Heaps v. Cobb

• Decision Date: 17 December 1945
• Docket Number: 18.
• Parties: HEAPS et al. v. COBB.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

45 A.2d 73

185 Md. 372

HEAPS et al. v. COBB.

No. 18.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 17, 1945

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Joseph Sherbow, Judge.

Mandamus by Caroline C. Cobb against Pearl Heaps and others constituting the Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of the City of Baltimore, seeking to recover for pension benefits on account of the death of her husband. Judgment granting the writ and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Helen Elizabeth Brown and Hamilton O'Dunne, Asst. City Solicitors, both of Baltimore (Simon E. Sobeloff, City Solicitor, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

Philip B. Perlman and Charles C. G. Evans, both of Baltimore, for appellee.

R. E. Lee Marshall, F. Murray Benson, Charles C Wallace, Eben J. D. Cross, Paul F. Due, Wilson K. Barnes, and Wirt A. Duvall, Jr., all of Baltimore, amici curiae.

Before DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, MELVIN, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

The following opinion, prepared by Judge MELVIN, was adopted by the Court, after his death, and ordered filed as the opinion of the Court.

The appellee is the widow of the late George Cobb who, at the time of his death on June 17, 1943, was the Chief Engineer of Baltimore City and a member in good standing of its 'Employees' Retirement System.' The appellants are the members of the Board of Trustees of said System which was established by municipal ordinance No. 553 approved February 1, 1926, and now codified as Article 30 of the City Code. The appellants refused to grant the appellee's petition for pension benefits under the ordinance and when, subsequently, the Baltimore City Court issued the writ of mandamus directing them to do so, this appeal was taken.

The particular portion of the ordinance which applies to the case at bar is Subsection 9 of Section 6. It reads as follows:

'Accidental Death Benefit

'(9) Upon the receipt of proper proofs of the death of a member by the Board of Trustees there shall be paid to the member's designated beneficiary or to his estate the amount of his accumulated contributions, and if, upon the receipt of evidence or proofs that such death was the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring at some definite time and place while the member was in the actual performance of duty, the Board of Trustees shall decide that the death was the result of an accident in the performance of duty and not caused by wilful negligence on the part of the member there shall be paid in lieu of the ordinary death benefit provided by the contributions of the City, a pension of one-half of the average final compensation of such employee, '(a) To his widow, to continue during her widowhood; * * *.'

In pursuance of the aforegoing provisions, and in due course after the death of her husband, Mrs. Cobb filed with the appellant Board her application for the 'accidental death benefit' prescribed by this subsection. The claim was made out on the usual detailed form, signed and sworn to by the claimant. Attached to it were the proofs of death, including the attending physician's certificate, the autopsy record and the Certificate of Death issued by the Baltimore City Health Department. These proofs of death concur in the finding that Mr. Cobb's death resulted from injuries received in an automobile accident. It is relevant to state here that the record shows no evidence to the contrary on this point.

The appellee's claim was filed on July 7, 1943, and the appellant Board set August 2nd as the date for a hearing on it. In doing so, it instructed its secretary to notify the claimant's counsel that she 'would be permitted to file an affidavit with the understanding that if the Board desires to call on her later it would do so.' On the appointed date the appellant Board held the hearing as scheduled, and had before it Mrs. Cobb's statement, under oath, setting forth the facts relating to the accident, together with the proofs of death and also the oral testimony of the City's Assistant Chief Engineer and its Highway Engineer. Their testimony was to the effect that Mr. Cobb's duties as Chief Engineer were manifold and extensive, requiring him to be on duty, or subject to call, at all hours of day and night; that on the morning of the fatal accident, June 14, 1943, Mr. Cobb had an official appointment for ten o'clock at his office to join a committee of other city officials on an inspection trip, in which they were to use the City Comptroller's car. It was also developed before the appellant Board, and conceded to be a fact in the case, that it had been the custom for many years for the City to provide transportation for the Chief Engineer to and from his office and his home, and when otherwise engaged on the City's business.

Further facts developed before the Board, and appearing in the record without contradiction, are that sometimes Mr. Cobb used his own automobile on City business, and that, by way of recognition of that practice and for the protection of the City, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore was named as one of the insured in the insurance policy covering Mr. Cobb's private car.

On the morning of the fatal accident, June 14, 1943, the City's car assigned to the Chief Engineer called for Mr. Cobb as usual to take him to his office, where he had the ten o'clock appointment above referred to. However, he decided to use his own car, in substitution for the one provided by the City, inasmuch as his wife and his aunt were going along with him for part of the way, the reason given for this substitution of cars being that Mr. Cobb thought that the presence of two members of his family in a City car might be misconstrued.

While on his way to the City Hall on Thirty-third Street near Ednor Road, being on the direct route customarily taken by him in going to and from his office, Mr. Cobb 'slumped forward in his seat and lost control of the car which veered to the right, striking first a lamppost and then a tree.' The accident happened about ten minutes before ten o'clock that morning. Mr. Cobb remained at the hospital until June 17, 1943, when he died as the result of internal injuries sustained in the accident.

With all this testimony, documentary and oral, before it, the appellant Board decided at the hearing on August 2, 1943, to call for an opinion from the City Solicitor, who is the Board's legal adviser under the terms of the ordinance in question. Another hearing before the Board was held on October 4, 1943, at which time it had before it a written opinion from the City Solicitor, dated September 10, 1943. Additional testimony was submitted at this hearing and argument of counsel heard. Then, on October 18, 1943, the Board held a meeting at which a motion to grant Mrs. Cobb's application was lost by a vote of two to three.

According to the record, no facts were stated showing the basis of this action and no reason given, except the following entry in the minutes of that meeting: 'The motion was lost by a majority vote, therefore, accidental death benefits were denied in the case of George Cobb, 19540, because he was not in the actual performance of duty at the time of the accident. Ordinance No. 553-6(9).'

Thereafter, the Board granted the request of appellee's counsel for a reconsideration of the claim. February 21, 1944, was set as the date for a special meeting at which re-argument would be heard. The minutes of that meeting show that 'after hearing testimony, the Board referred the case with all the records to the present City Solicitor for his opinion.' In response to that request the Board received, under date of April 24, 1944, another written opinion from its legal adviser, the successor to the City Solicitor who wrote the one of September 10, 1943. Finally, on June 5, 1944, after further consideration, the Board went on record as re-affirming its original action, refusing to grant the appellee's claim.

The decision of this appeal depends on whether or not (1) on the undisputed facts the appellee was entitled under the ordinance to the pension claimed, and (2) the appellant's refusal of the pension amounted to 'arbitrary' action,--that is to say, was without any supporting evidence. As stated by the Supreme Court in the Chicago Junction case, 264 U.S. 258, 44 S.Ct. 317, 320, 68 L.Ed. 667, 'To refuse to consider evidence introduced or to make an essential finding without supporting evidence is arbitrary action.'

Administrative boards in general may be said to act in a quasi judicial capacity insofar as they have the duty to hear and determine facts and, based on them, to make decisions. Moreover, such decisions carry with them the presumption of validity and, where the statute or ordinance provides for an appeal to the courts, will not be disturbed on review if the record shows substantial evidence to sustain the findings. The boards, however, are not clothed with judicial authority, which the legislature has no power to confer upon them, Article 4, Md. Constitution; Dal Maso v. Board, etc., 182 Md. 200, 34 A.2d 464, and their decisions, when they impair personal or property rights, are not irreviewable. The legislature is without authority to divest the judicial branch of the government of its inherent power to review actions of administrative boards shown to be arbitrary, illegal or capricious, and to impair personal or property rights; but the courts are likewise without authority to interfere with any exercise of the legislative prerogative within constitutional limits, or with the lawful exercise of administrative authority or discretion. As stated by this Court in the recent case of Hecht v. Crook, 40 A.2d 673, 677, regarding the construction of the ordinance: 'In the last analysis, the question as to what decisions of an...