Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners In Optometry, 392

Decision Date17 June 1963
Docket NumberNo. 392,392
PartiesAgnes K. HEAD, doing business as Lea County Publishing Co., et al., Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Carol J. Head, New York City, for appellants.

Earl E. Hartley, Santa Fe, N.M., and Robert Pyatt, Gallup, N.M., for appellee.

Archibald Cox, Sol. Gen., for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice STEWART, announced by Mr. Justice WHITE.

This case comes to us on appeal from the Supreme Court of New Mexico. One of the appellants, Agnes K. Head, owns a newspaper in Hobbs, New Mexico. The other appellant, Permian Basin Radio Corporation, owns and operates a radio station there. Hobbs is in the southeastern corner of the State, close to the Texas border, and much of the area served by both the radio station and the newspaper lies in Texas. The appellants were enjoined from accepting or publishing within the State of New Mexico a Texas optometrist's advertising found to be in violation of New Mexico law. The appellants claim that the state law, as applied, imposes an unlawful burden on interstate commerce. Permian also argues that regulation of advertising by radio has been preempted by the Communications Act of 1934.1 We noted probable jurisdiction, 371 U.S. 900, 83 S.Ct. 207, 9 L.Ed.2d 163, and invited the Solicitor General to express the Government's views concerning the question of federal preemption. We have concluded that the judgment should be affirmed.

Section 67—7—13 of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated deals generally with the practice of optometry. It pro- hibits several varieties of unauthorized practice, and forbids even licensed practitioners from employing certain sales techniques, such as house-to-house canvassing, peddling on streets or highways, or offering lenses and frames as premiums.2 It also prohibits:

The purpose of this provision, according to the Supreme Court of New Mexico, is to 'protect * * * citizens against the evils of price-advertising methods tending to satisfy the needs of their pocketbooks rather than the remedial requirements of their eyes.' 70 N.M. 90, 94, 370 P.2d 811, 813. Similar laws have been enacted in many States to assure high standards of professional competence.3 The facts stated in the complaint were not disputed. Appellants received and published advertisements from Abner Roberts, an optometrist who resided and conducted his business in the State of Texas, just a few miles east of Hobbs. In the words of the complaint, this advertising consisted of 'the quotation of prices on eyeglasses and spectacles, and of the quotation of discounts to be offered on eyeglasses and spectacles.' The appellants conceded that the advertising violated § 67—7—13(m). Finding the statute applicable and violated, the trial court enjoined each of the appellants 'from accepting or publishing within the State of New Mexico advertising of any nature from Abner Roberts which quotes prices or terms on eyeglasses * * * or which quotes moderate prices, low prices, lowest prices, guaranteed glasses, satisfaction guaranteed, or words of similar import * * *.' The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed, ruling that the injunction did not unlawfully burden interstate commerce and that the State's jurisdiction had not been ousted by federal legislation. 70 N.M. 90, 370 P.2d 811.

I.

Without doubt, the appellants' radio station and newspaper are engaged in interstate commerce, and the injunction in this case has unquestionably imposed some restraint upon that commerce. But these facts alone do not add up to an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. As we said in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852, upholding the application of a Detroit smoke abatement ordinance to ships engaged in interstate and international commerce: 'In determining whether the state has imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, it must be borne in mind that the Constitution when 'conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce, * * * never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution'. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103, 23 L.Ed. 819; Austin v. State of Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 21 S.Ct. 132, 45 L.Ed. 224; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 22 S.Ct. 95, 46 L.Ed. 298; The Minnesota Rate Cases, Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 33 S.Ct. 729, 57 L.Ed. 1511; Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234, 52 S.Ct. 336, 76 L.Ed. 729; Collins v. American Buslines, Inc., 350 U.S. 528, 76 S.Ct. 582, 100 L.Ed. 672.' 362 U.S., at 443—444, 80 S.Ct., at L.Ed. 1511; Boston & Maine R. Co. v.

Like the smoke abatement ordinance in the Huron case, the statute here involved is a measure directly addressed to protection of the public health, and the statute thus falls within the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power.4 The legitimacy of state legislation in this precise area has been expressly established. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563. A state law may not be struck down on the mere showing that its administration affects interstate commerce in some way. 'State regulation, based on the police power, which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally stand.' Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, supra, 362 U.S., at 448, 80 S.Ct., at 818.

It has not been suggested that the statute, applicable alike to 'any person' within the State of New Mexico, discriminates against interstate commerce as such. Nor can we find that the legislation impinges upon an area of interstate commerce which by its nature requires uniformity of regulation. The appellants have pointed to no regulations of other States imposing conflicting duties, nor can we readily imagine any. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 83 S.Ct. 1022, 10 L.Ed.2d 84. We hold that the New Mexico statute, as applied here to prevent the publication in New Mexico of the proscribed price advertising, does not impose a constitutionally prohibited burden upon interstate commerce.5

II.

In dealing with the contention that New Mexico's jurisdiction to regulate radio advertising has been preempted by the Federal Communications Act, we may begin by noting that the validity of this claim cannot be judged by reference to broad statements about the 'comprehensive' nature of federal regulation under the Federal Com- munications Act.6 '(T)he 'question whether Congress and its commissions acting under it have so far exercised the exclusive jurisdiction that belongs to it as to exclude the State, must be answered by a judgment upon the particular case.' Statements concerning the 'exclusive jurisdiction' of Congress beg the only controversial question: whether Congress intended to make its jurisdiction exclusive.' People of State of California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 731, 69 S.Ct. 841, 844, 93 L.Ed. 1005. Kelly v. State of Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 10—13, 58 S.Ct. 87, 82 L.Ed. 3. In areas of the law not inherently requiring national uniformity,7 our decisions are clear in requiring that state statutes, otherwise valid, must be upheld unless there is found 'such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, (or) evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field.' Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217.

The specific provisions of the federal statute chiefly relied upon the support Permian's claim are those governing the granting, renewal, and revocation of broadcasting licenses.8 Under the broad standard of 'public interest, convenience, and necessity,' the Federal Communications Commission may consider a wide variety of factors in passing upon the fitness of an applicant. It is argued that the content of advertising is one of the factors which may be considered, and there is evidence that the Commission itself has on occasion so interpreted its authority.9 Further, the United States argues that the Commission has the authority to promulgate general regulations concerning the subject of advertising for the guidance of broadcasters. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 289—290, 74 S.Ct. 593, 98 L.Ed. 699. This grant of federal power, it is argued, is sufficient to oust state regulation of radio advertising.

Assuming this to be a correct statement of the Commission's authority, we are nevertheless not persuaded that the federal legislation in this field has excluded the application of a state law of the kind here involved. The nature of the regulatory power given to the federal agency convinces us that Congress could not have intended its grant of authority to supplant all the detailed state regulation of professional advertising practices, particularly when the grant of power to the Commission was accompanied by no substantive standard other than the 'public interest, convenience, and necessity.'10 The Solicitor General has conceded that the power of license revocation is not a plausible substitute for state law dealing with 'traditional' torts or crimes committed through the use of radio. We can find no material difference with respect to the less 'traditional' statutory violation here involved. In the absence of positive evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, we cannot believe Congress has ousted the States from an area of such fundamentally local...

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