Haynesworth v. Miller
| Decision Date | 29 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | 80-1383,Nos. 79-1244,s. 79-1244 |
| Parties | , 8 Fed.R.Serv.3d 437 Josiah HAYNESWORTH and Fred Hancock, Appellants, v. Frank P. MILLER, Chief, Law Enforcement Section, Office of the Corporation Counsel, et al., Appellees. (Two Cases) |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 78-2223).
Edward L. Genn, with whom J. Stuart Lemle, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellants.
David P. Sutton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Judith W. Rogers, Corp. Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Martin L. Grossman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees, District of Columbia, et al. Leo N. Gorman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellees District of Columbia, et al.
L. Mark Winston, with whom Stuart L. Bindeman, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellee Gildon.
Before ROBINSON, Circuit Judge, WRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and VAN PELT, * Senior District Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBINSON.
ROBINSON, Spottswo W., III, Circuit Judge:
Josiah Haynesworth and Fred Hancock brought this Bivens action 1 for alleged violations of their First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by the District of Columbia and several of its officials. 2 Appellants aver that they were victimized by a policy of retaliatory prosecution--a practice of pursuing criminal charges against individuals who have endured wrongful arrests, solely because they refuse to waive civil suits against the arresting officers. 3
On appeal, Haynesworth disputes the propriety of the District Court's dismissal under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6) 4 of his claims against the District and three individual defendants, and the court's judgment on the pleadings 5 in favor of another. Hancock challenges the District Court's dismissal of his action in toto on the ground of improper joinder of plaintiffs. 6 We find that the order contested by Hancock is not now properly before this court, and accordingly we dismiss his appeal. 7 We do, however, perceive merit in Haynesworth's challenge. We therefore reverse and remand his case for further proceedings against all defendants named in his complaint 8 except one who took office only as the events at issue here were drawing to a close, 9 and another whose conduct is absolutely immune from suit. 10
Briefly summarized, the allegations of the complaint are as follows. 11
One morning in November, 1977, Hancock parked his car on the street in front of his home and proceeded to check the antifreeze. 12 He left the car briefly to fetch a tool, then returned to find appellee Sonya Proctor, an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department, who approached him, requested his driver's license and vehicle registration, and announced that he would be cited for leaving the vehicle unattended with the motor running. 13 As Proctor was handing the citation to Hancock through the car window she dropped it in the street, then demanded, in "a loud, angry voice," 14 that appellant retrieve it. The ticket had by then blown away, and Hancock refused to chase it. 15 Proctor repeated her order, stepping back from the car and unbuttoning the holster of her gun; 16 when Hancock again declined she ordered him out of the car, patted him down, and placed him under arrest. 17 Hancock was taken to a police station and charged with leaving a motor-running vehicle unattended, depositing trash--the citation--in the street, and disorderly conduct. 18 He forfeited collateral on the first charge but stated that he wished to stand trial on the latter two. 19
Three days after the incident, Hancock and his wife filed with the Metropolitan Police Department a citizens' complaint against Proctor. A week later, Hancock was formally charged with depositing trash. 20 At a pretrial conference on the trash charge, appellee Howard B. Horowitz, an Assistant Corporation Counsel assigned to the Law Enforcement Section of the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel's Office, told Hancock and his attorney that the pending citizens' complaint presented a "problem." 21 Horowitz stated that he needed to speak to Proctor before he could decide whether to prosecute the trash charge. 22 A few days later, Horowitz informed Hancock's attorney that Proctor was angry about the citizens' complaint, and that the charge would not be dismissed. 23 Hancock then learned that the Police Department was investigating his complaint, 24 and shortly thereafter the charge of disorderly conduct, which had not been pressed after the arrest, was added to the trash charge. 25
Hancock alleges that the trash charge would have been dropped, and the disorderly conduct charge would never have been reinstated, were it not for the lodging of his citizens' complaint. 26 He asserts that Horowitz pressed this retaliatory prosecution "pursuant to policies and/or directives of [appellee Frank] Miller who was then and is Chief of the Law Enforcement Section of the Corporation Counsel." 27 Hancock's "further demands to supervisory officials and threats of suit for declaratory or injunctive relief" 28 resulted eventually in dismissal of all charges against him. 29
In December 1977, Haynesworth, an employee of the District of Columbia Superior Court, was accosted in a courthouse corridor by three men, who were not known to him, dressed in street attire. One, without any explanation, seized Haynesworth and slammed him against a wall. 30 When Haynesworth endeavored to protect himself and identify his assailant, the latter punched him in the jaw. 31 While the other two men pinned Haynesworth against the wall, the aggressor frisked him and removed his identification badge and pocket calculator. 32
This episode was interrupted by a courthouse guard, who approached the group, identified Haynesworth as a court employee, and demanded to know what the other three were doing. 33 The assailants, Joseph Schwartz, Donald Lyddane, and Patrick Mooney, for the first time identified themselves as police officers. 34 One instructed the guard to arrest Haynesworth, but the guard demurred, saying that Haynesworth had done nothing to justify an arrest. 35 Haynesworth, seeing that a crowd had gathered, suggested that the three officers accompany him to an adjacent room. 36 There Schwartz, the aggressor in the corridor, grabbed Haynesworth while either Mooney or Lyddane administered a chokehold, restricting Haynesworth's breathing. 37 Haynesworth was struck with a blackjack and handcuffed, 38 then taken to police headquarters, where he was charged with disorderly conduct. 39
Processing of the charge against Haynesworth was assigned to appellee Miller, Chief of the Law Enforcement Section of the Corporation Counsel's office. After first talking privately with Schwartz, Lyddane, and appellee Dixie Gildon, their supervisor, Miller held a conference with the officers, Haynesworth and his attorney. 40 Miller stated that he might dismiss the charge under certain conditions, and asked Haynesworth whether he intended to file a civil suit. Haynesworth's counsel objected, stating that this question should be addressed only to him. 41 Miller then asked everyone but the attorney to leave the room. On her way out, Officer Gildon remarked that Haynesworth's initiation of civil proceedings would change their decision to drop the charge; Miller interjected that he, not the police, would make that decision. 42 When the others had departed, Miller told Haynesworth's attorney that the Corporation Counsel's office would pursue the disorderly conduct charge only if Haynesworth threatened civil action against the officers. 43 The attorney responded that he had no authority to waive Haynesworth's right to sue. Miller summoned the others back into the room and announced that Haynesworth would be prosecuted for disorderly conduct. 44
Haynesworth retained another attorney and, during subsequent discussion of the case, Miller admitted to the attorney that he had previously broached the subject of a release of civil claims. 45 On the day set for trial, Haynesworth and his new counsel met Schwartz, Lyddane, and Mooney on their way to Miller's office for another conference on the case, and Schwartz stated that potential civil litigation was an obstacle to dismissal of the charge. 46 At the conference, Miller, without any reference to waiver, reiterated his intention to press the disorderly conduct charge. 47
The charge against Haynesworth, like those against Hancock, was ultimately dismissed, "but only after further demands to supervisory officials and the threat of a suit." 48 Haynesworth alleges that the charge would have been dropped at the outset but for the tacit policy of retaliation that prevailed in the Corporation Counsel's office and the Metropolitan Police Department. 49
Appellants filed suit in the District Court in November, 1978, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, and expungement of all records relating to the arrests and prosecutions. 50 Shortly thereafter, the District Court, sua sponte, dismissed Hancock from the suit without prejudice, 51 on the ground that his "separate cause of action is improperly joined in this lawsuit." 52 Subsequent attempts to have this order set aside were unsuccessful. 53
Officer Gildon answered in due course, denying that Officers Schwartz, Lyddane, and Mooney 54 had accosted Haynesworth, and denying that she and these officers had engaged in retaliatory prosecution, but admitting that she had remarked that the decision to drop the disorderly conduct charge would be affected by Haynesworth's decision to file suit. 55 Gildon...
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