Haynes v. State, No. 2005-KA-00722-SCT.

• Decision Date: 08 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2005-KA-00722-SCT.
• Citation: 934 So.2d 983
• Parties: Justin HAYNES v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 983

934 So.2d 983

Justin HAYNES v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2005-KA-00722-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 8, 2006.

Rehearing Denied August 10, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edward C. Fenwick, Kosciusko, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Jose Benjamin Simo, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

SMITH, Chief Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. After an Attala County grand jury indicted sixteen-year-old Justin Haynes on charges of murder, sexual battery, and arson, venue was transferred to Rankin County. Haynes was tried and found guilty of murder, sexual battery, and first degree arson, and sentenced to consecutive sentences of life for murder, thirty years for sexual battery, and twenty years for first degree arson. Haynes subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, judgment not withstanding the verdict, which motions were denied.

¶ 2. Aggrieved, Haynes appeals to this Court, contending (1) the court erred in changing venue to Rankin County and in denying his motion to quash the venire, which was composed of only twelve percent African-American jurors in a county with a seventeen percent African-American population; (2) the court erred in failing to suppress Haynes' confession to law enforcement officers after he invoked his right to counsel; and (3) the evidence did not support the judgment.

FACTS

¶ 3. In the early morning hours of February 9, 2004, a newspaper delivery woman reported a house on fire on South Huntington Street in Kosciusko, Mississippi. Kosciusko Police Officer Carl Black and Kosciusko Firefighter Mark Hill, were some of the first responders to arrive at the house. Officer Black testified smoke was originating from the rear of the house, and that he noticed window screens located on the back of the home had been removed, as well as a broken window pane located in the back door. Officer Black also testified that he found a note in the driveway which read, "[d]o not say anything unless the note tells you. Shake your head yes when you finish reading this note." After extinguishing the fire, Hill and other officials discovered the body of fifty-nine-year-old Jeanette Nowell, a paraplegic, lying on her bed. Even though slash wounds were found on Nowell's neck the pathologist listed Nowell's primary cause of death as smoke inhalation.

¶ 4. Later that morning, Kosciusko Police Officer Matt Steed was eating at a McDonald's restaurant when Haynes, a McDonald's employee, approached him and said that he knew "who killed that lady last night." Officer Steed testified that Haynes told him that Barry Love was responsible and then Haynes described in detail how Love broke into the house and killed Nowell. Police investigator Curtis Pope testified Haynes repeated the same story to him, and that Haynes subsequently confessed that he, not Love, committed the crime. Physical evidence found at the crime scene, including fingerprints and seminal fluid, corroborated Haynes' confession.

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN CHANGING VENUE TO RANKIN COUNTY AND IN DENYING HAYNES' MOTION TO QUASH THE VENIRE.

¶ 5. Haynes first argues that the trial should not have been transferred to Rankin County, a county where black citizens constitute only seventeen percent of the demographic, as compared to Attala County, whose black citizens make up forty percent of the demographic. Instead, Haynes argues his trial should have been moved to a county with similar racial demographics as Attala County.

¶ 6. However, "a defendant has no right to a change of venue to a jurisdiction with certain racial demographics." Mitchell v. State, 886 So.2d 704, 709 (Miss. 2004) (citing De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So.2d 547, 597 (Miss.1997)); see also Simon v. State, 633 So.2d 407, 412 (Miss. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 513 U.S. 956, 115 S.Ct. 413, 130 L.Ed.2d 329 (1994), on remand, 679 So.2d 617 (Miss.1996). Furthermore, "[m]otions for change of venue are left to the trial court's sound discretion." Swann v. State, 806 So.2d 1111, 1116 (Miss.2002) (citing Davis v. State, 767 So.2d 986, 993 (Miss.2000); Hickson v. State, 707 So.2d 536, 542 (Miss. 1997)).

¶ 7. Here, the circuit judge moved the trial to Rankin County, after considering factors such as where Haynes could obtain a fair and impartial trial, away from pretrial publicity. The circuit judge also considered courthouse facilities, proximity from the transferor county, and the location of witnesses. Based on Mitchell and the trial judge's findings, we find no abuse of discretion.

¶ 8. Haynes also argues that the circuit judge improperly denied his motion to quash the venire which was only twelve percent black, when Rankin County's demographic is seventeen percent black. In order to show a violation of the right to an impartial jury representing a fair cross-section of the community, a defendant must show "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." Gray v. State, 887 So.2d 158, 165 (Miss. 2004) (citing Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 477 (Miss.1988)).

¶ 9. Here, the venire from which the jury was selected was produced by a computer which randomly selected names from the voter rolls of Rankin County. Haynes made no objection to the selection process, nor did he present any evidence indicating systematic exclusion of blacks in the jury-selection process. As the circuit judge noted, Haynes objected only to the results of the selection process, not the manner in which the jury was drawn. Because Haynes has failed to make a showing of any of the prima facie elements, this Court finds this argument is without merit.

II. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO SUPPRESS HAYNES' MARCH 3, 2004, CONFESSION WHICH WAS MADE AFTER HAYNES INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

A. Confession

¶ 10. On February 9, 2004, Haynes was arrested for Nowell's murder. During Officer Pope's first meeting with Haynes, Officer Pope first advised Haynes of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). At this time Haynes did not request an attorney. Officer Pope met with Haynes a second time, and again advised Haynes of his Miranda rights. However, this time, Haynes requested counsel, and Officer Pope subsequently stopped the interview. About one week later, Haynes received counsel. On March 3, 2004, Officer Pope received a phone call from the jail informing Officer Pope that Haynes had asked to speak with him.

¶ 11. Thereafter, Officer Pope and Detective Blakely went to the jail and met with Haynes, re-advised Haynes of his rights, and had Haynes sign a waiver form. Haynes did not say he wanted to talk about his case, but instead asked Officer Pope several questions about his bond, scheduling, and a preliminary hearing. Although Officer Pope's testimony is unclear as to the sequence of the remaining conversation's topics, the record provides a general description about the details of the conversation. At some point Officer Pope asked Haynes if anything else was bothering him, to which Haynes shook his head, and then began talking about problems at the jail.

¶ 12. Following this discussion, Officer Pope asked Haynes "if he wanted to tell us anything about the situation." Again, Haynes shrugged his shoulders. On cross-examination during a pretrial motion, defense counsel asked Officer Pope what he meant by "situation." Officer Pope replied "[w]ell, the whole situation. We probably were talking about the charges." However, Officer Pope went on to say "I don't think I would, I ever directly brought up the address or anything like that."

¶ 13. Officer Pope then asked Haynes if he previously had told the truth, to which Haynes shrugged his shoulders again. At some point Haynes discussed his vocational activities, his instructor, and fishing, although the record is not clear as to when this discussion took place. Officer Pope then stated Haynes was told that it was obvious he had something bothering him. Officer Pope stated he and Detective Blakely continued talking with him. Officer Pope testified Haynes eventually put his head down, took a deep breath, raised his head, and said "I'm ready to do my time and be a man." Officer Pope stated Haynes confessed that he attempted to kill Nowell and set fire to her home, but never admitted having intercourse with her.

¶ 14. After the confession, Officer Pope stated he and Detective Blakely asked Haynes if he would write down or allow a videotaping of his statement. Officer Pope testified Haynes told him no, because Haynes' attorney did not want him to give any statements. Thereafter, Officer Pope asked Haynes if he would like to speak with his attorney, to which Haynes responded affirmatively. After being contacted, Haynes' attorney went to the jail and after talking with Haynes, told Officer Pope that he could not advise his client to give a statement at that time.

¶ 15. Haynes claims his confession was the result of police interrogation, and therefore was inadmissible as a violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Whether a confession is admissible is a fact-finding function for the trial court, and its decision will not be overturned unless the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Thorson v. State, 895 So.2d 85, 115 (Miss.2004); Payton v. State, 897 So.2d 921, 935 (Miss.2003); Swinney v. State, 829 So.2d 1225, 1235 (Miss.2002).

¶ 16. In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held "that an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not...