Haynes v. Jason Williams ).

• Decision Date: 30 September 2010
• Docket Number: 1081257.
• Citation: 58 So.3d 761
• Parties: Ex parte Kristie HAYNES.(In re Kristie Haynesv.Jason Williams et al.).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

58 So.3d 761

Ex parte Kristie HAYNES.(In re Kristie Haynes

v.Jason Williams et al.).

1081257.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 30, 2010.

Frank R. Farish and Timothy Holdefer of Law Offices of Frank R. Farish, Birmingham, for petitioner.W. Casey Duncan, Conrad M. Fowler, Jr., and William R. Justice, Columbiana, for respondentsSam's Trucking, Inc., James Casey, and Casey Trucking, Inc. MURDOCK, Justice.

Kristie Haynes petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to set aside its order granting the defendants' motion to set aside the default judgment entered against them on Haynes's complaint in an action resulting from a vehicle collision and alleging negligence and wantonness.We grant the petition and issue the writ.

I.Facts and Procedural History

Though not stated directly, it appears from the submissions filed in conjunction with Haynes's petition that she was involved in a vehicle collision with a truck driven by Jason Williams, who was apparently employed by and working in the line and scope of his employment with Sam's Trucking, Inc.(“Sam's Trucking”), at the time of the accident.Sam's Trucking is a corporate affiliate of Casey Trucking, Inc.(“Casey Trucking”), and both operated out of the same premises and are owned by defendantJames Casey.

Haynes sued Williams, Casey, Sam's Trucking, and Casey Trucking on October 26, 2006,¹ alleging that she sustained severe injuries to her spine and neck as a result of a vehicle collision caused, she alleged, by the defendants' negligence and wantonness.Haynes stated that her medical expenses for her injuries were $39,500.She alleged that she sustained pain and suffering, permanent physical impairment, loss of employment, loss of income, and loss of quality of life and that she suffered mental anguish as a result of the accident.Haynes requested $350,000 in total damages for her injuries.

The complaint was served on the following dates: on Sam's Trucking on November 28, 2006; on Williams on July 8, 2007; on Casey on August 6, 2007; on Casey Trucking on September 10, 2007.For reasons not explained in the submissions before us, none of the defendants filed responsive pleadings to the complaint.Accordingly, Haynes filed for and received from the trial court an entry of default judgment against all the defendants on January 15, 2008.The trial court awarded Haynes her requested damages of $350,000.

On February 14, 2008, the defendants filed a “Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment,” in which they requested “pursuant to Rule 55(c),Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure,” that the trial court set aside its January 15, 2008, order of default judgment.The motion provided the following explanation as the sole ground for the requested relief:

“5.The undersigned is aware of and concedes that no responsive pleading has been filed on behalf of his clients, the Defendants in the instant case.However, that failure to answer, plead or otherwise defend is purely a matter of oversight on the part of the attorney and is/was inadvertent.

“6.The Defendants should not be punished for their attorney's excusable neglect.They are prepared to go forward with this litigation.”

The motion was not accompanied by any exhibits or a brief containing an argument in support of the motion.

Haynes filed a response to the defendants' motion to set aside the default judgment in which she noted that the motion “merely sets forth bare legal conclusions without factual support.”In conjunction with this observation, she noted that the defendants did not argue that they were entitled to relief under any of the three factors for setting aside a default judgment articulated by this Court in Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc.,524 So.2d 600(Ala.1988).²

Despite Haynes's objections, the trial court entered an order on June 5, 2008, purporting to set aside the default judgment against the defendants.The following day, Haynes filed a “Motion to Rescind”the trial court's June 5, 2008, order pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.³ Haynes observed that the trial court had entered its order more than 90 days after the defendants had filed their motion to set aside the default judgment, and that there had been no agreement between the parties to extend the time under which the trial court could rule on the motion.Therefore, Haynes argued, the defendants' motion to set aside the default judgment was denied by operation of law on May 14, 2008.

Five months later, on November 10, 2008, the trial court entered an order granting Haynes's motion to rescind the court's June 5, 2008, order purporting to set aside the default judgment, and it reinstated its previous order of default.The order also provided that “the Court is considering Defendants' Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment as a 60(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion.”Haynes filed two responses objecting to the trial court's construing the defendants' motion to set aside the default judgment as a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion.She again noted that the motion failed to set forth substantive reasons why the defendants were entitled to have the default judgment set aside under the Kirtland factors.She also stated various reasons why she believed the defendants were not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.

On December 24, 2008, the defendants filed what they styled “Defendants' Argument and Citations to Authority in Support of Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.”In this motion, the defendants contended, for the first time, that they were entitled to have the default judgment set aside under the Kirtland factors.The defendants attached to this filing an affidavit from an alleged eyewitness to the accident as well as records from the Calera Fire and Rescue Department indicating that Haynes had refused medical treatment and transport to a hospital at the scene—intending to show their meritorious defense.The filing also included arguments and authorities for why the defendants believed that the trial court possessed the authority to construe their original motion to set aside the default judgment as a Rule 60(b) motion.

On June 11, 2009, the trial court entered an order treating the defendants' motion as a Rule 60(b) motion and granting that motion, i.e., setting aside the default judgment.Haynes petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to set aside that order.

II.Standard of Review

“When considering a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling a trial court to vacate an order setting aside a default judgment, the standard this Court applies is whether, in setting aside the default judgment, the trial court exceeded its discretion.”Ex parte Bolen,915 So.2d 565, 568(Ala.2005).

III.Analysis

Haynes contends that the trial court exceeded its discretion in construing the defendants' Rule 55(c) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion.Haynes argues that once the defendants' “Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment” was denied by operation of law under Rule 59.1, on May 14, 2008, the defendants' remedy was to appeal—a remedy that the defendants failed to pursue.

The defendants contend that the trial court acted appropriately because, they say, their “Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment” was a Rule 55(c) motion or, alternatively, a Rule 60(b) motion.The defendants acknowledge that the motion itself stated that it was being filed “pursuant to Rule 55(c),” but they also note that the motion states that the failure to file a responsive pleading was the result of “oversight” and “their attorney's excusable neglect” and that it was “inadvertent.”They argue that “these contentions are clearly consistent with Rule 60(b)(1)” and that, after seeking relief under Rule 55(c), the defendants sought relief in the alternative under Rule 60(b)(1).More specifically, the defendants contend that when their Rule 55(c) motion was denied by operation of law, it “quickened” the Rule 60(b) aspect of the motion, allowing it to be considered by the trial court.For support, the defendants cite Ex parte Lang,500 So.2d 3, 4–5(Ala.1986), in which this Court stated, in pertinent part:

“It is clear that under our Rules of Civil Procedure the nomenclature of a motion is not controlling.Ex parte Hartford Ins. Co.,394 So.2d 933(Ala.1981).Notwithstanding the designation in its title, the document filed on October 7, 1985, was clearly a Rule 60(b) motion(albeit, prematurely filed) seeking relief under grounds (1) and (6); the trial court properly treated it as such.The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure do not contemplate the filing of a Rule 60(b) motion during the pendency of a Rule 55(c) motion.But while the Rules do not contemplate it, they do not preclude it, either.Under Rule 59.1, the Rule 55(c) motion was denied as a matter of law on November 26, 1985(90 days after August 28, 1985); upon that denial, the default judgment of August 12 became ‘final’ within the contemplation of Rule 60(b)—‘[o]n motion ... the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment’—and the court was free to consider the Rule 60(b) motion, which had been theretofore premature.We consider that the Rule 60(b) motion was quickened and became a pending motion as of November 27, 1985, without the necessity of a refiling.Thus, the court had jurisdiction of that motion at the time of its order granting the motion on December 3, 1985.”⁴

Lang involved successive Rule 55(c)andRule 60(b) motions, but as the defendants observe, this Court subsequently allowed an alternative Rule 55(c)andRule 60(b) motion in Ex parte Vaughan,539 So.2d 1060, 1061(Ala.1989).As the Court of Civil Appeals has succinctly explained:

“[W]hile it frowns upon the practice, Alabama law allows a party to join a request for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) with a request for a post-judgment remedy affected by Rule 59.1's 90–day ‘automatic denial.’SeeEx parte Vaughan,539 So.2d 1060(Ala.1989).In Vaughan, our...