Healer v. Saul

Decision Date03 December 2020
Docket NumberSA-19-CV-01497-ESC
PartiesJOHN HEALER, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY; Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
ORDER

This order concerns Plaintiff's request for review of the administrative denial of his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). After considering Plaintiff's Opening Brief [#14], Defendant's Brief in Support of the Commissioner's Decision [#15], the transcript ("Tr.") of the SSA proceedings [#10], the other pleadings on file, the applicable case authority and relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, and the entire record in this matter, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision finding Plaintiff not disabled and that no reversible legal error was committed during the proceedings. The Court will therefore affirm the Commissioner's decision finding Plaintiff not disabled.

I. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to review a decision of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The undersigned has authority to enter this Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), as all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge [#9, #11].

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff John Healer filed his application for DIB on July 14, 2017, alleging disability since January 17, 2017. (Tr. [#10] at 211, 230-42.) At the time of his DIB application, Plaintiff was a 55-year-old high school graduate with one year of a college education. (Tr. 211, 234.) Plaintiff has past relevant work as a service manager for various businesses, including a rental equipment company, mobile office rental company, and forklift dealership. (Tr. 235.) The related medical conditions upon which Plaintiff based his initial DIB application were reactive arthritis (formerly known as Reiter's syndrome), osteoarthritis of the knees, chronic pain syndrome, ankylosing spondylitis in multiple sites in the spine (arthritis of the spine), and other reactive arthropathies (inflammation of joints) on multiple sites. (Tr. 233.) Plaintiff's application for DIB was denied initially on October 12, 2017 and again upon reconsideration on April 24, 2018. (Tr. 64, 65.)

Following the denial of his claim, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. Plaintiff and his attorney Brooke Glidden attended the administrative hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Mark M. Swayze on December 3, 2018. (Tr. 26-52.) Plaintiff and vocational expert ("VE") Judith Harper provided testimony at the hearing. (Id.)

The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March 14, 2019. (Tr. 11-18.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured-status requirements of the SSA and applied the five-step sequential analysis required by SSA regulations. At step one of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 17, 2017, the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 13.) At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff to have the following severe impairments: ankylosing spondylitis, degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, and trigger finger (a condition in which fingers remain in a bent position). (Tr. 12-13.) The ALJfound that Plaintiff's claimed mental impairments were not severe. (Tr. 12-13.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in the applicable Social Security regulations so as to render Plaintiff presumptively disabled. (Tr. 13.)

Before reaching step four of the analysis, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except Plaintiff is only able to engage in occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing of ramps and stairs and is unable to engage in the climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 15-17.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff must also avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold temperatures, vibrations, and hazards including dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights. (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff is, however, able to engage in frequent bilateral handling and fingering. (Id.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is capable of performing his past relevant work as a manger in the field of customer services. (Tr. 17-18.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the Act, and therefore not entitled to receive DIB. (Tr. 18.)

Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision, but his request for review was denied by the Appeals Council on March 14, 2019. (Tr. 1-9.) On December 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant case, seeking review of the administrative determination.

III. Governing Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review

In reviewing the denial of benefits, the Court is limited to a determination of whether the Commissioner, through the ALJ's decision,1 applied the proper legal standards and whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)). Four elements of proof are weighed by the Court in determining if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination: (1) the objective medical facts; (2) the diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174. "'[N]o substantial evidence' will be found only where there is a 'conspicuous absence of credible choices' or 'no contrary medical evidence.'" Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hames, 707 F.2d at 164). The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). Conflicts in the evidence and credibility assessments are for the Commissioner, not the Court, to resolve. Id.

While substantial deference is afforded the Commissioner's factual findings, the Commissioner's legal conclusions, and claims of procedural error, are reviewed de novo. SeeGreenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994); Carr v. Apfel, 133 F. Supp. 2d 476, 479 (N.D. Tex. 2001).

B. Entitlement to Benefits

The term "disability" means the inability to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is disabled only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are so severe that he is unable to do his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, participate in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in significant amount in the national economy—regardless of whether such work exists in the area in which he lives, whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

C. Evaluation Process and Burden of Proof

As noted above, SSA regulations require that disability claims be evaluated according to a five-step process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2016). In the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). "Substantial gainful activity" means "the performance of work activity involving significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit." Newton, 209 F.3d at 452-53 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)-(b)). An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found disabled regardless of his medical condition, age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

Then, at the second step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is severe or a combination of impairments thatis severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). "An impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality having such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience." Stone, 752 F.2d at 1101 (internal quotation omitted). An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

Under the third step, an individual who has an impairment that meets or is medically equal to the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 ("the Listings") of the regulations will be considered disabled without the consideration of other vocational factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the claimant does not qualify under the Listings, the evaluation continues to the fourth step. Before commencing the fourth step, however, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is a "multidimensional description of the work-related abilities" a claimant retains despite medical impairments. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 2005).

At the fourth step, the ALJ reviews the RFC assessment and the demands of his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If an individual is capable of performing the work he has...

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