Hayward v. Houtan
| Decision Date | 01 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:19-cv-75 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
| Parties | DANTE BENJAMIN HAYWARD, Plaintiff, v. AUSTIN VAN HOUTAN; and SETH CUBBEDGE, Defendants. |
DANTE BENJAMIN HAYWARD, Plaintiff,
v.
AUSTIN VAN HOUTAN; and SETH CUBBEDGE, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-75
United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
December 1, 2021
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BENJAMIN W. CHEESBRO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Cubbedge and Van Houtan's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 70. Plaintiff filed a Response, and Defendants filed a Reply. Docs. 76, 80. At the request of the Court, Plaintiff also filed a Surreply addressing the timeliness of his Response, to which Defendants filed a Sur-Surreply. Docs. 83, 84, 88. For the following reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court DENY Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant Van Houtan is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claim. However, if the Court adopts these recommendations, Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Defendant Cubbedge in his individual capacity remain pending.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff brought this suit, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendants' use of a taser while he was held as a pretrial detainee at Effingham County Jail, alleging the force used violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Doc. 1 at 5. After conducting frivolity review, the Court
dismissed claims against Defendants Taser Company and John Doe 3, along with Plaintiff's claims for failure to protect and denial of adequate medical care. Doc. 10. However, the Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed with his claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Cubbedge and Van Houtan.[1] Id.
After Defendants answered, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his Complaint. Doc. 23. Plaintiff's motion was granted in part and denied in part. Doc. 31. Plaintiff was permitted to amend his Complaint to assert his excessive force claims against Defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged incident.[2] Id. at 1-4. The Court did not require Plaintiff to submit an Amended Complaint, as the only permitted amendments involved which constitutional provision his claim was brought under and the names of the John Doe Defendants.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS[3]
Defendants submitted a Statement of Material Fact (“SMF”) in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 56.1. Doc. 70-1. Defendants' SMF relies on: Plaintiff's deposition; Effingham County
Sherriff's Use of Force Report; the declarations of Defendants Cubbedge and Van Houtan; Effingham County Jail's Incident Report; and photographs of Plaintiff's leg. Docs. 70-3 to 70-8.
Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, including his own SMF. Docs 76, 76-2. In support of his Response and SMF, Plaintiff relies on: his declaration, [4] his deposition; Defendants' interrogatory and discovery responses; Defendants' training history; Effingham County Sherriff's Response to Aggression Report; medical records; Effingham County Jail Incident Reports; Plaintiff's grievances; Defendant Cubbedge's disciplinary history; Defendants' declarations; Effingham County Jail's log; Effingham County Jail policies; standard operating procedures, operations manual, and mission statement for jail operation; Effingham County's Sheriff's Standard Operation Procedures; photographs of Plaintiff's leg; Plaintiff's inmate disciplinary report; and Georgia Department of Public Safety Policy Manual. Docs. 76-3 to 76-22.
When considering the record at summary judgment, “the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 651 (2014)). In light of these circumstances, and after reviewing the parties' submissions, the Court identifies the following undisputed, material facts for the purposes of evaluating Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment:
At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Effingham County Jail as a pretrial detainee and Defendants were employees working at the Jail. Doc. 70-1 at 2; Doc. 76-2 at 2. On April 14, 2017, several detainees in a cell near Plaintiff's were attempting to remove one of their cellmates. Doc. 70-2 at 2; Doc. 70-4 at 2-6; Doc. 76-2 at 3. These other inmates were throwing bed mats and other property over the railing to expel their cellmate. Doc. 70-1 at 2. Plaintiff was housed in a single-person cell at this time because the other cells were full. Doc. 70-1 at 3; Doc. 76-2 at 3.
In order to regain control of the jail, officials determined they needed to move Plaintiff from his single-person cell into a multi-person cell so they could place one of the inmates involved in the disturbance in a single-person cell. Doc. 70-1 at 3; Doc. 76-2 at 3. Jail officials notified Plaintiff over the Jail's intercom system he needed to pack his belongings because he was moving to a different cell. Doc. 70-1 at 3; Doc. 76-2 at 3. Plaintiff responded he did not want to move and did not pack his belongings as instructed. Doc. 70-1 at 3.
Because Plaintiff refused to comply with an official's orders over the intercom, Defendants Cubbedge and Van Houtan went to Plaintiff's cell to facilitate the move. Id. Defendants again informed Plaintiff he needed to move into a multi-person cell. Id.; Doc. 76-2 at 4. At this point, Plaintiff told Defendants he would not move into a multi-person cell and he would only move to “the hole, ” which is an isolation cell used for disciplinary segregation. Doc. 70-1 at 3; Doc. 76-2 at 4. Plaintiff did not explain to Defendants why he refused to move into the multi-person cell.[5] Doc 70-1 at 4.
Defendant Van Houtan then warned Plaintiff if he refused to voluntarily vacate his cell, Defendants would use force to remove him. Doc. 70-1 at 4; Doc. 76-2 at 4. Plaintiff still refused to comply; instead, he crossed his arms and stood in the middle of his cell. Doc 70-1 at 4; Doc. 76-2 at 4. At this point, Defendant Van Houtan advanced toward Plaintiff to handcuff him. Doc. 70-1 at 4.
The parties disagree about the next events. Defendants state Plaintiff refused to comply and continued to actively resist their efforts to handcuff him and move him to another cell. Doc. 70-1 at 4. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends he began complying with Defendants' orders, turned around and put his hands up, and was allowing himself to be handcuffed just before Defendants tased him. Doc. 76-3 at 4. Both parties rely on declarations to support their versions of events. Docs. 70-6, 70-6, 76-3. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as the Court must, it is assumed Plaintiff was complying with Defendants' orders and was allowing himself to be handcuffed when Defendants tased him. Under these facts, Defendant Cubbedge deployed his taser to immobilize Plaintiff while Plaintiff was complying with Defendants' orders. Doc 70-1 at 4.
Defendant Cubbedge deployed his taser in a way that resulted in the taser handset ejecting two prongs, which are connected to the handset by wires and designed to contact the target's body from a distance and immobilize him. Id.; Doc. 76-2 at 5. Both taser prongs connected with Plaintiff's leg. Doc. 70-1 at 4; Doc. 76-2 at 6. One of the wires connecting the taser handset device to the prongs in Plaintiff's leg became disconnected. Doc. 70-1 at 4. Defendant Cubbedge then put the taser handset device on Plaintiff's torso so a complete circuit
could be established between the handset device and the other prong that was still lodged in Plaintiff's leg. Id. Defendant Cubbedge then completed one taser cycle, which lasts five seconds. Id. After being tased, Plaintiff fell to the ground. Id. at 6. Defendant Cubbedge then triggered a second cycle, also lasting five seconds. Id.
Plaintiff complained of an injury to his leg where the taser prongs made contact. Doc. 70-1 at 5; Doc. 76-2 at 6. Those injuries consisted of some bleeding and two small puncture wounds to his skin where the taser prongs hit his leg. Doc. 70-1 at 5; Doc. 76-2 at 6. After being tased, Plaintiff requested medical attention. Doc. 76-2 at 6. At the time of the incident, there was no medical staff on site, so Defendants contacted off-site medical personnel. Doc. 70-1 at 5; Doc, 76-2 at 6. The off-site medical personnel advised Defendants to disinfect the area where the taser prongs punctured Plaintiff's leg and provide him with Band-Aids for the affected area. Doc. 70-1 at 5; Doc. 76-2 at 7. Defendants allowed Plaintiff to shower and clean his leg and then provided him with Band-Aids. Doc. 70-1 at 5; Doc. 76-2 at 7.
DISCUSSION
Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing Plaintiff failed to state a claim because he brought the claim under the wrong constitutional amendment. Doc. 70-2 at 7-9. Alternatively, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claims in their individual and official capacities. Id. at 9-24. Defendants also argue Plaintiff's Response should be disregarded as untimely, which I address first. Doc. 80 at 2-4.
I. Plaintiff's Response Will Not Be Disregarded as Untimely
Defendants argue Plaintiff's Response to their Motion for Summary Judgment should be disregarded as untimely and their Motion should be treated as unopposed under Local Rule 7.5.
Doc. 80 at 3. Defendants contend Plaintiff did not deliver his Response for mailing until July 9, 2021, which was after the July 2, 2021 deadline. Id. at 3.
On September 23, 2021, the Court...
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