Haynes-Wilkinson v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp.
| Decision Date | 18 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:00CV1139 MLM.,4:00CV1139 MLM. |
| Parties | Greta HAYNES-WILKINSON, Plaintiff, v. BARNES-JEWISH HOSPITAL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Peggy Hardge-Harris, Hardge-Harris Law Office, St. Louis, MO, for Greta Haynes-Wilkinson, plaintiffs.
Dennis G. Collins, Partner, Michael J. Luna, Greensfelder and Hemker, Daniel J. Doetzel, Bobroff and Hesse, St. Louis, MO, for Barnes-Jewish Hospital, a Nonprofit Missouri Corporation dba Barnes Extended Care at Clayton, defendants.
Before this Court is Defendant Barnes-Jewish Hospital's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons stated in this Memorandum and Order, Defendant's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff originally filed suit against her former employer, Defendant Barnes-Jewish Hospital on September 12, 1997 (Case No. 4:97CV01899MLM). Her Complaint included counts alleging race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act, R.S.Mo. § 213.010 et seq., all stemming from her allegation that Defendant terminated her, failed to promote her, and subjected her to different terms and conditions of employment based on her race. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that action without prejudice on July 14, 1999.
Plaintiff re-filed this case on July 14, 2000. Her revised four-count Complaint includes Count I (42 U.S.C. § 1981), Count II (Title VII), Count III (R.S.Mo. § 213.010 et seq.), and Count IV (state law libel). Specifically, Plaintiff's libel claim is based upon statements made by Defendant in a letter regarding Report of Certain Disciplinary Actions Pursuant to Mo.Rev. Stat. 383.130 and a report entitled "Confidential and Privileged Peer Review Report ... Report of Final Action" filed with the Missouri State Board of Nursing in March 1996, which Plaintiff attached to her Complaint as Exhibit 1.. The report details an incident involving Plaintiff and a patient under her care, concludes that Plaintiff was "negligent in her actions," and reports that management was "justified in the decision to terminate [Plaintiff] for neglect which causes injury to a patient.'"' Id.
Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment with respect to all of Plaintiff's claims. Because the Court's decision involves matters within the pleadings (including Exhibit 1), the Court will treat Defendant's Motion as one to dismiss.
A court may dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1349 (8th Cir.1993) (). "The issue is not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support her claim." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (). The Court must review the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff and take all well-pleaded allegations as true to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99.
Defendant contends that Counts II and III in Plaintiff's Complaint are barred by the statute of limitations. In her response, Plaintiff stated that she does not oppose dismissal of these claims on those grounds. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Counts II and III.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." BJC asserts that because Plaintiff was an at-will employee, she cannot maintain a cause of action under § 1981.
The Eighth Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether at will employment is contractual for purposes of § 1981, and a split of authority exists within this district.1 Compare Foster v. BJC Health System, 121 F.Supp.2d 1280 (E.D.Mo.2000) (); Cummings v. Mallinckrodt, No. 4:00CV660 CAS (); and Morgan v. United Parcel Service, 4:94CV1184 CEJ () with Nofles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 101 F.Supp.2d 805, 819-20 (E.D.Mo.2000) (); Jones v. Becker Group of O'Fallon Div., 38 F.Supp.2d 793, 795 (E.D.Mo.1999) (); and Blue v. Abbott Ambulance, No 4:00CV583RWS ().
At the appellate level, however, all four circuits considering this issue have uniformly held that at will employees may sue under § 1981. Lauture v. IBM, 216 F.3d 258, 261-62 (2nd Cir.2000); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018-19 (4th Cir.1999); Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (5th Cir.1998); Cf. Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1034-35 (7th Cir.1998) (). The most divisive aspect of the question appears to be whether a federal court should look to the general common law of contracts or to specific state law in determining whether at-will employment is contractual. The Second and Fourth Circuits take the former approach, while the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the latter. Id.
After reviewing the myriad approaches to the issue, this Court will adopt the rationale and conclusion set forth in Foster v. BJC, supra. In that case, the court noted that most states have adopted the "at-will employment" doctrine and explained the principle as follows:
Under this doctrine, either party may terminate an employment relationship at any time and for any reason unless the parties have agreed otherwise. At-will employees have no contractual right to continued employment. See Nofles, 101 F.Supp.2d at 820. Courts and commentators have long recognized, however, that the at-will doctrine operates not as a barrier to contract formation, but as a rule of contract interpretation. [citations omitted] The at-will doctrine supplies a default term in employment contracts in which the parties have not specified the employment's duration or the reasons for which the employment may be terminated. [citations omitted]
121 F.Supp.2d at 1287. Indeed, under common-law principles, an at-will employment relationship has all the elements of a valid contract, because (among other things) an at-will employee's work is performed as consideration for the employer's promise to pay, and the employee may sue the employer for breach of contract if the employer fails to pay earned wages; consequently, most state courts recognize at will employment as contractual. 121 F.Supp.2d at 1288 (citations omitted).
The Foster court found the approach of looking at this common law to determine whether a contract exists for purposes of § 1981 to be more compelling "because it is a `settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms,'" 121 F.Supp.2d at 1287, quoting United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182-82, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (). This appears to be the more common sense approach, because unnecessarily subjecting a federal statutory scheme to the vagaries of differing state laws may create undue confusion about the application of the law — e.g., similarly situated at-will employees in different states being accorded different rights (or no rights) under § 1981 depending on where the employee lives and works — as well as many arguments about which state's law will apply to determine the existence of a contract. Using this common-law approach, an at-will employee such as Plaintiff may clearly maintain a cause of action under § 1981.
Although the Foster court adopted the common law approach, it noted that even if it were to look to Missouri law, the result would not differ. Recognizing that Missouri courts differentiate clearly between contractual employment and at-will employment, the court found that Missouri law also recognizes the existence of a contractual remedy for at-will employees if the employer withholds compensation and benefits previously earned — an approach that is consistent...
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