Hayslip v. Genuine Parts Co., Case No. 2:17-cv-584

• Decision Date: 06 November 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:17-cv-584
• Parties: Rodney HAYSLIP, as Administrator of the Estate of Maria D. Hayslip, Plaintiff, v. GENUINE PARTS COMPANY d/b/a NAPA and/or RMDS; Balkamp Inc. d/b/a Automotive Redistribution Center; TransForce, Inc.; and Benjamin Devries, Defendants, v. TransForce, Inc.; Balkamp Inc. d/b/a Automotive Redistribution Center; Genuine Parts Company d/b/a NAPA and/or RMDS, Third-Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

420 F.Supp.3d 666

Rodney HAYSLIP, as Administrator of the Estate of Maria D. Hayslip, Plaintiff,

v.GENUINE PARTS COMPANY d/b/a NAPA and/or RMDS; Balkamp Inc. d/b/a Automotive Redistribution Center; TransForce, Inc.; and Benjamin Devries, Defendants,

v.TransForce, Inc.; Balkamp Inc. d/b/a Automotive Redistribution Center; Genuine Parts Company d/b/a NAPA and/or RMDS, Third-Party Defendants.

Case No. 2:17-cv-584

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Filed November 6, 2019

Gerald Scott Leeseberg, Craig S. Tuttle, John Anthony Markus, Leeseberg & Valentine, Columbus, OH, Katherine Audrey Clemons, C. Joseph McCullough, White Getgey & Meyer, Mason, OH, for Plaintiff

Eric N. Anderson, Meyer, Edward G. Brandenstein, Paul R. Robinson, Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C., Pittsburgh, PA, Kevin P. Foley, Reminger Co. L.P.A., Mohammad Salman Shah, Gallagher Sharp LLP, Columbus, OH, Robert W. Johnson, Johnson Jensen LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE

This matter is before the Court upon Genuine Parts Company's ("GPC") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) ("GPC's Motion") and TransForce, Inc.'s ("TransForce") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 56) ("TransForce's Motion" and together with the GPC Motion, the "Motions"). The Motions originally requested this Court to grant summary judgment against Plaintiff. However, since TransForce and GPC filed the Motions, TransForce, GPC, and Plaintiff have settled Plaintiff's claims. Therefore, the Motions, as they relate to Plaintiff's claims against GPC and TransForce, are moot and this Court will only consider the arguments GPC and TransForce raise in the Motions against each other. The Motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, TransForce's Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and GPC's Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART .

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 25, 2017 Maria Hayslip ("Hayslip") was killed in an auto accident while traveling along Interstate 270 in Columbus, Ohio. Hayslip's vehicle was struck by a semitruck driven by Benjamin Devries ("Devries"). The ensuing investigation revealed that Hayslip had traces of alcohol and marijuana in her system. (Doc. 59-1, Columbus Div. of Police Inf. Summary at 2). The investigation also revealed that Hayslip did not have her lights on at the time of the crash and was either traveling at a low rate of speed or completely stopped on the interstate. (Id. at 2–3). The investigation further revealed that Devries was traveling within the posted speed limit and could not have avoided Hayslip if he had tried. (Doc. 59-5, Sanborn Dep. at 12, 16; Doc. 59-8, McWhorter Dep. at 30–31). The Columbus Police Department's investigation ultimately concluded that "Ms. Hayslip's actions were the cause of the crash and therefore she is responsible for her own death." (Doc. 59-1, Columbus Div. of Police Inf. Summary at 3).

Before diving into the details of the legal action, it is important to understand the relationship of the parties involved in this lawsuit. Although Devries was driving the semitruck, the semitruck was owned by Penske.¹ Penske had leased the truck to GPC for GPC's use. GPC was using the truck to transport Balkamp Inc.'s ("Balkamp") products. TransForce is a staffing agency that provides drivers to its customers to drive motor vehicles. GPC contracted with TransForce and used TransForce employees as drivers of its vehicles. GPC and TransForce memorialized their business arrangement in the Drivers Services Agreement by and between TransForce and GPC, dated as of May 21, 2010 (the "Driver Services Agreement") (Doc. 56-1). At the time of the accident that killed Hayslip, TransForce placed Devries with GPC and the Driver Services Agreement established the terms of the arrangement. Thus, to summarize, the semitruck was owned by Penske, leased to GPC, and driven by a TransForce employee who was hired by GPC for this job pursuant to a Drivers Service Agreement.

On May 31, 2017, Plaintiff brought an action against GPC, TransForce, Balkamp, and Devries alleging that Hayslip's death was caused by Devries while performing his duties under the Driver Services Agreement. Following the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint, TransForce filed a cross-claim against GPC alleging that, should TransForce be held liable to Plaintiff, then TransForce is entitled to contribution, indemnification, and subrogation from GPC and Balkamp. GPC also filed a cross-claim against TransForce. GPC alleged that, should it be found liable for the accident, then GPC is entitled to indemnification and contribution from TransForce. Additionally, GPC alleges that TransForce breached the Drivers Services Agreement by not indemnifying GPC and failing to list GPC as an additional insured on TransForce's general liability insurance policy.

Following the filing of the cross-claims, both GPC and TransForce filed motions for summary judgment regarding the wrongful death claims the Plaintiff asserted against them, as well as the cross-claims that were pending against each other. On March 25, 2019, this Court was notified that all of Plaintiff's claims against GPC and TransForce were settled, pending approval by the Probate Court.² GPC and TransForce's cross-claims against each other remain pending. Although Plaintiff settled his claims against GPC and TransForce, GPC and TransForce did not file new motions for summary judgment on their cross-claims. Those motions remain pending before this Court, and we turn to them now.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Berryman v. SuperValu Holdings, Inc. , 669 F.3d 714, 716–17 (6th Cir. 2012). The Court's purpose in considering a summary judgment motion is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" but to "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if the Court finds a jury could return a verdict, based on "sufficient evidence," in favor of the nonmoving party; evidence that is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," however, is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of presenting the Court with law and argument in support of its motion as well as identifying the relevant portions of " ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ). If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ; see also Cox v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp. , 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (after burden shifts, nonmovant must "produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury").

In considering the factual allegations and evidence presented in a motion for summary judgment, the Court "views factual evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp. , 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009). But self-serving affidavits alone are not enough to create an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Johnson v. Washington Cty. Career Ctr. , 982 F. Supp. 2d 779, 788 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (Marbley, J.). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support [the non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Copeland v. Machulis , 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995) ; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. DISCUSSION

The Motions that are before this Court can be categorized into three different disputes.

The first dispute is about liability. TransForce argues that GPC is liable for the actions of Devries under the "statutory employee" theory that is derived from the federal Interstate Commerce Commission regulations found in 49 CFR 376.12. (Doc. 56 at 8). Alternatively, TransForce argues that under state law agency principles, GPC controlled the manner of Devries' work, and therefore GPC is vicariously liable for Devries' actions on the night of the accident. (Id. at 10). GPC, of course, disputes both arguments and argues that Devries was a TransForce employee and therefore TransForce is liable for Devries' actions. (Doc. 63 at 8, 11). Additionally, GPC seeks summary judgment for Balkamp because Balkamp simply made the products that Devries was transporting on the night of the accident. (Doc. 59 at 14). TransForce argues that Balkamp should not be dismissed because Balkamp could be vicariously liable. (Doc. 64 at 3).

The second dispute is about indemnity. TransForce argues that it is entitled to indemnification from GPC pursuant the Driver Services Agreement. (Doc. 56 at 13). GPC takes the exact opposite position. GPC disputes that it is required to indemnify TransForce and argues that TransForce is actually required to indemnify GPC. (Doc. 63 at 16). TransForce, of course, disputes that it must indemnify GPC. (Doc. 67 at 6).

The third dispute is about breach of contract. In its cross claim, GPC argues that TransForce breached the Drivers Service Agreement in two ways. First, GPC argues that TransForce was contractually required to indemnify GPC and when TransForce failed to do so, they breached the Drivers...