court will examine whether the TCPA applies to Haynes' RICO claims against Reaud.
Reaud first argues that Haynes' claims implicate his right of free speech.
Under the TCPA, the “exercise of the right of free speech” means “a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(3) (West 2015). A “ ‘matter of public concern includes an issue related to: (A) health or safety; (B) environmental, economic, or community well-being; (C) the government; (D) a public official or public figure; or (E) a good product or service in the marketplace.” Id. at § 27.001(7). Texas courts have routinely found that a “communication” under the TCPA includes both newspaper articles and oral speech. See, e.g., Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 71, 81 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). Further, in deciding whether a claim “relates to” a defendant's rights of free speech, application of the TCPA is not limited to a plaintiff's defamation claims, but other civil claims based on that defamation, including tortious interference and civil conspiracy. E.g., In re Lipsky, 411 S.W.3d 530, 550 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2013), aff'd 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) ) ( that because the object of the alleged conspiracy was to defame plaintiff, the conspiracy claim related to defendant's right to free speech under the TCPA); Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Servs . , Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) ().
Haynes has conceded that she is a public official under the TCPA. The Court agrees based on her status as the Director of Communications at BISD. Reaud further asserts that she is a “public servant”. “Public servant” means a Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(9)(A). Her claims appear connected to her role as Communications Director for BISD because the core of Haynes' RICO claims is that she was targeted by a RICO enterprise and conspiracy after she publically supported BISD Superintendent Carroll Thomas and prevented Jordan from entering the BISD press conference. She alleges that this enterprise, led by Reaud, engaged in a campaign to harass her and tarnish her reputation. The enterprise allegedly accused Haynes of defrauding BISD out of the amount of her salary when she took a leave of absence after the BISD press conference; impugned her reputation, honesty, and fitness for work at BISD; mocked her on social media about the press conference and obstruction conviction; and marched down the hallways of BISD chanting “Fire Jessie now. “4 Reaud argues, therefore, that Haynes' claims implicate his rights of free speech to the...
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