Healey v. Healey

• Decision Date: 26 January 1891
• Citation: 48 N.J.E. 239,21 A. 299
• Parties: HEALEY v. HEALEY.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

21 A. 299

48 N.J.E. 239

HEALEY

v. HEALEY.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Jan. 26, 1891.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

On bill, answer, replication, and proofs taken before a master.

Allen B. Endicott, (William I. Smyth, of counsel,) for complainant.

Joseph Thompson, for defendant.

GREEN, V. C. These parties are husband wife. They were married January 1, 1885. At that time the complainant was the owner of five small houses in West Philadelphia, unincumbered, and worth, as ascertained by their subsequent sale, $7,250. Their rental value was $780 per annum. The defendant was the owner of a house and lot at Atlantic City, known as the "Melos Cottage, "subject to a mortgage of $3,000, and a judgment of $800. The Melos cottage had a rental value of from $800 to $1,000 a year, and defendant refused an offer of $9,500, and consented, at one time, to sell it for $10,000. The complain ant seeks to recover from the defendant $1,000, which he alleges he loaned to her, at her special instance and request, to pay her indebtedness for taxes, water-rents, insurance, and a balance for building her house; and also a further sum of $250, to pay a balance she owed for a piano. Further, that his wife requested him to pay off the mortgage upon her property, promising at the time to sell the said property, and from the proceeds thereof to reimburse him the amount advanced by him, as well as the said $1,250; and alleges that, relying on said promises, he sold his houses, and from the proceeds paid off and satisfied the $3,000 mortgage and the $800 judgment. An agreement by a married woman, owning a separate estate, made with hpr husband, to reimburse him from such estate, for moneys loaned her, or paid by him for the benefit of her estate, on the faith of such agreement and at her request, will be enforced in equity against her separate estate. Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1372, 1373; Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. 537; Black v. Black, 30 N.J. Eq. 215, on appeal, 31 N. J. Eq. 798; Woodward v. Woodward, 3 De Gex, J. & S. 672; Butler v. Butler, 14 Q. B. Div. 831. Such agreement can only be enforced in a court of equity. Woodruff v. Clark, 42 N. J. Law, 198; Rusling v. Rusling, 47 N. J. Law, 1; Bank v. Brewster, 49 N. J. Law, 231, 12 Atl. Rep. 769. The foundation of the action is a contract made by the husband with his wife. Wood v. Chetwood, 44 N. J. Eq. 64, 14 Atl. Rep. 21, affirmed 45 N. J. Eq. 369, 19 Atl. Rep. 622. The defendant by her answer denies the contract, and the burden of proof is therefore upon complainant to prove the contract, and its execution by himself.

A great mass of testimony has been taken, much of which is irrelevant and immaterial to the real issue. Whether the complainant drank to excess, or whether the defendant cruelly deserted her husband, or left him only when strength, patience, and self-respect were well-nigh exhausted, would be material in another action, but throw but little light on the question whether complainant advanced money for the betterment of defendant's estate, or loaned her money, on her agreement to repay him from the proceeds of the sale of her property. The case is conspicuously barren of dates, amounts, checks, receipts, accounts, and instruments in writing connected with the transactions involved. The whole testimony, with the exception of two receipts, rests on the recollection of witnesses. A mortgage was produced before the master, but has been mislaid. The testimony of the complainant tends to prove the contention of his bill, but on the vital point of his case he is contradicted by his wife. The advancements claimed to have been made are amounts appropriated—First, to the payment of an installment of $1,500 on the mortgage on the defendant's property; second, to the final payment of $1,500 on said mortgage; third, to discharge the judgment of $800 held by James Byrne; fourth, other amounts claimed to have been loaned.

The evidence shows that complainant did from time to time furnish his wife with sums of money; the amounts are in most cases indefinite, the times uncertain, and the attendant circumstances obscure. It is undisputed, however, that the complainant and defendant, shortly after their marriage, made mutual wills, each leaving to the other his or her property, and that said wills were left in the possession of the defendant. That the defendant had charge of all domestic arrangements for the support and maintenance of the family. That during the first year after their marriage complainant sold one of his houses in West Philadelphia for $1,425 or $1,450. That the second year he sold two more of said houses for $1,300 each. That the rent of all of said houses, $13 a month, was, as collected by the complainant, handed over by him to the defendant, up to the time of the sale of the third house. That the defendant, in 1888, sold his two other houses for $1,500 each, none of the proceeds of which came to the hands of defendant. That the Melos cottage was rented during the years 1885 and 1886 for $800 a year. That the parties occupied it in 1887, and defendant kept boarders, from which business she made considerable money. That in 1888 she received $900 for its rent, and in 1889 the same amount, and that said rent was received by defend, ant. That $1,500 was paid February 2, 1886, on account of the mortgage on the Melos cottage, through Mr. Guillou, a conveyancer and real-estate agent in Philadelphia, and that $1,425 of that amount was derived from the sale of the first house of complainant, and was given by him to defendant for such purpose. That the balance of said mortgage, viz., $1,500, was paid by the defendant to Mr. Downs, the owner, January 10, 1887. That in December, 1886, complainant paid Joseph Byrne his judgment against defendant of $800. That complainant gave various sums of money to the defendant, and that her antenuptial debts were paid.

Were the moneys advanced by the husband to the wife voluntary gifts, or made under an agreement to repay it out of her separate estate? She contends the former; he, the latter. As to the mortgage, he is, to a certain extent, corroborated by the testimony of John Byrne, with whom the parties boarded in 1888. He says that there was a dispute between the parties at the dinner table; he does not know exactly what it was about, but the complainant went up-stairs, and brought papers down, which he showed to witness, whose testimony proceeds as follows: "Question. Well, it was nothing but an ordinary bond and mortgage, was it? Answer. That is what it was. Q. It did not say on it that he paid it, did it? A. It did not say on it that he paid it, but he asked her in my presence if he had not paid it. What it said there I do not exactly recollect. Q. And she said nothing in reply? A. She didn't make him no answer. Q. Now, just state what he said in relation to her paying him back this money, and how it was to be paid back. A. Well, the way he stated she was to pay it back was that the house was to be...