Haynie v. Warden, Noble Corr. Inst.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-cv-1781 |
| Parties | ELGIN Z. HAYNIE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, NOBLE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Final judgment dismissing this habeas corpus action was entered on February 26, 2019. (ECF Nos. 4 and 5.) This matter is before the Court[1]for consideration of Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment. (ECF No. 15.) Because Petitioner's arguments fail to meet the standard for relief from judgment, the motion is DENIED.
Petitioner seeks relief from the Court's February 26, 2019, Opinion and Order adopting the Magistrate Judge's January 23 2019, Report and Recommendation. The Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge that Petitioner's action should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases[2] because Petitioner's claims were plainly waived or without merit. Specifically, the Court held that Petitioner's claims-actual innocence (one); involuntary guilty plea due to actual innocence and ineffective assistance (two); and improper application of res judicata (three)-were barred by procedural default for not having been raised, or otherwise failed to provide a basis for habeas relief. (Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 2, at PageID 16; Opinion and Order, ECF No. 4, at PageID 41.) The Court also declined to certify any issues for appeal. (Opinion and Order, ECF No. 4, at PageID 40-41.)
The United States Court of Appeals likewise declined Petitioner's requests for a certificate of appealability. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit found that reasonable jurists would not disagree that Petitioner's first and third grounds are not cognizable in habeas corpus, and that even if reasonable jurists would debate whether Petitioner's second claim was barred by res judicata, they would not debate whether claim two was arguably meritorious. (Order, ECF No. 13, at PageID 82-83.)
In arguing for relief from judgment, Petitioner suggests that the Magistrate Judge relied on an erroneous depiction of his postconviction claims by the state appellate court to conclude that Petitioner could not overcome the procedural default of his claims challenging the validity of his guilty plea. (Motion for Relief, ECF No. 15, at PageID 86-87.) Petitioner additionally argues, based on the Magistrate Judge's observation about the availability of a delayed direct appeal, that the state courts' decision denying his recent motion for leave to pursue a delayed appeal constitutes newly discovered evidence warranting relief from judgment. (Id. at PageID 87-88.) Petitioner's arguments do not meet the standard for relief from judgment.
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Under Rule 60(c), all Rule 60(b) motions for relief must be filed within a reasonable time, and motions filed under subsections (1), (2), or (3) must be filed no later than one year from the date of the judgment challenged. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1); see also Kemp v. United States, 142 S.Ct. 1856, 1861 (2022). Rule 60(b) motions filed under the “catch-all” (6) subsection have no fixed deadline, but again, must be filed within a “reasonable time.” Reasonableness is a fact-specific determination evaluated by considering a petitioner's diligence in seeking relief. Miller v. Mays, 879 F.3d 691, 699 (6th Cir. 2018). Factors to consider include the facts of the case, the length and circumstances of the delay, any prejudice to the opposing party by reason of the delay, and the circumstances compelling equitable relief. Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
Petitioner herein does not specify under which subsection of Rule 60(b) he seeks relief. On the one hand, he offers “newly discovered evidence” as a reason that relief from judgment is warranted. But “newly discovered evidence” is addressed by clause (2) of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), and any motion for relief from judgment pursuant to the first three clauses must be filed within one year from the judgment at issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c). On the other hand, Petitioner uses language, such as “interest of justice,” that tends to invoke Rule 60(b)(6). (ECF No. 15, at PageID 88.) Out of an abundance of caution and indulging Petitioner every benefit of the doubt, the Court construes his motion under Rule 60(b)(6).
Rule 60(b)(6) “vests courts with a deep reservoir of equitable power to vacate judgments ‘to achieve substantial justice' in the most ‘unusual and extreme situations.' ” Zagorski v. Mays, 907 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stokes v. Williams, 475 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2007)). It “applies only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances where principles of equity mandate relief[,] ” West v. Carpenter, 790 F.3d 693, 696-97 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 738 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 2013)), and only where not expressly addressed by the first five numbered clauses, Tanner v. Yukins, 776 F.3d 434, 443 (6th Cir. 2015); Broach v. City of Cincinnati, 244 Fed. App'x 729, 735 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Such circumstances rarely occur in habeas cases. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). Further, Rule 60(b)(6) “does not grant a defeated litigant ‘a second chance to convince the court to rule in his or her favor by presenting new explanations, legal theories, or proof.' ” Johnson v. Merlak, Case No. 4:18-cv-1062, 2019 WL 1300215, at *2 (N.D. Ohio March 21, 2019) (quoting Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2001)). The public policy favoring the finality of judgments and the termination of litigation further circumscribes the application of Rule 60(b)(6). Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Ben. Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A claim of legal error, without facts establishing extraordinary and exceptional circumstances, does not provide a basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief. West v. Bell, Case No. 3:01-cv-91, 2010 WL 4363402, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 27, 2010) (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535). And it is the petitioner's burden to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a basis for relief. Johnson, 2019 WL 1300215, at *2 (citing Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merck, Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008)).
The Court remains of the view that dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 4 was warranted because Petitioner's claims are either plainly forfeited by Petitioner's guilty plea-a guilty plea that Petitioner's proffered affidavits and arguments do not invalidate-or plainly insufficient to support habeas corpus relief. His arguments now do not persuade the Court otherwise, and fall short of the standard for Rule 60(b) relief from judgment.
The Court is willing to assume that the instant motion was filed within “a reasonable time.” From the time that the Sixth Circuit denied Petitioner's requests for a certificate of appealability until Petitioner filed his motion for relief from judgment here, Petitioner was attempting to pursue a delayed direct appeal (Motion for Relief, ECF Nos. 15, at PageID 87)-a remedy mentioned as possibly available by the Magistrate Judge in recommending that Petitioner's habeas action be dismissed, (Report and Recommendations, ECF No. 2, at PageID 24, n.2.). Petitioner filed the instant motion within nine months after the Supreme Court of Ohio's entry declining Petitioner's appeal-a period of time that does not strike the Court as unreasonable. (Motion for Relief, ECF No. 15, at PageID 95.)
Turning to Petitioner's arguments, Petitioner appears to assert that his unsuccessful pursuit of a delayed direct appeal opens the door for this Court to reconsider its judgment dismissing his habeas action. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the state appellate court's decision withdrawing leave to pursue a delayed direct appeal constitutes “newly discovered evidence” that warrants relief from judgment. Petitioner's argument fails for several reasons.
As a preliminary matter, to the extent that Petitioner offers “newly discovered evidence” as a basis for relief from judgment, that is addressed by clause (2) of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), and as noted above, Rule 60(b)(6)'s catch-all provision does not apply to circumstances expressly addressed by one of the five enumerated clauses. Because any motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2)'s “newly discovered evidence” clause must be filed within one year from the February 26, 2019, judgment, the instant motion would be subject to denial as untimely. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c). But even if considered under the Rule 60(b)(6) catch-all provision, Petitioner's “newly discovered evidence” argument is unpersuasive for several additional reasons.
The Magistrate Judge remarked that, “[t]o the extent that [Petitioner's claim...
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