Haynes v. State

• Decision Date: 09 March 1976
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 406
• Citation: 335 So.2d 203
• Parties: Grover Jesse HAYNES v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 203

335 So.2d 203

Grover Jesse HAYNES v. STATE.

7 Div. 406.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 9, 1976.

Rehearing Denied June 1, 1976.

Donald W. Stewart, Anniston, for appellant.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Sam L. Webb, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

CATES, Presiding Judge.

Haynes appeals from his conviction of receiving, etc., a stolen automobile. ¹ The trial judge sentenced him to ten years in the penitentiary.

The indictment, in essential parts, charged as follows:

'* * * GRAVER HAYNES alias G. J. HAYNES alias GEEK HAYNES alias GROVER JESSE HAYNES alias JEEK HAYNES, whose name is to the Grand Jury otherwise unknown, did Buy, Receive, Conceal, or Aid in Concealing one (1) 1967 Cadillac automobile, vehicle identification number L7254208, a better description of which being unknown to the Grand Jury, of the total value, of, to-wit: $1400.00 the personal property of Arthur McPeters, knowing that the same had been stolen, or having reasonable grounds for believing same had been stolen, and not having the intent to restore it to the owner, * * *'

I

Jean Robinson, a resident of Talladega, testified for the State that in June, 1973, she bought from Mr. Haynes a 1967 Cadillac for $800.00 and traded him another car. The Cadillac was unsatisfactory; she returned it and got another car instead. The bill of sale for this car stated that the Motor Number was K-71884056. This number was apparently the same as one taken off a wrecked Cadillac which Haynes had bought from an insurance adjuster.

In February of 1974 Lt. Hardigree, of the State Department of Public Safety, came to see Mrs. Robinson inquiring about the transaction whereunder she had bought the Cadillac. On cross examination, she described the car as a white Cadillac with a black vinyl top. She did not remember much else about the car's description because she didn't keep it very long.

Lt. Hardigree took the stand on behalf of the State and testified that on, or about, February 9, 1974, he went to see Mrs. Robinson in Talladega at her place of work and saw the car which she said Haynes had sold her. The vehicle identification number usually found near the windshield bore the number K-71884056. Later the same car was found in Atlanta with these public numbers, but also had certain confidential VIN marks which reflected the identity of a different Cadillac which had been earlier stolen from Mr. Arthur McPeters of Gadsden, sometime around June 14, 1973.

After Hardigree had examined, in a cursory fashion, Mrs. Robinson's Cadillac, in Talladega, he went back later to make a further examination and discovered that it had been moved from its parking place. It seems that Haynes, because of Mrs. Robinson's complaint, had come to Talladega and removed it. When Hardigree returned to Anniston to see the car in Haynes's possession, Haynes reported that it had gone to Roanoke for some additional work and was to be returned to Haynes's shop. This eventuality never came into being. The next time Hardigree found the car it was in Atlanta, where it had been impounded by the police. McPeters identified it as his, by certain catsup stains on the upholstery and some unfinished wiring in the trunk.

Haynes testified in his own behalf describing his calling thus:

'I am in the automobile garage, salvage, and parts business (for) twenty-eight years. I buy wrecked automobiles, salvage them for the parts. I also buy wrecked automobiles that are repairable and have them repaired, occasionally. I do not repair them in my shop.'

He explained that he did not examine the VIN numbers on the wrecked Cadillac he bought from the adjuster. After he took the car back from Mrs. Robinson he sold it to Ross McKleroy. McKleroy did not testify. No license tag transfer to him in the probate judge's office was produced. See Code 1940 T. 51, § 706, as amended, which was in Patterson v. State, 45 Ala.App. 229, 228 So.2d 843, construed to be in aid of 'police, injured persons and tax officials.'

We do not consider this explanation so cogent that every reasonable jury would as a matter of law have been required to credit it as a reasonable explanation of Haynes's recent possession of stolen property and thus give him an acquittal.

His failure to ascertain what the VIN number was partakes of what Glanville Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part (2d ed.) § 57, describes as wilfull blindness. As a dealer in auto salvage Haynes was in an area where pilferers seek out witting or unwitting fences. To shut his eyes as to a VIN is a fact which a jury may have before them in weighing the reasonableness of his explanation of the stolen Cadillac.

'* * * The evidence against Spivey of the altered number plates, of the discrepancies in bills of sale and other surrounding circumstances, together with the permissible inference from his possession of recently stolen automobiles sufficed to meet the stated test. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government the evidence was sufficient to establish appellant's guilt. Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680.' United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 1061 (5 Cir. 1975)

'* * * A summary of State Police Sergeant George Meyers' testimony is that he took into custody the station wagon because a vehicle that fitted its description had been reported as stolen, and this information was obtained when the motor company filed a stolen car report at the time of the theft with the State Police. That report showed the serial number, and Meyers knew the confidential number is composed of the last five digits of the serial number. This officer checked the serial number of the machine in controversy and found it did not compare with any number listed for a stolen vehicle. In fact, the number corresponded with that of a 1947 station wagon for which appellant had a bill of sale.

'But this officer, having with him a report on a stolen 1958 station wagon and believing the car under examination to be a 1958 model rather than a 1947 one, as stated on appellant's bill of sale, contacted either the National Auto Bureau or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the only two agencies from which such information can be obtained) for the location on the car of the confidential number of the 1958 model reported as stolen. He obtained this information, checked on the station wagon the place given him, found the confidential number of the 1958 stolen vehicle on the station wagon in appellant's possession, and thereby obtained knowledge that this was the car taken from the lot of the motor company. From the above evidence, it is shown it is easy to remove or change any public number on a motor vehicle but that only by chance could a thief find and alter the confidential number.

'We believe the foregoing testimony * * * makes out a case against appellant that will sustain the verdict of the jury.' Bower v. Commonwealth, Ky., 357 S.W.2d 333.

The subject of 'recently stolen' has been the topic of much judicial writing. In Davenport v. State, 53 Ala.App. 326, 299 So.2d 767, the word 'recent' was described (as is any measure of time not expressed in hours, days or other units based on the earth's rotation and orbiting) as relative in concept--both as to the passage of time and the type of property. Automobiles offer a peculiar example: virtually all are publicly registered, their utility makes them notoriously visible and their lawful transfer requires some red tape. See Burroughs v. State (Fla.Dist.App.) 221 So.2d 159.

In Smitherman v. State, 33 Ala.App. 316, 33 So.2d 396, the opinion recognized the ordinary rule that remoteness of time affects weight rather than admissibility. However, it recognized a threshold question of law--when objection is interposed, viz:

* * * the tendered evidence must not be so remote in point of time as to be without causal connection or logical relation to the main event. * * *'

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