Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 26008.,26008.
• Citation: 33 P.3d 816,136 Idaho 342
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Alfred S. HAYWARD, Personal Representative of the Estate of Delbert Lewis Hayward, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VALLEY VISTA CARE CORPORATION, a non-profit corporation, d/b/a Valley Vista Care Center, Scott F. Burpee and Jan Burpee; Jack's Pharmacy, Incorporated; Jack Botts; Chad Brown; Nancy Renfrew; Jerrold E. Park and Richard K. Thurston, M.D., Co Personal Representatives of the Estate of W. Dyce Thurston, M.D., Defendants-Respondents.

33 P.3d 816

136 Idaho 342

Alfred S. HAYWARD, Personal Representative of the Estate of Delbert Lewis Hayward, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VALLEY VISTA CARE CORPORATION, a non-profit corporation, d/b/a Valley Vista Care Center, Scott F. Burpee and Jan Burpee; Jack's Pharmacy, Incorporated; Jack Botts; Chad Brown; Nancy Renfrew; Jerrold E. Park and Richard K. Thurston, M.D., Co Personal Representatives of the Estate of W. Dyce Thurston, M.D., Defendants-Respondents.

No. 26008.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Coeur d'Alene, April 2001 Term.

September 28, 2001.

Cody Law Office, Coeur d'Alene; Eymann, Allison, Hunter & Jones, LLC, Spokane; for appellant. Debra L. Stephens argued.

Christensen & Doman, St. Maries, for respondent Valley Vista. Andrew P. Doman argued.

Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent Jack's Pharmacy, Inc. Eugene L. Miller argued.

Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, Coeur d'Alene, for respondents Park and Thurston. Troy Y. Nelson argued.

KIDWELL, Justice.

Alfred S. Hayward (Alfred), personal representative of his father's estate, appeals the lower court's ruling denying Alfred's motion to amend his state court complaint to add a wrongful death claim and the lower court's ruling granting summary judgment dismissal of Alfred's remaining state court claims.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Delbert Hayward (Delbert), an eighty-five-year-old resident of northern Idaho, lived at his home in Emida, Idaho, with the assistance of home health care providers. In order to continue the home health care services, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare required Delbert to submit to periodic medical evaluations.

Delbert was admitted into Kootenai Medical Center on February 22, 1994, in order for the required evaluation to be conducted. On March 4, 1994, Delbert was released to a personal care home in Hayden Lake, Idaho. He was admitted back into Kootenai Medical Center on March 10, 1994, when he refused to eat and wanted to return to his home. After being discharged from Kootenai Medical Center for the second time, Delbert was admitted to Valley Vista Care Center (Valley Vista), a nursing home facility in St. Maries, Idaho. He resided at Valley Vista from March 11, 1994, until his death on February 16, 1995.

On February 14, 1997, Alfred S. Hayward, a surviving son of the decedent and a resident of Oregon, filed two complaints. One, a wrongful death action, was filed in federal district court. The other, a complaint consisting primarily of contractual allegations, was filed in state court. The state court complaint was brought on behalf of the estate of Delbert Hayward and sought to recover medical expenses. Both complaints contained identical factual allegations. The defendants named in both complaints were Valley Vista and various health care professionals that provided services to Valley Vista.

In Alfred's complaint, he claimed that his father was falsely imprisoned in the nursing home and that the negligent care he received there, including the injection of high dosages of the drug Haldol, attributed to his father's death. Alfred also alleged that the defendants breached duties imposed on them by the terms of Alfred's admission agreement, as well as duties imposed under federal and state law. Alfred's wrongful death claim filed in federal district court asserted diversity of citizenship, based on the fact that Alfred was a resident of Oregon, his brother and sister were residents of Washington, and the defendants were all residents of Idaho.

On March 10, 1997, the defendants moved to dismiss the federal court action based on lack of diversity jurisdiction and because there were "identical wrongful death claims in both courts." The defendants argued that diversity could not be maintained since a personal representative is deemed to be a resident of the decedent's state of residency. In this case, since Delbert was a resident of Idaho, Alfred's state of residency was also Idaho. Consequently, the diversity requirements were no longer satisfied.

On February 6, 1998, the federal court granted a motion filed by Alfred to amend the complaint (to change the plaintiff's status from personal representative to heir) and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. On June 8, 1998, Alfred moved the federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state court claim for breach of contract. The federal court declined to do so on November 18, 1998.

The defendants moved the court to reconsider it's denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 24, 1999, the federal court dismissed the federal claim in its entirety, finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint when it was originally filed and that it had erred in its previous decision. The court found that Alfred was not entitled to change his status from personal representative to "heir" in order to create diversity.

On March 10, 1999, Alfred moved the court to amend the state court complaint to add the claim of "loss of love and affection of their father," which, in effect, served to add a claim for wrongful death.

On April 7 and 8, 1999, defendants Thurston and Valley Vista moved the trial court for summary judgment dismissal of the breach of contract claims, as well as for the dismissal of the entire case. These motions were granted by the trial court judge on June 18, 1999.

The district court found that the plaintiff was not allowed to amend the state court complaint to add the wrongful death action. In making this determination, the district court focused on two key factors. First, the district court noted that the statute of limitations had run for the wrongful death action. Second, the court highlighted the fact that the plaintiff had brought the claim as personal representative, not as heir. According to the district court, even if the statute of limitations could have been avoided through the "relation-back" doctrine, the fact that the complaint was brought by the personal representative, instead of the heir, precluded the amendment. The court noted, "[R]elating back to '97 won't do you any good because you didn't have the right party pleading. And amending a complaint by adding a party will not get you the relation back doctrine under Rule 15 anyway." The court also found that the original complaint did not state a cause of action for wrongful death and that any cause of action stated did not survive the death of the decedent. Summary judgment was subsequently granted in favor of Jack's Pharmacy. The district court subsequently denied Alfred's motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment. Alfred filed this timely appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court's decision to allow the amendment of pleadings is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. When determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court asks: "(1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether it acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Hough v. Fry, 131 Idaho 230, 232, 953 P.2d 980, 982 (1998)(internal citations omitted).

In Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999), this Court set forth the following standard of review to be utilized when a summary judgment is being reviewed:

When this Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment, it uses the same standard properly employed by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The record is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of that party. If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, summary judgment is inappropriate. On appeal, this Court exercises free review.

Id. at 870, 993 P.2d at 1201 (internal citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING ALFRED LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO FORMALLY ALLEGE A WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM.

Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) reads in relevant part, "[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires...." I.R.C.P. 15(a).

A detailed examination of this rule was recently set forth by the Court in Carl H. Christensen Family Trust:

The twin purposes behind the rule are to allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts at issue.

It is within the district court's sound discretion to decide whether to allow a party to amend its complaint after a responsive pleading has been served. "[I]n the interest of justice, district courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint."

Id. at 871, 993 P.2d at 1202 (internal citations omitted).

The Court went on to discuss the effect of "timeliness" on a motion to amend, noting that in Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977), this Court adopted the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting the comparable federal rule:

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given.

Id....