Healy v. Healy
| Decision Date | 21 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. DA 15–0504.,DA 15–0504. |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of: Stephanie G. HEALY, Petitioner and Appellee, v. John P. HEALY, Respondent and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Patrick T. Fleming, Esq., Fleming & O'Leary, PLLP, Butte, Montana.
For Appellee: C. Kathleen McBride, Corette Black Carlson & Mickelson, P.C., Butte, Montana, Peggy Probasco, Special Assistant Attorney General, Child Support Enforcement Division, Butte, Montana.
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶ 1 Stephanie Healy filed for dissolution of her four-year marriage with John Healy in July 2002. Following a November 2003 dissolution hearing, the Second Judicial District Court approved a stipulated Final Parenting Plan and Property Settlement Agreement. As part of the Agreement, John paid $600 per month in child support for the couple's two minor children. In November 2013, Stephanie requested modification of the child support arrangement. Following a hearing in November 2014, the District Court granted modification of the Agreement and increased John's child support to $2,048 per month. John appeals. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
¶ 2 Stephanie and John Healy were married in Butte, Montana, on September 26, 1998. A daughter was born in June 1999, and a son was born in November 2000. On July 10, 2002, Stephanie filed a petition for dissolution. The parties participated in a settlement conference on November 12, 2003, at the conclusion of which they entered into a Final Parenting Plan and Property Settlement Agreement (the Agreement). The Agreement was presented to and approved by the District Court.
¶ 3 The Agreement provided, in relevant part:
¶ 4 Following the dissolution, John consistently made timely child support payments; however, he neglected to establish the College Trust. Rather, he deposited the mandated annual funds into his employment-related 401(k) plan for a period of time prior to transferring it to a segregated account at a federal credit union. Stephanie established two savings accounts in the children's names and deposited her annual contributions into those accounts.
¶ 5 During the marriage, John worked, and continues to work, as a transmission operator at Northwestern Energy. Stephanie was, and continues to be, employed as an elementary school teacher at Butte Central Catholic School (BCCS). As a teacher, Stephanie's children may attend BCCS at a 50% discounted tuition. Upon reaching school age, the children began attending BCCS and John and Stephanie cooperatively paid the annual tuitions for the school. John paid approximately 60% and Stephanie paid the remainder. In 2008, after Stephanie remarried, she and John agreed that John would pay their daughter's school tuition and Stephanie would pay their son's. This practice continued until 2012 when their daughter got braces. John agreed to pay for the braces and Stephanie agreed to pay both tuitions for school year 2012/2013 with the understanding that the tuitions for the 2013/2014 school year would revert to the 50/50 arrangement and remain so thereafter.
¶ 6 In November 2013, Stephanie applied to the Department of Health and Human Services (DPHHS) Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) for review and modification of the ten-year-old Agreement. In January 2014, after obtaining relevant information from both parties and applying the Montana Child Support Guidelines, CSED calculated a monthly child support amount of $571/child/month, for a total of $1,142/month. John was to begin making these payments in February 2014. CSED served the modification notice and order on Stephanie and John, informing them that they had 20 days in which to object to the new terms. If neither objected, the modification would be submitted to the district court for approval and would become final. Neither party objected within 20 days and on March 24, 2014, CSED filed its modification motion with the District Court.
¶ 7 On April 2, 2014, John filed an objection in District Court arguing that CSED used his 12–month salary to calculate his annual income but used only a 9–month salary for Stephanie. He asserted that some income should be imputed to Stephanie for the summer months. CSED defended its calculation asserting that Stephanie worked only 9 months/year and did not, and had not historically, earned income during the summer months so no imputation of additional income was required. CSED moved the District Court to adopt the modified child support order while John urged the court to reject it and remand the matter to CSED for recalculation. In accordance with § 40–5–277(8)(b), MCA
, the District Court scheduled a hearing for May 30, 2014. This hearing was repeatedly continued before being held on November 17, 2014.
¶ 8 In June 2014, Stephanie learned that John had not paid their daughter's tuition for school year 2013/2014. Consequently, in July 2014, while the modification hearing was pending, Stephanie asked CSED to recalculate John's child support to include school tuition and submit a revised modification order for the court's approval. In August 2014, CSED submitted a revised modification order that included John's recalculated child support of $1,024/child/month, or a total of $2,048/month. John objected.
¶ 9 The District Court conducted a hearing on November 17, 2014. John initially argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over CSED's August 2014 proposed modification because that proposal had not been subject to the administrative process. The District Court concluded it had jurisdiction to hear all issues raised before it and commenced the hearing. Both John and Stephanie testified.
¶ 10 John challenged the salary upon which CSED based his child support obligation. While he acknowledged that the annual salary CSED relied upon was derived from his year-end or near-year-end employment pay stubs from 2010–2013, he explained that during those years as well as in 2014, he worked considerable overtime hours at double-pay. However, he claimed that Northwestern intended to eliminate all overtime opportunities beginning in 2015. He argued that CSED should have calculated his child support obligation using his regular hourly wage multiplied by a maximum annual hours of 2,080. Stephanie testified that John had told her in 2003, when they were negotiating John's initial child support, that he would “probably not be getting any more overtime.”
¶ 11 On April 16, 2015, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order (Final Order). The court found that the evidence presented supported CSED's use of past earnings to calculate John's child support. The court stated that John's “assertions that he will not continue to earn overtime and that his wages would decrease in the future should not be considered by child support because they are speculative in nature.” The District Court ordered John to pay child support in the amount of $2,048/month, retroactive to February 2014.
¶ 12 The District Court further concluded that John's failure to pay school tuition in accordance with the parties' past practices constituted a substantial change in circumstances which justified modification of the 2003 Agreement. The court determined that a modification addressing, among other things, school tuition was necessary, appropriate, and in the best interests of the children. Turning to the College Trust, the District Court ordered the parties to establish a 529 plan account for each minor child. John was ordered to deposit $17,531.18, constituting his annual $1,000 contribution from June 1, 2004 through June 1, 2013, with 10% interest per annum. Stephanie was ordered to deposit $4,481.23, constituting $300 per year plus 10% interest per annum. The parties were to make their respective deposits within 60 days of the date of the court's order.
¶ 13 John appeals.
¶ 14 The issues on appeal are:
¶ 15 Did the District Court have jurisdiction to decide the CSED motion when there was no showing of changed circumstances so as to make the existing child support obligation unconscionable?
¶ 16 Did the District Court misapprehend the evidence when it made findings with respect to John's future income potential?
¶ 17 Did the District Court err when it imposed a 10% interest penalty on the parents' required College Trust contributions?
¶ 18 We review a district court's findings of fact in parenting plans and child support orders to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review of the record convinces us that the district court made a mistake. In re the Parenting of M.C., 2015 MT 57, ¶ 10, 378 Mont. 305, 343 P.3d 569
. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine if they are correct. M.C., ¶ 10.
¶ 19 Whether a party is entitled to post-judgment interest is a conclusion of law which we review de novo. In re Marriage of DeBuff, 2002 MT 159, ¶ 15, 310 Mont. 382, 50 P.3d 1070
.
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