Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n

• Decision Date: 12 December 1950
• Docket Number: No. 47745,47745
• Citation: 45 N.W.2d 151,241 Iowa 1269
• Parties: HAYNES v. PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL ASS'N.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 151

45 N.W.2d 151

241 Iowa 1269

HAYNES v. PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL ASS'N.

No. 47745.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 12, 1950.

John C. Gates, Waterloo, for appellant.

Pike, Sias, Butler & Hoxie, Waterloo, for appellee.

HAYS, Justice.

This appeal presents a single question, namely, Is a charitable institution liable for damages for the negligence of its employees in administering the Charity?

The facts are stipulated. Defendant, a corporation not for pecuniary profit and organized under what is now Chapter 504, Code 1946, I.C.A., owns and operates the Presbyterian Hospital at Waterloo, Iowa. Plaintiff, while a paying patient therein, was injured through the alleged negligence of nurses there employed. Plaintiff seeks damages on account thereof. The trial court dismissed his petition and he appeals.

This is not a case of first impression, the identical issue having been before this court on two occasions. In both instances the decision was adverse to plaintiff's claim herein, and in accord with the ruling now before us. Appellant recognizes this fact but asserts that those decisions are not in accord with the modern trend and wrong in principle and asks that we re-examine the question.

The proposition was first before this court in the case of Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 1918, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N.W. 219. There we recognized the great diversity of opinion among the courts on this question and the varied reasons upon which the immunity is based, by those states granting the same. The trust theory, the implied waiver theory, the nonapplicability of the respondeat superior maxim, and the public policy theory were discussed. Without approving, or disapproving, any one of the various theories, we said, 183 Iowa at page 1382, 168 N.W. at page 220, 'We think the great weight of authority is to the effect that an institution of this kind is exempted from liability to one who comes to it and accepts the benefits of its charity, to a patient received for treatment, so far as liability is predicated on the negligence of its servants in administering the charity'. The fact that plaintiff was a pay patient was deemed to be immaterial. Recovery was denied.

The general question of immunity of charitable institutions was next before this court in the case of Andrews v. Young Mens C. A., 1939, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186. The case differs from the instant one, in that the plaintiff, a WPA worker working on the defendant's premises, was held not to be a beneficiary of the charity. Liability due to the negligence of defendant's employees was upheld. We will refer to this case later herein.

In Servison v. Young Mens C.A., 1941, 230 Iowa 86, 296 N.W. 769, the identical situation was again before this court. In a very brief opinion and with no attempt to analyze the question, or the authorities, this court said, 230 Iowa at page 87, 296 N.W. at page 769, 'That appellant cites a large number of authorities which we are not called on here to analyze. This case is ruled by Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N.W. 219, which sustains the ruling of a trial court'. Liability was denied.

Thus in the two instances where this precise question has been before this court it has recognized the great diversity of opinion among the courts on this question, and likewise the varied and different reasons which have been assigned by the courts as a basis for granting immunity. It then accepted what it deemed to be the majority rule, as the rule in Iowa, without determining and adopting a specific basis or reason therefor.

In Andrews v. Young Mens C.A., supra, this court, Justice Bliss speaking, made an exhaustive analysis of the various theories, both pro and con, advanced by the different courts and denied the immunity claim. While the facts therein are different in that the plaintiff was held not to be a beneficiary of the charity, as in the instant case, it is clear that this court deemed the entire question of immunity to be before the court, as it said, 226 Iowa at pages 382-383, 284 N.W. at page 191. 'The appellant claims the right to this exemption and bottoms the existence of this immunity upon all of the above stated theories, advocated as the foundation for it, towit: (1) The trust fund theory; (2) The nonapplicability of the rule of respondeat superior to it; (3) The waiver theory; and (4) The public policy theory. It is thus apparent that the question of the immunity of a public charity institution for its negligence, in all of its relations, and in all of its phases, is before us.'

The 'trust fund' theory, the oldest and perhaps the Granddaddy of them all, is that the institution was created by donations for strictly charitable use. To make such funds subject to damages on account of the negligence of its employees, is to deplete the funds and thwart the purpose of the donors.

The 'nonapplicability of the respondeat superior maxim' theory is that the corporation, being not for pecuniary profit, receives no benefits from the work of its employees.

The 'waiver' theory is that one who becomes a beneficiary of the charity does so with knowledge that the assets of the institution are not available in damages, in the event of injury through the negligence of its employees.

The 'public policy' theory is that it is deemed better for the public at large, that the individual bear his injury, rather than that the institution should be liable in damages.

After a careful analysis of each theory, it is said, again referring to the Andrews case, 226 Iowa at page 412, 284 N.W. at page 206, 'The various doctrines which have been advocated in support of the immunity which we are considering, other than the public policy theory, have little of inherent or real merit to recommend them. They are but legal fictions which the courts have announced to make effective an immunity which they have conceived to be a demand of sound public policy.' Thus in so far as immunity of charitable institutions for negligence of its employees is recognized in this state, it is based on the public policy theory. While 226 Iowa at page 384, 284 N.W. at page 192 we say: 'The next question for determination is whether the deceased was a beneficiary of the charity * * *. For if he was such a beneficiary, then that is an end of this case under the authority of the Mikota case, and of the majority of the authorities...