Hazelgrove v. FORD MOTOR CO., FORD PARTS DIV.

• Citation: 428 F. Supp. 1096
• Decision Date: 01 February 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 75-0231-R.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Ms. Sharon HAZELGROVE, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, FORD PARTS DIVISION, Defendant.

428 F. Supp. 1096

Ms. Sharon HAZELGROVE, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, FORD PARTS DIVISION, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 75-0231-R.

United States District Court, E. D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

On Motion For Summary Judgment February 1, 1977.

Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Wash., D. C., Robert B. Wallace, Alexandria, Va., Kenneth V. Farino, Richmond, Va., Geoffrey J. Vitt, Cohen, Vitt & Anand, Alexandria, Va., for plaintiff.

Francis V. Lowden, Jr., Hunton & Williams, Hill B. Wellford, Jr., A. W. Vander-Meer, Jr., Richmond, Va., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

MERHIGE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant Ford Motor Company, brings this action under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., to redress alleged sexually discriminatory employment practices engaged in by the defendant. Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief. Jurisdiction is premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). The matter comes before the Court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The issue has been briefed and argued by counsel for all parties and, accordingly, it would appear ripe for disposition.

The plaintiff was hired by Ford on September 8, 1969 as a salaried key punch operator. At some point in 1970, the plaintiff became pregnant. She met with her supervisor, Mr. Ferguson, on or about February 15, 1971 to discuss the date upon which she was to commence her maternity leave. Mrs. Hazelgrove contends that Mr. Ferguson arbitrarily selected the commencement date while the defendant, on the other hand, submits that the date was mutually agreed upon. In any event, Mrs. Hazelgrove was medically forced to leave work on March 24, 1971, and gave delivery to a son the following day. On May 4, 1971, the plaintiff indicated she desired to return to work. Pursuant to Ford's policy in this regard, Mrs. Hazelgrove was told she needed a doctor's certificate before she could return to work. Although such a certificate was obtained on May 10, 1974, Mrs. Hazelgrove was not reinstated. The facts are undisputed that this was due to a general reduction in force which necessitated the termination of one position. On June 24, 1971, the plaintiff was placed on layoff status effective May 10, 1971. On July 28, 1971, the defendant issued to Mrs. Hazelgrove a check which contained on its face the letters "TERM". Another check was issued to the plaintiff on August 2, 1971 which contained the letters "SEV". Plaintiff received and endorsed both checks which were deposited in a joint bank account no later than August 9, 1971. On February 16, 1972, the plaintiff sent an unsworn handwritten charge of discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This charge was later perfected. The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on May 14, 1975, and this action was filed the following day.

The plaintiff's substantive allegations focus on Ford's maternity policies. Specifically, the plaintiff challenges (1) Ford's alleged policy of arbitrarily selecting a commencement date for maternity leave without regard to differing abilities to work; (2) Ford's policies concerning pregnancy disability which allegedly materially differ from other nonsex linked disabilities; and (3) Ford's policies concerning the employment of persons returning from maternity leave.¹ The defendant's motion for summary judgment is premised upon the submission that the plaintiff did not file a charge with the EEOC within 90 days of the occurrence of the alleged discrimination and, hence, the complaint must be dismissed as untimely.² See, e. g., Collins v. United Airlines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1975); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc). The defendant maintains that the 90-day filing period commenced to run on May 10, 1971, at which time the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to be reinstated by Ford. The plaintiff maintains, on the other hand, that she filed her charge within 90 days of reasonably becoming aware of the facts that would support a charge of discrimination. This, it is argued, is sufficient to render a charge timely. See, e. g., Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975). Secondly, the plaintiff argues that her layoff status generated certain reinstatement rights sufficient to give her standing to challenge ongoing policies at Ford. These reinstatement rights, it is contended, place the plaintiff in a situation analogous to that of a job applicant. This latter group of persons have been deemed able to challenge employment practices applicable only to incumbent employees. See, e. g., Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970).

The plaintiff seeks to invoke the equitable principles enunciated in Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., supra, to avoid a dismissal of this action as being untimely filed. In that opinion, the Court held "that the ninety-day period did not begin to run . . . until the facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff." Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., supra, 516 F.2d at 931. A threshold issue to the matter at bar is whether the heretofore quoted principle is a correct statement of law and, if so, whether it is applicable on the facts of the instant case. The bedrock of the Reeb rationale is the analogy drawn between the statutory 90-day filing period and a statute of limitations. A limitations period is susceptible to more flexible construction than our statutes which confer subject matter jurisdiction. Compare American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) with Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 79 S.Ct. 760, 3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959). While the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not commented on this precise issue, it has viewed the time period in which charges of discrimination must be filed is akin to statutes of limitations. See Williams v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 530 F.2d 539, 542 (4th Cir. 1975). Indeed, our Court of Appeals has exhibited a consistent tendency to construe the time limitations contained in Title VII in such a way as to effectuate the statute's broad remedial purposes and take recognition of the practical realities of a statutory enforcement mechanism which must be triggered by "laymen operating without legal assistance." Garner v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 538 F.2d 611, at p. 614 (4th Cir. 1976), quoting Coles v. Penny, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 277, 531 F.2d 609, 614 (1976). See also EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1974).

Several courts have permitted equitable modifications of the filing time period of Title VII and other similar statutes. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. 74-1791, Sl.Op. pp. 88-89 (D.C.Cir. Oct. 20, 1976). East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 336 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1975); Anisgard v. Exxon Corp., 409 F.Supp. 212 (E.D.La.1975); EEOC v. Nicholson File Co., 408 F.Supp. 229 (D.Conn. 1976); Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F.Supp. 797 (D.N.H.1975). Cf. Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1976); Coles v. Penny, supra, 531 F.2d at 614 n. 13. This Court is of a similar view. See Briggs v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 414 F.Supp. 371, 378 (E.D.Va.1976).

Whether the plaintiff may avail herself of the Reeb doctrine is dependent upon whether she knew or should have known of the facts which would support a charge under Title VII.³ This involves both objective and subjective awareness. There is no doubt that Mrs. Hazelgrove knew or should have known of all the pertinent facts relating to the allegations of an involuntary early maternity leave and Ford's discriminatory pregnancy disability policies more than 90 days before filing her charges with the EEOC. Mrs. Hazelgrove has acknowledged in affidavits that the commencement of her maternity leave and the benefits to which she was entitled were discussed with her at two meetings in February and March of 1971. The Court would, therefore, be inclined to dismiss these allegations as being time barred were it not for the further allegation that there are pending proceedings of a similar nature before the EEOC. These pending charges may, of course, affect the viability of Mrs. Hazelgrove's claims, depending on the degree of similarity and their dates of filing. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 394 F.Supp. 1361, 1366-67 (E.D.Va.1975). See also, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n. 8, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) and cases cited therein. Accordingly, a dismissal at this juncture would be inappropriate.

The claims stemming from the plaintiff's termination present different problems. The plaintiff submits that she was not aware of two facts needed to support a charge of discrimination until sometime within the 90-day filing period. First, Mrs. Hazelgrove alleges that she was not, nor should have been aware that she was terminated from Ford effective May 10, 1971. Secondly, it is submitted that she was not informed of the reason which prompted her layoff. With regard to these contentions, it should be noted that Mrs. Hazelgrove was placed on layoff because of a general reduction in force. Layoffs prompted by a reduction in force are made according to seniority. Had the plaintiff been on a short term medical leave of absence — as opposed to maternity leave — when the reduction of force was ordered, her seniority would have secured her position.

Whether the plaintiff knew or should have known of either of these facts is confused on the state of the instant record. It does appear that some of Ford's normal termination procedures were not followed in this case and that maternity leave may last up to one year. These two factors...