Hazen v. Reagen, 93-1294

Citation16 F.3d 921
Decision Date16 February 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-1294,93-1294
PartiesBruce Peter HAZEN; Thomas Wright; Walter Smith; Dale Davis; Robert Lee Kearn; Willie Lloyd; Plaintiffs, Albert W. Ware; Intervenor-Appellant, Arthur Alan Poyner; Rick Dean Foster; George Segler; David Streets; Bryan Kirby Barrett; Jerry Mark; Bill Davis; Tim Florea; Herbert Schnee, Intervenors, v. Michael V. REAGEN, as Commissioner of Social Services of State of Iowa; David Scurr, as Warden of Iowa State Penitentiary, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was Patricia M. Hulting, Des Moines, Iowa.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Layne M. Lindebak, Assistant Attorney General, Des Moines, Iowa.

Before LOKEN, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, * and HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellant Albert Ware was a prisoner in the Iowa State Penitentiary ("ISP") when he was transferred under the Interstate Corrections Compact to a Florida prison. Ware and other inmates at the ISP moved in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa 1 for an Order to Show Cause why the prison officials should not be held in contempt of a consent decree in effect at the prison. Ware asserted that his transfer was intended to frustrate his nomination to a position on an elected inmate advisory council at ISP. The district court denied the motion. Ware appeals, and we affirm.

I.

In 1975, prisoners at the ISP filed a class action in the district court alleging that policies and practices at the prison violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The parties in 1981 entered into a settlement agreement, and in 1982 the district court approved the agreement, giving it the force and effect of a consent decree ("the Decree").

One of the provisions of the Decree was the formation of an elected inmate council, the Prisoners' Advisory Council ("PAC"), that would "meet regularly with the prison administration to discuss programs and inmate living concerns." The PAC was to consist of a prisoner representative of each living unit at the prison and of at least three representatives of recognized self-help organizations and the like. Otherwise, the Decree contained little to describe the PAC's organizational structure and means of operation leaving these matters to be "worked out by the parties."

The prison administration and the class subsequently agreed on Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws for the PAC. Under the Articles of Incorporation, the PAC was to have the authority to "develop, enact and implement" bylaws, with such power being "subject to the discretionary power of the Warden." Pursuant to such power, the Warden has the "final authority to approve or disapprove" any amendment. Bylaw BL-111:03.

Under the bylaws agreed to by the parties, one of the PAC members is to be from the "honor lifers," prisoners serving life sentences who have earned special privileges because of good behavior. Elections for the honor lifer member, along with the other representatives, are to be held every nine months. Before each election, a prison official is to determine that the nominees are eligible and willing to serve on the PAC. To be eligible, according to the bylaws, an inmate must live in the unit he represents and cannot have received a conviction of a major disciplinary report within a ninety day period before the election. 2 Bylaw BL-102:07.

If no nominee is both eligible and willing to serve, the position remains vacant until such time as it can be filled through either election or appointment. A prison official, entitled the "PAC staff liaison," is responsible for choosing the method of selection. Bylaw BL-103:02c; Bylaw BL-103:07. Similarly, if a vacancy in the honor lifer position arises before the expiration of the nine-month term of office, the PAC "may fill the vacancy by election or appointment at the discretion of the PAC staff liaison." Bylaw BL-101:04.

Under the Decree, the parties agreed that the district court would "have broad equitable authority to consider the purposes of the agreement, ... the security and order of the institution, as well as inmate rights, in reviewing disputes as to the agreement and its development and implementation." In its approval of the settlement, the district court explained that the prison had "consented to a greater than usual post-settlement supervisory role for the Court, which will allow closer and more frequent judicial security of the good and bad faith displayed by the parties in the performance" of the Decree.

II.

In early August, 1991, the PAC honor lifer representative, an inmate named David Streets, resigned prior to the expiration of his term. There was no alternate for the position, and the PAC chairman, an inmate named Arthur Poyner, wrote a memo to Deputy Warden John Henry, the PAC liaison, nominating Ware to the vacant slot. Ware had earlier been the chairman of the PAC, but had resigned when he earned the status of honor lifer. Ware was active in inmate programs during his imprisonment and wrote a column for the PAC newsletter.

Deputy Warden Henry did not accept Ware's nomination and instead asked Poyner to submit the names of three inmates from which the administration could choose. Poyner did so, proposing Ware and two others. Both of the other two nominees, however, declined the position. Ware indicated interest in serving, but prison officials refused to appoint him, as they apparently believed that Ware was trying to intimidate his way onto the PAC.

On August 19, Poyner wrote to then-Warden Crispus Nix complaining that the prison was acting inconsistently with the Decree by interfering in the replacement of a PAC representative. Poyner stated his "demand" that Ware be appointed. Responding to Poyner on August 26, Warden Nix called his demand "outlandish," and said that under the bylaws Poyner should allow the appointment to "rest with the proper authority."

Meanwhile, also in mid-August, Warden Nix learned from the Florida Department of Corrections that Florida would accept two Iowa inmates under the Interstate Corrections Compact, Iowa having previously taken two Florida inmates.

On September 3, 1991, the Deputy Warden for Programs at the ISP sent a request to the Department of Corrections that Ware be one of the inmates transferred to Florida. The transfer was based, according to the request, "primarily on [Ware's] manipulation of the system." The request stated that the transfer would "show him that it can happen to him as well as others, and give him an opportunity to change his attitude and direction." As Ware was serving a life sentence, he would "no doubt [ ] return to ISP," but, according to the writer, presumably with a "better attitude than he now possesses."

The relationship between prison officials and the PAC deteriorated. On September 4, Poyner wrote prison officials objecting to a raise in the surcharge at the prisoner's canteen. On September 9, the Warden decided that "because of the caustic correspondence of the PAC," he would not "make a decision as to who would be on the PAC" for another 60 days. On September 18, Poyner forwarded to officials a letter from Ware also objecting to the canteen surcharge. On September 24, Warden Nix responded to Ware calling him and Poyner "typical inmate bureaucrats" who were "probably just where they belong[ed]." Nix further stated that Ware and Poyner should expect no further reply since he did "not intend to respond on this subject any more." On October 9, Poyner wrote to the Governor of Iowa and the Director of the Department of Corrections, asserting that the "relationship between the ISP administration and the PAC has deteriorated to the point where outside intervention is called for."

On November 1, 1991, prison officials transferred Ware to a Florida prison. After his transfer, officials allowed an election to be held among the honor lifers to select a PAC representative.

The inmates, as the plaintiff class in the original class action, moved in the district court for an order of contempt, alleging that prison officials had violated the Decree. They contended that Ware was involuntarily transferred for the purpose of disrupting the effectiveness of the PAC and in retaliation for his and others' complaints that prison officials were failing to abide by the Decree. Ware's transfer was also alleged to have violated his and other inmates' First Amendment free speech rights. As a further contempt of the Decree, the inmates cited the prison administration's delay in permitting an honor lifer representative to be selected.

After hearing, the district court found that the prison officials reasonably believed Ware to be a troublesome inmate who had used intimidating tactics to persuade other inmates to allow him to serve as PAC representative. The district court concluded that the PAC bylaws did not preclude Ware's transfer, and that the bylaws, in any event, were not an integral part of the Decree. The district court also concluded that no constitutional issues were implicated by Ware's transfer. Holding that the plaintiff class had failed to prove noncompliance with a provision of the Decree by clear and convincing evidence, the district court refused to hold the prison officials in contempt.

Ware, as a member of the plaintiff class, appealed. We affirm the district court's denial of the contempt motion and its determination that Ware's transfer did not implicate rights protected by the Constitution.

III.

Review of the denial of a contempt motion is limited to determining whether the district court abused its discretion. Davis v. Bowen, 894 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 904, 110 S.Ct. 1922, 109 L.Ed.2d 286 (1990). Findings of fact may not be set aside unless demonstrated to be clearly erroneous....

To continue reading

Request your trial
39 cases
  • C. Line, Inc. v. City of Mali
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States State District Court of Southern District of Iowa
    • August 2, 2013
    ...the Court was in effect, that Defendants knew of the Order, and that Defendants failed to comply with the Order.24See Hazen v. Reagen, 16 F.3d 921, 924–25 (8th Cir.1994). C. Line is not, however, required to show that any claimed violation of a court order was intentional or willful. See Mc......
  • Weidt v. State, S–13–0053.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • November 19, 2013
    ...Doe v. Maywood Hous. Auth., 71 F.3d 1294, 1297 (7th Cir.1995); Downey v. Clauder, 30 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir.1994); Hazen v. Reagen, 16 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir.1994); In the Matter of Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d 109, 112 (5th Cir.1993); S.E.C. v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 439 (2d Cir.1987)......
  • Hancock v. Thalacker, C 95-0252-MWB.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa
    • July 9, 1996
    ...officials may not `retaliate' against a prisoner for exercising his constitutional right of access to the court...."); Hazen v. Reagen, 16 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir.1994) (holding it is impermissible to retaliate against a prisoner for the exercise of a constitutional right); Goff v. Burton, 7......
  • United States v. Blechman, 10-40095-01/02-SAC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas
    • June 22, 2011
    ...in contempt only if the court's order is sufficiently specific so as to put the alleged contemnor on notice. See, e.g., Hazen v. Reagen, 16 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Before a party can be held in contempt for violating a court order, he must have actual knowledge of the order and the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT