Hays v. Skoog
| Decision Date | 07 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:16-cv-00384-RDP |
| Parties | TIMOTHY HAYS, as the personal representative of the Estate of Brandon Lee Hays, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES VERNON SKOOG, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This case is before the court on Defendant Charles Vernon Skoog's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 38). The parties have fully briefed the motion and have filed supplemental briefs regarding Defendant Skoog's qualified immunity defense. (Docs. # 44, 52, 64, 66, 67). After careful review, and for the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that Defendant's motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief for violations of Brandon Lee Hays's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for medical malpractice allegedly committed by several Defendants, including Defendant Dr. Skoog. (Doc. # 33). Plaintiff claims that Dr. Skoog was a medical director for Prison Healthcare, LLC ("PHC"), a private corporation. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5). According to Plaintiff, Defendant Skoog was a final decisionmaker for PHC and established policies and practices for PHC. (Id. at ¶ 5).
The Second Amended Complaint presents three categories of claims against Dr. Skoog. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Skoog violated Hays's Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee because he was deliberately indifferent towards Hays's serious medical needs. (Id. at ¶ 82). Second, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Skoog, along with other Defendants, established customs or policies that violated Hays's Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee. (Id. at ¶ 83). Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Skoog committed medical malpractice, which caused Hays's medical condition to deteriorate and contributed to his death on March 3, 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 85-86).
Skoog has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 (Doc. # 38). "A Rule 12(b)(6) motion questions the legal sufficiency of a complaint; therefore, in assessing the merit of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true." Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 928 F. Supp. 1552, 1557-58 (M.D. Ala. 1996). Thus, for the purpose of resolving Defendant's motion, the court treats the following facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint as true.
In February 2014, Brandon Lee Hays was sent to the Shelby County Jail when his bond was revoked due to a positive drug test. (Doc. # 33 at ¶¶ 14-15). Officers at the jail confiscated suboxone film from Hays at booking. (Id. at ¶ 16). Moreover, Hays informed jail personnel "that he had a history of serious withdrawal symptoms." (Id. at ¶ 18). Nevertheless, Hays did not receive medication, treatment, or monitoring for his withdrawal symptoms. (Id. at ¶ 21).
Medical personnel at the jail provided Hays no medical treatment for severe withdrawal symptoms from February 27, 2014 through March 1, 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-37). On March 2, 2014, he was taken to the jail's medical unit at 5:20 a.m. after suffering from seizures. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-37, 39). Nothing in the Second Amended Complaint indicates that the jail's medical personnel informed Dr. Skoog of Hays's condition before March 2, 2014. Two nurses, Defendants H. Willard and K. Lovett, informed Dr. Skoog of Hays's medical condition that morning. (Id. at ¶ 45). They informed him that Hays had suffered from seizures, severe dehydration, weakness, and inability to walk. (Id. at ¶ 46). Dr. Skoog directed nurses to administer Phenergan to Hays. (Id. at ¶ 44). Dr. Skoog did not instruct the medical personnel at the Shelby County Jail to transfer Hays to a hospital. (Id. at ¶ 47).
Hays's condition continued to worsen in the early morning hours of March 2nd, even after he took the prescribed medication. (See id. at ¶¶ 51-54). He was unable to drink a significant amount of fluids that day. (Id. at ¶ 51). His heart rate remained above 110, and his blood pressure dropped significantly. (Id. at ¶ 53). Medical personnel at the jail contacted Dr. Skoog again on March 2nd and informed him of Hays's deteriorating condition. (Id. at ¶ 55). Dr. Skoog did not direct medical personnel at the jail to transfer Hays to a hospital during the second communication. (Id.). An officer examined Hays at 5:00 a.m. on March 3, 2014 and found that he was unresponsive. (Id. at ¶ 44). Ultimately, Hays died on March 3, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 59).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, the complaint must include enough facts "to raise a right to relief above thespeculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that contain nothing more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon "labels and conclusions" or "naked assertion[s]" without supporting factual allegations. Id. at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. International Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'" the complaint must demonstrate "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A plausible claim for relief requires "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 'assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Kivisto v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 F. Appx. 136, 138 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (quoting Am. Dental Assn. v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)). That task is context specific and, to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the court based on its "judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the court determines that well-pleaded facts, accepted as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be dismissed.2 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Defendant Skoog presents two arguments as to why Plaintiff's claims against him should be dismissed. Initially, he argues that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims and medical malpractice claim fail to state a claim for relief. (Doc. # 38, Memorandum Brief Supporting Defendant Charles Vernon Skoog's Motion to Dismiss ("Memorandum Brief"), at 11-17). Moreover, he claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he entered into a contract with the Shelby County Commission, a public entity, and Plaintiff has only accused him of committing negligent conduct. (See Doc. # 64 at 1-2). The court addresses each of these arguments below.
Defendant Skoog argues that Plaintiff's complaint fails to present an actionable claim of deliberate indifference. (Doc. # 38, Memorandum Brief, at 11). Relying on the jail's medical records, Skoog asserts that he prescribed medication for Hays when informed about Hays's vomiting. (Id. at 11-12). In a footnote, he indicates that the court should disregard Plaintiff's allegations that he was informed of Hays's seizures, severe dehydration, and inability to walk on March 2, 2014 because those allegations "are not supported by any known facts." (Id. at 11 n. 2).
The Eleventh Circuit has "consistently held that knowledge of the need for medical care and an intentional refusal to provide that care constitutes deliberate indifference."3 Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1995) (). However, not every claim of inadequate medical treatment states a cognizable claim under the federal constitution. "Medical treatment [is deliberately indifferent] only when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). To establish that a medical provider or jail official was deliberately indifferent to a detainee's serious medical need, a plaintiff must meet both an objective and a subjective standard of proof. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999).
With respect to the objective component, a plaintiff is required to show both (1) an objectively serious medical need that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) that the response by the prison official to that need was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000). An objectively serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity...
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