Heady v. Heady

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CARL R. GAERTNER; PUDLOWSKI, C.J., and SATZ
• Citation: Heady v. Heady, 766 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. App. 1989)
• Decision Date: 21 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 53644,53644
• Parties: Mark A. HEADY, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Lissa HEADY, Respondent-Appellant.

Page 489

766 S.W.2d 489

Mark A. HEADY, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Lissa HEADY, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 53644.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Five.

March 21, 1989.

Mary Ann Weems, Clayton, for respondent-appellant.

N. Barrett Braun, Clayton, for petitioner-respondent.

CARL R. GAERTNER, Judge.

This case involves the dissolution of a marriage of ten months duration. The trial court denied appellant's request for $9,600 in lump sum maintenance, found no marital property to be distributed and ordered each party to retain his or her separate property and to pay their respective attorney's fees. We affirm.

Lissa Heady (appellant) had been employed for five years by Mark Heady (respondent) in his cleaning business. When they decided to marry, an Antenuptial Agreement was prepared by Mark's attorney. A copy of this agreement was reviewed by Lissa's personal attorney prior to its execution. The relevant portions of this nine page agreement provided for each party to retain separate ownership of his or her property, whether acquired before or during the marriage, and including future earnings and income. In the event of dissolution of the marriage, each party expressly waived all rights to maintenance or to any interest in the separate property of the other. The assets of each party were disclosed by attachments to the agreement.

During the marriage, Mark and Lissa resided in her home with her two sons from a previous marriage. Each maintained separate bank accounts. Mark paid Lissa from $300 to $500 per month as his share of their living expenses. These payments ceased when the parties separated ten months after their wedding.

Mark commenced this dissolution proceeding and Lissa concurred in his allegation that the marriage was irretrievably broken. By her pleadings, Lissa sought a declaration that the Antenuptial Agreement was invalid and unenforceable due to lack of consideration and failure to provide full disclosure of assets. Mark and Lissa were the only witnesses at the hearing. The Antenuptial Agreement was received in evidence with the understanding the court would consider a motion to strike the agreement after Lissa's evidence had been adduced. No such motion is disclosed by the record before us.

The evidence regarding lack of disclosure of assets consisted of Mark's admission that he had failed to include within his four page listing of assets, valued in excess of $200,000, sports equipment, tools, cameras and clothing. The evidence regarding the value of these omitted items, although meager and indefinite, indicates their value to be insignificant in comparison to the value of the disclosed assets. The evidence regarding a failure of consideration was that the recited monetary consideration, $10, did not in fact change hands.

In her testimony, Lissa acknowledged she was not seeking any share of the assets Mark owned before the marriage or acquired after the marriage. She expressly relinquished any request for permanent or "periodic" maintenance. She did request the court to order payment of her attorney's fees and to award her "$400 a month for every month that he has been gone--we've been going through this," a total of $9,600.

The trial court ordered the marriage dissolved, denied maintenance, ordered each party to retain his or her separate property and found no marital property to be apportioned. The decree is silent regarding attorney's fees and makes no mention of the Antenuptial Agreement.

Lissa appeals charging trial court error in failing to determine whether the Antenuptial Agreement was valid and enforceable, in failing to set aside separate property and to divide marital property, and in failing to award her maintenance and attorney's fees. Appellate review of this court tried case is circumscribed by the oft-quoted standards of Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976) and we must affirm the judgment of the trial court "unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the...