Healy v. N.Y., N. H. & H. R. Co.
Decision Date | 15 June 1897 |
Citation | 20 R.I. 136,37 A. 676 |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Parties | HEALY v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO. |
Action by John Healy against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. There was a verdict for plaintiff on the first count of the declaration, and for defendant on the second count, and both parties petition for a new trial on the respective counts. New trial denied on the second count, and granted on the first.
E. K. Parker, for plaintiff.
Prank S. Arnold, for defendant.
The verdict in this case was for the plaintiff on the first count of the declaration, and for the defendant on the second count. The first count is based upon an accident which happened to the plaintiff, who was a brakeman in the defendant's employ, on the 17th day of February, 1893, at Providence, while he was engaged in uncoupling cars; and the second count is based upon another accident which happened to the plaintiff, while in defendant's employ, in the same capacity, on the 16th day of June, 1893, at Carolina Station, in Charlestown. The defendant petitions for a new trial on the first count of the declaration, and the plaintiff petitions for a new trial on the second count thereof.
Of the nine distinct grounds upon which the defendant bases its petition for a new trial, we will consider but one, for the reason that we are of the opinion that a new trial must be granted on that ground, and it therefore becomes unnecessary to consider the others. The eighth ground on which defendant relies is this: "Because the verdict upon the first count of the plaintiff's declaration, as found, is against the special findings of the jury, and inconsistent therewith." The special findings referred to are as follows:
The release referred to in these special findings was as follows:
It will at once be seen, by an examination of the special findings aforesaid, that they are both inconsistent with themselves, and also inconsistent with the general verdict of guilty. The jury found: (1) That the release in question was executed by the plaintiff; (2) that it was executed voluntarily and of his own free will; (3) that it was read to plaintiff before its execution; (4) that it was not obtained by fraud; and (5) that, notwithstanding all this, the plaintiff did not know what he was executing when he signed it. The last-named finding is so clearly inconsistent with those which precede it as to show that the jury must have been mistaken either as to it, or as to the others; and, as it is impossible for the court to determine wherein the mistake exists, wo must hold that the entire findings were a nullity. Said first five findings are also clearly inconsistent with the general verdict of guilty. If the release was voluntarily executed by the plaintiff after it was read to him, and no fraud was practiced upon him in obtaining it, then it was a bar to his action, and the verdict should have been for the defendant, as it was only by ignoring the release as a valid and binding instrument that the plaintiff could be allowed to recover. The jury have practically found both ways as to this instrument,— first, that it was valid and binding, and, second, that it was invalid and of no avail,— and have based their verdict upon the latter theory. Such a verdict, of course, cannot be allowed to stand. And here we may suggest that it would be well for the trial court, in its discretion, to limit, as far as may be, the number of issues submitted to the Jury under the statute, in order that they may not be confused, and that such questions as are necessarily involved in the general verdict may be excluded, as far as possible, from the special findings. For the reasons above given, the defendant's petition for a new trial is granted on the first count.
We will now consider the plaintiff's petition for a new trial on the second count in the declaration. The facts set out in the record are briefly as follows: On the 16th day of June, 1893, the train upon which plaintiff was a brakeman left Stonington for Providence, and arrived at Carolina at about 7 o'clock a. m. Prior to arriving at this station, the train had stopped at Wood River Junction, in pursuance of a signal, to receive orders. Up to this time the train had been run on the east-bound track, which was the regular track for this train to run on. The train was under the government of the conductor, Joseph R. Adams. At the last-named station a train order was delivered to the conductor, directing him to run his train from that point to Kingston on the west-bound track, and informing him that he had right of track over all west-bound trains. In accordance with this order, his train took the west-bound track at Wood...
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