Healey v. Carter
Decision Date | 21 August 2018 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 76A03-1711-MI-2681 |
Citation | 109 N.E.3d 1043 |
Parties | Nathan HEALEY, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Robert CARTER, Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Corrections, et al., Appellees-Respondents. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Michael D. Dean, Gibson Law Office, Lafayette, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Robert Carter: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Nathan Healey pleaded guilty to criminal confinement, a Class D felony. Following his release from the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"), the DOC required Healey to register as a sex offender, even though Healey did not plead to the circumstances in which criminal confinement constitutes a sex offense. Having registered as a sex offender in the years since his release, Healey brought this declaratory judgment action seeking relief from the DOC's determination that he must register as a sex offender. The trial court denied Healey's petition along with a subsequent motion to correct errors. Healey now appeals raising the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in denying his petition for declaratory relief. Concluding the trial court did not err, we affirm.
[2] On July 4, 2007, Healey was charged with criminal confinement against a child, a Class C felony, and battery against a child resulting in bodily injury, a Class D felony. Seventeen months later, an additional count was added to the information charging Healey with criminal confinement, a Class D felony. In May 2009, Healey pleaded guilty to criminal confinement, a Class D felony, and, pursuant to the written plea agreement, the remaining charges were dismissed. Healey was sentenced to three years with all but 270 days suspended.
[3] After Healey served his executed sentence, the DOC required him to register as a sex offender for life because the victim of Healey's offense was less than "twelve (12) years of age at the time of the crime." Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(c) (2007) ; see Appellant's Second Amended Appendix, Volume 2 at 16. Healey registered on June 16, 2009.
[4] On May 3, 2017, Healey filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, asking to be relieved of his duty to register as a sex offender because he never pleaded to the age of the victim. Healey named the commissioner of the DOC, Robert Carter; the Steuben County prosecutor; and the Steuben County sheriff as respondents. Carter responded to Healey's petition through counsel, the Indiana Attorney General, seeking dismissal, or in the alternative, denial of relief.1
[5] The parties waived a formal evidentiary hearing and instead submitted a joint stipulation of facts to the trial court. On September 6, 2017, the trial court issued its Order:
Appellant's Second Amended App., Vol, 2 at 39-42. Healey filed a motion to correct error which was similarly denied. Healey now appeals.
[6] Healey contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition for declaratory judgment because the trial court may review the constitutionality of agency decisions and because the DOC's registration requirement violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.
[7] We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Kashman v. Haas , 766 N.E.2d 417, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). And where, as here, the issues involve matters of law, we review the trial court's decision de novo. City of Indianapolis v. Hicks , 932 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
[8] Healey claims the trial court erred in concluding "that it did not have authority to rule on the constitutionality of a sex offender registration decision made by the [DOC]." Appellant's Brief at 11. Specifically, the trial court concluded:
14. In accordance with existing Indiana Law the moment the trial court entered judgment upon Healey's plea of guilty to the crime of criminal confinement his fate was sealed regarding whether he was or was not required to register as a sex offender all in accordance with law barring any constitutional infirmities with the enacted legislation.
Appellant's Second Amended App., Vol. 2 at 42. Viewed in the context of Healey's Sixth Amendment claim, the trial court's order could be read as concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review a DOC action, "barring any constitutional infirmities with the enacted legislation." Id.
[9] In 1994, Congress adopted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act to encourage individual states to adopt sex offender registration statutes. Wallace v. State , 905 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. 2009). Soon thereafter, the Indiana General Assembly adopted the Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA"), also known as "Zachary's Law," which required persons convicted of certain sex crimes to register as "sex offender[s]." Id. at 375 (citing Act of March 2, 1994, Pub.L. No. 11-1994, § 7). SORA originally applied to eight crimes and included both registration and notification provisions. Id. Since then, SORA has been amended several times, and actively expanded "in both breadth and scope." Id.
[10] The General Assembly delegated administrative authority over SORA to the DOC. See Ind. Code § 11-8-2-12.4.
As an administrative agency, the DOC is governed generally by the Indiana Administrative Orders and Procedures Act ("IAOPA"). Pierce v. State Dep't of Correction , 885 N.E.2d 77, 88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). IAOPA provides the "exclusive means for judicial review of an agency action." Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-1. The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting its invalidity. Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(a). And, a reviewing court shall grant relief only if it determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been prejudiced by an agency action that is:
[11] The IAOPA expressly exempts "certain agency actions" of the DOC from administrative judicial review. Ind. Code § 4-21.5-2-5(6) ( ). However, nothing in this provision prevents judicial review over alleged violations of constitutional protections and...
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...to me that Apprendi applies to situations beyond judicial factfinding at an actual sentencing proceeding. See Healey v. Carter , 109 N.E.3d 1043, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that "[t]he issue presented here is not one of judicial fact-finding but rather a determination of the [Departm......
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