Head v. Knopp, 48902
| Decision Date | 09 December 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 48902,48902 |
| Citation | 587 P.2d 867,225 Kan. 45 |
| Parties | , 23 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1300, 88 Lab.Cas. P 55,225 Charles H. HEAD, Appellant, v. Marvin KNOPP and Dighton Livestock Auction Market, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
B. A. Lightfoot, Jetmore, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
John D. Osborn, of Calihan, Green, Calihan & Lloyd, Garden City, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees.
This is an action by an employee to recover wages which he contends were wrongfully withheld. The sole issue is whether plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff Charles H. Head filed this action on June 12, 1975, alleging that during the period from April 1, 1972, to October 1, 1972, defendant employers Marvin Knopp and Dighton Livestock Auction Market, Inc., withheld from him the sum of $525.00 in wages. Defendants' answer set up the statute of limitations as a defense. Plaintiff was subsequently given leave to amend his petition to increase the sum sought to $973.72, plus interest. On June 9, 1976, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff relinquished his claim for any amount exceeding $900.00, plus interest. On August 4, 1976, the court set aside the summary judgment on defendants' motion and allowed plaintiff to withdraw his relinquishment of claim. Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the action on the ground it was barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained the motion.
Plaintiff claims the trial court granted the motion on the basis of the two-year limitation period contained in K.S.A. 60-513, whereas defendants assert the trial court acted pursuant to 60-514(3), limiting actions to one year "upon statutory penalty or forfeiture." At oral argument both parties addressed themselves solely to 60-514(3).
In our judgment, the provisions of K.S.A. 60-513 do not apply. This action is controlled by 60-512(1), which assigns a three-year statute of limitations to all actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities expressed or implied, but not in writing, unless defendants are correct in their assertion that the action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 60-514(3).
Defendants' answer alleges any wages withheld were paid to plaintiff's creditors with his consent. Defendants have conceded, however, they had no written authorization from plaintiff to withhold wages. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was based upon K.S.A. 44-319, which states:
"(A ) No employer may withhold, deduct or divert any portion of an employee's wages unless: . . . (3) the employer has a signed authorization by the employee for deductions for a lawful purpose accruing to the benefit of the employee."
Defendants argue that since K.S.A. 44-323 provides "(w)illful violation of . . . this act (including 44-319) by an employer . . . is a class C misdemeanor," an action based upon 44-319 is one for a statutory penalty or forfeiture, and the action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
In his petition plaintiff does not cite or rely upon any statute that would entitle him to recover any amount in excess of wages actually earned. His cause of action arises from an oral contract for the payment of wages. K.S.A. 44-319 does not provide a basis for a cause of action, nor does it provide for a penalty or forfeiture. In an action by an employee against an employer for wages withheld, the statute provides the defense of consent to withhold must be based on an authorization signed by the employee. The fact plaintiff relied upon 44-319, the violation of which is controlled by 44-323, does not make the cause of action one which is based upon a statutory penalty or forfeiture and subject to a one-year statute of limitations. We hold plaintiff's cause of action does not seek a statutory penalty or forfeiture and is thereby controlled by the three-year statute of limitations provided in K.S.A. 60-512(1).
Defendants contend that even if the three-year statute of limitations applies, a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rupe v. Triton Oil & Gas Corp.
...payment becomes due, thus giving rise to a separate cause of action for each failure to make payment when due. See Head v. Knopp, 225 Kan. 45, 47, 587 P.2d 867 (1978) (where contract of employment fixes time for payment, action accrues at the end of each period of payment); Leonard v. Kleit......
-
Hailey v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 84-5111-CV-SW-0.
...statute of limitations which applies to a cause of action of the nature of plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. See Head v. Knopp, 225 Kan. 45, 587 P.2d 867, 869 (1978); Lorson v. Falcon Coach, Inc., 214 Kan. 670, 522 P.2d 449, 457 (1974). That statute provides for a three year limitation......
-
Smith v. Douglas Cable Communications
...to run, and he can recover only what has accrued within the statutory period before the commencement of his action.'" Head v. Knopp, 225 Kan. 45, 587 P.2d 867, 869 (1978) (quoting, 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 133, pp. 49-50). Without a better understanding of when plaintiff was paid......
-
Spor v. Presta Oil Co., Inc.
...See Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chev. Co., 227 Kan. 45, 605 P.2d 95 (1980); Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586, 603 P.2d 180 (1979); Head v. Knopp, 225 Kan. 45, 587 P.2d 867 (1978); Holder v. Kansas Steel Built, Inc., 224 Kan. 406, 582 P.2d 244 (1978); McGowen v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 215 Kan. 887......
-
See Dick and Jane Work: a Kansas Wage Payment Act Primer
...(b), (c). 149. K.A.R. 49-21-3(a). 150. K.S.A. 44-322(d). 151. K.S.A. 44-327; K.A.R. 49-21-4. 152. K.S.A. 60-512(1); Head v. Knopp, 225 Kan. 45, 46, 587 P.2d 867 (1978). 153. K.S.A. 60-511(1). 154. K.S.A. 60-514(3) (providing a one-year statute of limitations for an action upon statutory pen......