Healy v. Vaupel

• Decision Date: 17 January 1990
• Docket Number: No. 67122,67122
• Citation: 133 Ill.2d 295,140 Ill.Dec. 368,549 N.E.2d 1240
• Parties: , 140 Ill.Dec. 368, 58 Ed. Law Rep. 982 Tara Joan HEALY, Appellee, v. Wayne VAUPEL et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1240

549 N.E.2d 1240

133 Ill.2d 295, 140 Ill.Dec. 368, 58

Ed. Law Rep. 982

Tara Joan HEALY, Appellee, v. Wayne VAUPEL et al., Appellants.

No. 67122.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 17, 1990.

Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago (Stephen R. Swofford, Clayton L. Lindsey and Kathryn A. Spalding, of counsel), for appellant Wayne Vaupel.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor Gen., and Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Deborah L. Ahlstrand and Michael L. Loker, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), and Pickett, Barnett, Larson, Mickey, Wilson & Ochsenchlager, Aurora (Gary W. Mickey, of counsel), for appellantsBobbie Cesarek et al.

Howard R. Wertz, William P. Brady and Kurt P. Klein, of Gallagher, Klein & Brady, De Kalb, for appellee.

Baker & McKenzie, Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Byron H. Higgins, John T. Coleman and Corinne Seither, of counsel), for amicus curiae Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Tara Joan Healy, brought the present action in the circuit court of De Kalb County, seeking recovery for personal injuries she allegedly sustained in a gymnastics accident while a student at Northern Illinois University. The defendants, who are four employees of the university, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the Court of Claims provided the sole forum for the suit. The circuit judge refused to dismiss the plaintiff's action but certified, for purposes of a permissive interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308 (107 Ill.2d R. 308), the question whether the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The appellate court denied the defendants' application for leave to appeal. We allowed the defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 107 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

The plaintiff commenced her action on October 15, 1987. According to the amended complaint, the plaintiff, then a student at Northern Illinois University (NIU) and a member of the university's gymnastics team, was injured on October 23, 1985, at the NIU campus in De Kalb while participating in university-sponsored gymnastic activities. The plaintiff brought the present action against four university employees: athletic directors Robert Brigham and Susie Pembroke-Jones, gymnastics coach Bobbie Cesarek, and gymnastics team trainer Wayne Vaupel. In the amended complaint the plaintiff alleged that her accident was caused by the defendants' negligent performance of their respective job duties. The plaintiff requested compensatory damages for her injuries, which are described in the pleadings as involving the anterior cruciate ligament.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit, contending that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action and that the Court of Claims provided the only forum for the matter. The circuit judge denied the dismissal motions, relying on a decision of the appellate district in which his circuit was located. In a letter to counsel, the judge stated:

"I agree with counsel for the Defendants to an extent. The 4th District, on the basis of Robb v. Sutton, 147 Ill.App.3d 710 [101 Ill.Dec. 85, 498 N.E.2d 267] and Christensen v. City of Bloomington, 147 Ill.App.3d 702 [101 Ill.Dec. 77, 498 N.E.2d 259] would clearly decide this case for Defendants.

However, in Madden v. Kuehn, 56 Ill.App.3d 997 [14 Ill.Dec. 852, 372 N.E.2d 1131] the 2nd District has ruled to the contrary. In the Madden case the Court doesn't limit its opinion to malpractice cases. Therefore, I believe I am bound to follow it.

Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are denied." (Emphasis in original.)

On the defendants' motion, the circuit judge later certified the following question for purposes of a permissive interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308 (107 Ill.2d R. 308):

"Whether the statutory immunity provided in Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 127, para. 801, and Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 37, para. 439.8(d), giving exclusive jurisdiction of actions against the State to [the] Illinois Court of Claims, shall be applicable to the individual defendants in the instant action so as to bar jurisdiction[ ] of the Circuit Courts of the State of Illinois."

In the certification order, the trial judge declared that he was staying further proceedings in the circuit court pending resolution of the appeal (see 107 Ill.2d R. 308(e)). Also, the judge expressly noted that he had made no ruling with respect to the defendants' alternative argument that the present action was barred by the common law doctrine of public official immunity.

Pursuant to Rule 308, the defendants filed in the appellate court a timely application for leave to appeal. The appellate court denied the defendants' application. Following that, we allowed the defendants' petition for leave to appeal, under Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)). We have permitted the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois to file a brief as amicus curiae in behalf of the defendants. See 107 Ill.2d R. 345.

I

The plaintiff raises, as an initial matter, several procedural questions with respect to our decision to grant review in the instant case. The plaintiff first argues that we do not have jurisdiction over the present appeal. The plaintiff next contends that this court's decision to allow the present appeal was improvident. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the sole issue properly before us is whether the appellate court abused its discretion in denying the defendants' application for a permissive interlocutory appeal, and that no abuse of discretion occurred. We shall consider each of these arguments in turn.

The plaintiff first contends that we do not have jurisdiction over the present matter because an appeal to this court following the appellate court's denial of a Rule 308 application for appeal is provided for by neither the Illinois Constitution (see Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(c)) nor supreme court rule. The defendants' petition for leave to appeal to this court was granted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315(a). Noting that Rule 315(a) refers to "a decision sought to be reviewed," the plaintiff asserts that the rule requires, as a condition of our review, that the appellate court have rendered a decision on the merits of the case. It will be recalled that the appellate court denied the defendants' application for an interlocutory appeal and thus did not issue a decision on the merits of the question certified by the circuit judge. The plaintiff concludes that the defendants are, in effect, seeking an unauthorized direct review of the circuit court's order refusing to dismiss the present action.

The procedural course of the present appeal is not unique: this is not the first case in which we have allowed a party's petition for leave to appeal following a decision by the appellate court declining to grant the same party's Rule 308 application for leave to appeal. (See, e.g., Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill.2d 308, 137 Ill.Dec. 579, 546 N.E.2d 524; Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 124 Ill.2d 226, 124 Ill.Dec. 544, 529 N.E.2d 525 (denial by appellate court of application for leave to appeal in one of two consolidated cases); Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1986), 115 Ill.2d 1, 104 Ill.Dec. 751, 503 N.E.2d 308; O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital (1986), 112 Ill.2d 273, 97 Ill.Dec. 449, 492 N.E.2d 1322; Feen v. Ray (1985), 109 Ill.2d 339, 93 Ill.Dec. 794, 487 N.E.2d 619; County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 143, 92 Ill.Dec. 833, 485 N.E.2d 1076; Prewein v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1985), 108 Ill.2d 141, 90 Ill.Dec. 906, 483 N.E.2d 224 (denial by appellate court of application for leave to appeal in one of two consolidated cases); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill.2d 520, 88 Ill.Dec. 628, 478 N.E.2d 1354; Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc. (1983), 97 Ill.2d 104, 73 Ill.Dec. 337, 454 N.E.2d 197.) In one of those cases a question was raised concerning the propriety of our review of the matter, under Rule 315, following the appellate court's refusal to grant a Rule 308 application for appeal. In County of Du Page the court stated:

"Initially we would note that the county, in its brief before us, contends that the court should not have granted the petition for leave to appeal because the appellate court did not abuse its discretion when declining to hear the Rule 308 appeal. Our decision to review this case is not predicated on an abuse of discretion by the appellate court. Rather, it is based on this court's authority to consider any issue determined to warrant review. (See Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 4; 87 Ill.3d R. 315.) Thus we find the county's argument to be without merit." 109 Ill.2d at 147-48, 92 Ill.Dec. 833, 485 N.E.2d 1076.

We do not discern in Rule 315 a requirement that the appellate court have issued a decision on the merits as a condition of our review; in the present case, the appellate court's decision denying the defendants' application for appeal under Rule 308 was sufficient for purposes of review. Rule 315(a) provides, "Except as provided below for appeals from the Industrial Commission division of the Appellate Court, a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the Appellate Court may be filed by any party, including the State, in any case not appealable from the Appellate Court as a matter of right." The plain language of the rule authorizes the present appeal. Contrary to the plaintiff's understanding, the reference in Rule 315 to "the decision sought to be reviewed" cannot be understood to require, as a condition of our jurisdiction, that the appellate court have issued a decision on the merits in the particular case. The language cited appears in a nonexhaustive list of criteria this court will employ in...