Headen v. Headen

• Decision Date: 09 February 1911
• Citation: 171 Ala. 521,54 So. 646
• Parties: HEADEN v. HEADEN ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

54 So. 646

171 Ala. 521

HEADEN v. HEADEN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 9, 1911

Appeal from City Court of Talladega; G. K. Miller, Judge.

Suit by Andrew Headen against Nannie Headen and others. From an order overruling motions to strike certain pleas filed by defendants, together with exceptions taken thereto, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Pierce & McMillan, for appellant.

Knox Acker, Dixon & Blackmon, for appellees.

SOMERVILLE J.

The appellant, Andrew J. Headen, filed his bill in the court below, averring that he owned an undivided onefourth interest in certain property described therein, jointly with Nannie Headen, Kate Cunningham, and Ambrose Headen, and praying for a sale of the same for distribution among the owners. The respondents Nannie Headen and Kate Cunningham filed their answer denying that complainant owned any interest in the property; and filed also a number of special pleas.

Plea 1 avers that the property in question was owned and occupied as a homestead by Ambrose Headen, the father of complainant and respondents, who died on February 18, 1893, leaving surviving him his widow, Affiah Headen; that this homestead tract together with a four-acre tract not here concerned, was all the real estate owned by the decedent at the time of his death; and that the whole did not exceed in value the exemptions allowed by law to said widow. The plea further avers that on April 19, 1893, said widow filed her petition in the probate court of Talladega county, asking that the real estate of her deceased husband be set apart to her in fee simple; that proceedings were had thereunder in accordance with the statutes; and that a decree was rendered by said probate court ascertaining the jurisdictional facts confirming the report of the commissioners, and vesting the title to all of the decedent's estate in the said widow in fee simple. These proceedings of the probate court are all exhibited by copies thereof attached to the plea, and made a part thereof. The plea concludes by averring that the (alleged) fee-simple title of the said widow, their mother, has passed to them, to the exclusion of complainant, by devise from her.

Plea 2 avers, in substance, that the tract in question was owned and occupied as a homestead by Ambrose Headen at the time of his death, which occurred on February 18, 1893; that this tract, together with a four-acre tract used in connection with the homestead, was all the real property owned by decedent at the time of his death, and that it was less in area than 160 acres, and in value than $2,000; that decedent left surviving him his widow, Affiah Headen, and no minor children; and that under the laws then in force said property vested in said widow in fee; and that her title thus acquired passed to them, to the exclusion of complainant, by devise from her.

Complainant challenged the sufficiency of the facts set up in each of these pleas to negative his alleged interest in the property, by motions to strike and exceptions, based upon various grounds hereafter discussed. These motions and exceptions were overruled by the trial court, and the pleas held sufficient. The assignments of error present for review the propriety of this action.

We deem it not improper to preface our consideration of the questions here involved with the observation that the present status of our laws governing the homestead and estate of decedents, who leave a surviving widow or minor children, has been arrived at by the piecemeal processes of legislative amendment and accretion extending over a period of 40 years, and that as a system it has been lacking both in clearness and homogeneity; and that, in spite of numerous decisions of this court dealing with the meaning and operation of its various provisions, some obscurities and uncertainties have persisted to the present time. These have been in part removed by the revision of the statutes as they are found in the Code of 1907. Whether or not the complainant now owns any interest in the property described in the bill of complaint as an heir of his father, Ambrose Headen, depends upon whether or not by judicial proceedings or by operation of law, or by both agencies combined, the fee-simple title to the property was intercepted and vested in the decedent's widow, Affiah Headen; and this of course must be determined by the application of the laws in force in this state at the date of his death on February 18, 1893.

In order to keep clearly in mind these statutory provisions, as far as they are pertinent to this appeal, we here state them as follows:

(1) An act approved February 28, 1887, as cited in Code of 1886, p. 570: "That on and after the passage of this act, where any resident of this state shall die, or where any resident has heretofore died, leaving surviving him a widow, or widow and minor child or children, or minor child or children, and who, at the time of his death, owned in this state personal and real property, or either personal or real property, not to exceed the amount exempted to widows and minor child or children, as provided under the laws of this state, it shall be the duty of the probate judge of the county in which such property is situated, if there has been no administration of the estate of the decedent, and sixty days have elapsed since his death, upon the application of the widow, or if there be no widow, upon the application of some suitable person, who shall be appointed by such probate judge, as the next friend of such minor child or children, to appoint two commissioners, who shall be citizens of good standing in such county, whose duty it shall be to make a complete inventory of all the personal property so exempt, and to set apart to such widow, or widow and minor child or children, or minor child or children, all the personal and real property exempted to such widow, or widow and minor child or children, or minor child or children, under the provisions of the laws of this state."

(2) An act approved December 13, 1892, as found in Sess. Acts 1892-93, p. 138: "An act to vest title to homestead and exempt personal property in the widow, or widow and minor children, or minor children in estates that do not exceed the amount of exemption. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Alabama, that whenever the estate of a decedent who dies leaving an estate less in value than the amount exempted by law, either real or personal, or both, it is set aside as provided by law, to the widow, or to the widow and minor children, or to the minor children, the title to the property so set aside, whether real or personal, or both, shall vest absolutely in fee, in such widow, or widow and minor children, or minor children. Approved December 13, 1892."

The grounds upon which complainant assails the validity of plea 1 may be summarized thus: (1) Because the probate court was without jurisdiction to render a decree vesting title in the widow, or to render any decree at all. (2) Because the probate petition fails to aver the jurisdictional fact that the real and personal property of the decedent at the time of his death did not exceed in amount the exemptions allowed by law to the widow. (3) Because said petition does not show that the widow sought to have a homestead owned by decedent set aside to her, and that he owned no other real property. (4) Because said petition shows that the decedent owned real property other than his...