Haynes v. Lemann
| Decision Date | 27 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:95CV89-B-O.,2:95CV89-B-O. |
| Citation | 921 F. Supp. 385 |
| Parties | Robert L. HAYNES, Plaintiff, v. Nicholas LEMANN, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Random House, Inc., Vintage Books, Anthony Geffen, British Broadcasting Corp., and Does, 1 Thru 50 Inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Robert L. Haynes, Los Angeles, CA, pro se.
John C. Henegan, Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Jackson, MS, James A. Klenk, Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, Chicago, IL, for defendants.
This cause is presently before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Upon due consideration of the motion, the pro se plaintiff's response thereto, the affidavits and the memoranda submitted by the parties, the court is prepared to rule.
This is the plaintiff's second attempt to sue the author and publisher of The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America ("The Promised Land"). The defendant Nicholas Lemann wrote the book and it was published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. ("Knopf"). The book recounts the Twentieth Century migration of millions of African-Americans from the cotton fields of the Deep South to Chicago and the origin of the Great Society social programs of the 1960's. The narrative is presented from two perspectives — the politicians' and the migrant families'.
One of the principal migrants depicted in The Promised Land is Ruby Daniels Haynes. Ruby Haynes' life history, including her experience as a single welfare mother trying to raise eight children in a housing project in Chicago, is told throughout two chapters of the book. Plaintiff Robert Haynes is one of Ruby Haynes' eight children. The book was published on February 15, 1991, and by March made the non-fiction best seller lists of the Chicago Tribune and The Washington Post.
On March 12, 1993, the plaintiff filed a four-count complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court against defendants Lemann and Knopf. Count I of the original complaint claimed that The Promised Land defamed the plaintiff by reporting that he was "kicked out" of the Navy and was a member of a gang while a teenager in Chicago. Count II claimed the book invaded the plaintiff's privacy by the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts (i.e., that he lost his virginity in a stairwell at the Robert Taylor Homes, a Chicago housing project; fathered illegitimate children; and was an alcoholic). Count III alleged that Defendant Lemann and the plaintiff had an oral agreement to pay the plaintiff "upon publication of the book," and Count IV claimed quantum meruit for the value of the plaintiff's "services" when he was interviewed in April of 1990.
The original defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, invoking diversity jurisdiction as the basis for the district court's removal jurisdiction.
After a hearing before Chief Judge Manual Real on November 2, 1993, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in an order entered on November 10, 1993. The district court found that the March 12, 1993 complaint was untimely, specifically, that the libel and privacy claims were barred by the one-year California statute of limitations on those actions, and by the two-year statute on oral contracts and quantum meruit claims.
The district court further held that the libel and privacy claims failed to state a claim on the merits. First, the documentation and admissions of the original defendants established the substantial truth of the alleged defamations. Moreover, the alleged defamations were not defamatory on their face; and there were no "special damages." As for the privacy claim, the district court held that the plaintiff could have no such claim because the "disclosures" complained of were not truly private facts and were logically connected to a newsworthy subject of public interest. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting only the time-barred nature of the actions.
The present cause was filed on May 12, 1995, in the Circuit Court of Coahoma County, Mississippi. After service of the complaint, defendant Lemann timely removed the case to this court, basing jurisdiction on both diversity of citizenship and the federal question posed by the plaintiff's copyright claim.
The allegations of the complaint about the book in the present case are virtually identical to those in the original action. The plaintiff complains here again of statements in The Promised Land that he was a gang member and was kicked out of the Navy (Libel, Count I); and that he lost his virginity in a stairwell, fathered illegitimate children, and was a recovering alcoholic (Invasion of Privacy, Count III). The plaintiff also alleges the existence of the same oral agreement with defendant Lemann (Breach of Agreement, Count III), and/or his entitlement to quantum meruit from all defendants based on "services" he allegedly provided them (Quantum Meruit, Count V). Finally, the plaintiff asserts new claims of Misappropriation of Likeness for Profit (Count IV) and Copyright (Count VI) which are also based on the publication of material about him in the book.
In February 1995, the Discovery Channel aired a documentary film, produced by defendants British Broadcasting Corporation ("BBC") and Anthony Geffen, based on the book The Promised Land. According to the defendants, the film of the same name does not mention the plaintiff, his family, or any "literary works" owned by the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the plaintiff alleges that the film defamed him, invaded his privacy, misappropriated his likeness, infringed on his copyright, and owes him money in quantum meruit for reproducing "a service on cable television of The Promised Land that remains unpaid from the original agreement between the plaintiff and Lemann...."
The defendants contend that the actions against the book defendants are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. Furthermore, they claim that the actions against the film defendants fail to create a genuine issue of material fact and thus are appropriate for summary judgment. Additionally, the defendants assert that many of the claims are time-barred under Mississippi statutes of limitations.
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel deal with the question of whether the adjudication of certain matters is precluded by a prior adjudication. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889 n. 6, 72 L.Ed.2d 262, 270 n. 6 (1982). Under the doctrine of res judicata, parties and their privies are precluded from relitigating claims that were or should have been raised in a prior action and have reached a final judgment on the merits. Metro Charities, Inc. v. Moore, 748 F.Supp. 1156, 1159 (S.D.Miss. 1990); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2427, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); see also Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948) (); Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876) (same).
Collateral estoppel is a derivative of res judicata with a more narrow focus. While res judicata encompasses questions which might have been litigated, collateral estoppel applies only to questions actually litigated in a prior suit. Metro Charities, 748 F.Supp. at 1160. Once a court has decided an issue essential to its judgment, collateral estoppel precludes the issue from being relitigated in another suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first cause. Metro Charities, 748 F.Supp. at 1159. The doctrine has the effect of establishing conclusively questions of law or fact that have received a final judgment for the purposes of a later suit. In addition to protecting litigants from the burden of relitigation, collateral estoppel serves the purpose of promoting judicial economy. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 601 F.Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.Miss. 1984).
Federal law determines the preclusive effect of a prior federal court judgment. RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir.1995); Russell v. SunAmerica Sec. Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1992). Under federal standards, there are four necessary criteria that must be met for res judicata to apply:
United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir.1994).
Clearly, the district court in California had jurisdiction over the original diversity action and entered a final judgment on the merits, thus satisfying two of the four requirements. See Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 399, 101 S.Ct. at 2428 (); Lamb v. Equifax Services, Inc., 620 F.Supp. 1457 (E.D.Mo. 1985) (). The decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Haynes v. Lemann, No. 94-55126, 1995 WL 241489 (9th Cir. April 19, 1995).1 The court thus examines the two identity elements — parties and claims — as they relate to the original defendants, the new book defendants and the film defendants.
The plaintiff and the original defendants (Lemann and Knopf) were parties to the California case. The four counts of the original complaint were revived by the plaintiff and again directed at these defendants....
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Icon Indus. Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc.
-
Pisharodi v. Betancourt, No. 13-06-479-CV (Tex. App. 1/10/2008)
...Laboratories to bar action by plaintiff as res judicata although plaintiff sued additional defendants); see also Haynes v. Lemann, 921 F.Supp. 385, 390 (D. Miss. 1995) (applying res judicata in favor of defendants although plaintiff sued others in second lawsuit); cf. Richards v. Jefferson ......
- Haynes v. Lemann