Haynes v. Cupp, 83-3863

• Decision Date: 02 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 83-3863,83-3863
• Parties: Charles Leroy HAYNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hoyt C. CUPP, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 435

827 F.2d 435

Charles Leroy HAYNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hoyt C. CUPP, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83-3863.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 9, 1984.

Resubmitted May 27, 1987.

Decided Sept. 2, 1987.

Terrance P. Gough, Eugene, Or., for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert E. Barton, Salem, Or., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before KENNEDY and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges, and INGRAM, ^* District Judge.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:

Charles Leroy Haynes appeals the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims that state authorities placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense, breached their plea agreement, and engaged in serious misconduct during the proceedings against him. We reject these contentions and affirm.

In 1978 Oregon indicted Haynes for murder. ¹ The indictment alleged that he "intentionally cause[d] the death of Pamela Lee Bruno." Following denial of a suppression motion, he agreed to a stipulated facts trial on the murder charge.

The judge presiding over the stipulated facts trial found Haynes guilty of intentional murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed, State v. Haynes, 40 Or.App. 129, 594 P.2d 436 (1979), but the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed, finding denial of the suppression motion improper. State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 2175, 64 L.Ed.2d 802 (1980).

In 1981 Oregon reindicted Haynes for murder. This time the indictment charged that he "intentionally cause[d] the death of Pamela Lee Bruno in the course of and in ... furtherance of committing and attempting to commit Rape and Sodomy in the First Degree ... having personally stabbed, dismembered, and killed [her]." Following a jury trial, he was convicted of intentional murder, acquitted of felony murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The court of appeals affirmed, State v. Haynes, 56 Or.App. 592, 643 P.2d 424 (1982), and the state supreme court denied review, leaving his conviction intact. State v. Haynes, 293 Or. 235, 648 P.2d 852 (1982). Haynes then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1982). Adopting the magistrate's recommendation, the district court declined to issue the writ. Haynes now appeals.

He first contends that he was subjected to multiple prosecutions for the same offenses, in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Specifically, he claims that he was prosecuted for aggravated murder and felony murder after being acquitted of those charges at his first trial. Whether the alleged violations resulted in injury redressible in the federal courts is unclear, for he was not convicted of either offense. He claims, however, that the presence of these charges adversely affected tactical decisions during his second trial. He does not document these decisions, and we remain unsure that his claim would entitle him to federal habeas corpus relief in any event. Because the record does not conclusively rebut his allegations of injury, however, we consider the substance of his double jeopardy claims.

Under Oregon law at the time, criminal homicide constituted murder when

(a) it [was] committed intentionally by a person who [was] not under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance; or

(b) it [was] committed by a person acting either alone or with one or more persons, who commit[ed] or attempt[ed] to commit ... rape in the first degree ... or sodomy in the first degree.

Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 163.115(1) (1977). The sentence for murder, be it intentional, section 163.115(1)(a), or felony murder, section 163.115(1)(b), was life imprisonment.

A more severe punishment was set for the crime of aggravated murder, which was a criminal homicide in which

(d) [t]he defendant personally committed the homicide in the course or in the furtherance of ... any sexual offense specified in ORS chapter 163.

Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 163.095(2)(d) (1977). ² The sentence for this crime was life imprisonment with a mandatory period of incarceration of twenty years. Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 163.105(2) (1977).

Intentional murder is a lesser included offense of aggravated murder. Riley v. Cupp, 56 Or.App. 467, 642 P.2d 333, 335, review denied, 293 Or. 146, 651 P.2d 143 (1982). Under prevailing double jeopardy principles, conviction of a lesser included offense precludes trial on the greater offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). Thus if the state had tried Haynes for aggravated murder after his conviction for intentional murder, it likely would have violated the double jeopardy clause. See id. at 165 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. at 2225 n. 5 (distinguishing between retrial after conviction and retrial after reversal of conviction).

The state, however, did not try Haynes for aggravated murder at either the first or second trial. Though the resubmitted indictment would have supported an aggravated murder prosecution, the state did not proceed on that charge. The statutory reference at the foot of the resubmitted indictment is not clear on this point, but the ruling on the motion to dismiss, the course of the trial, and the verdict forms used by the jury all demonstrate that aggravated murder was never in issue.

Felony murder was in issue at the second trial, but lawfully so. A conviction for one offense may result in an implied acquittal of another, Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190, 78 S.Ct. 221, 225 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), but that did not occur here. A conviction may effect an acquittal of another offense only if the conviction "actually represents a resolution (in the defendant's favor) ... of some or all of the factual elements of the [other offense]." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977)). A conviction after a plea of guilty and an agreement with the government does not necessarily produce such a resolution, because the judge considers the defendant's guilt or innocence only with respect to the specific charge in the agreement. United States v. Barker, 681 F.2d 589, 592 (9th Cir.1982). The same is true of the stipulated facts trial here. The judge considered Haynes' guilt or innocence only with respect to the intentional murder charge in the stipulation. He did not reach any conclusions about the felony murder charge, nor did he acquit and thereby determine facts in favor of the accused, nor did he find guilt of any lesser included offense of felony murder. As a result, the felony murder prosecution that followed did not contradict the earlier proceedings or offend the double jeopardy clause.

As it relates to aggravated murder, then, Haynes' double jeopardy claim fails because no prosecution for that offense occurred at any point. As it relates to felony murder, his claim fares no better, for the second prosecution was lawful.

Haynes next contends that prosecution for aggravated murder or felony murder violated his plea agreement. In view of our conclusion that no aggravated murder prosecution occurred, we need consider the argument only as it relates to felony murder.

Haynes claims the state agreed to forego a felony murder prosecution if he submitted to a stipulated facts trial on the intentional murder charge. The state, in contrast, claims it only agreed to refrain from seeking an enhanced sentence under the aggravated murder statute. As the agreement was not reduced to writing, we must reconstruct it from the record before us.

In establishing the terms of the agreement, we defer to the findings of the Oregon courts. See Ricketts v. Adamson, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 2683 n. 3, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Their construction of the agreement must remain...