Heard v. Heard

• Court: Texas Civil Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: GANNON; Presiding; BELL
• Citation: Heard v. Heard, 305 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957)
• Decision Date: 20 June 1957
• Docket Number: No. 13084,13084
• Parties: C. E. HEARD et al., Appellants, v. R. E. HEARD et al., Appellees.

Page 231

305 S.W.2d 231

C. E. HEARD et al., Appellants, v. R. E. HEARD et al., Appellees.

No. 13084.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Galveston.

June 20, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 1957

W. E. Barron, Navasota, and George Red and Pat N. Fahey, Houston, for appellants.

Robert W. Dean, Navasota, and James W. Dilworth, F. L. Andrews, and Andrews, Kurth, Campbell & Bradley, Houston, for appellees.

Malcolm R. Wilkey, U. S. Atty., and Willard I. Boss, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, for United States of America, amici curiae.

GANNON, Justice.

Appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, basing their motion on two grounds, but we find it necessary to discuss only the first which asserts that the appeal bond was not filed with the Clerk of the trial court 'within thirty days after the date of rendition of judgment' [Rule 356, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure], even when that rule is read in the light of Rule 306a, T.R.C.P., providing that 'In determining the periods within which the various steps of an appeal must be taken, the date of rendition of a judgment or order shall be deemed to be the date upon which the written draft thereof was signed by the trial judge as stated therein.' (Emphasis supplied.)

The original transcript certified by the Clerk of the trial court includes a copy of a duly approved and proper appeal bond, the date of filing being shown as July 24, 1956. Appellees seek, under the second ground of their motion, to impeach by affidavit the certification in the transcript of the filing of the bond on the date shown, but for purposes of our discussion we assume that the appeal bond was filed on July 24, 1956.

Trial below was to the court without a jury. There was no motion for new trial, and the appeal is directly from the judgment. It appears from the copy of the judgment certified in the transcript that the case went to trial on June 4, 1956, and that on June 13, 1956, the court, 'being of the opinion, and so finding, that the law and the facts are with the defendant and cross-plaintiff, Belle Heard, enters [renders] the following judgment:', being the judgment appealed from. July 24, 1956, is more than thirty days after June 13, 1956. The original transcript shows an '(s)' before the signature of the trial judge on the judgment. Also, the original transcript shows the following underneath the court's said signature: '(s) and filed June 26, 1956.' However, by supplemental transcript the original of the judgment has been brought forward. This original, actually signed by the trial court, bears only the following:

Max M. Rogers

Judge Presiding

On this original draft there is no '(s)' before Judge Rogers' signature, and no notation as follows: '(s) and filed June 26, 1956.' The presence in the original transcript of the '(s)' before Judge Rogers' signature, and the notation of filing, is explained by affidavit of the Clerk of the trial court, which also appears in the supplemental transcript. This affidavit reads in part:

'In preparing the original transcript of the Judgment rendered in that certain cause Numbered 20,023 and styled C. E. Heard et al. v. R. E. Heard et al., pending in the District Court of Grimes County, Texas, for the 12th Judicial District, I made the following notation on the transcript copy of the Judgment, following the signature of the Judge: '(s) and filed June 26, 1956.' This notation refers to the date I, as District Clerk, signed my name on the outside of the jacket of said Judgment and filed the same in my office and does not in any manner refer to the date the Judgment was signed by Judge Max M. Rogers. I do not, of my own personal knowledge, know when the Judgment was signed by the Judge although there is nothing on file in my office to indicate that it was signed and rendered on any day other that June 13, 1956, this being the date stated in the Judgment.'

It does not appear from the transcript, as was the case in Cox v. Payne, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 957, that appellants at any time filed a motion in the trial court asking the court to amend its judgment by changing the date recited therein as the date of its rendition, to wit: June 13, 1956, to any other date, or to have the judgment show on its face that it was not signed until a later date. This is probably due to the fact, as stated in one of the briefs, that 'no one, including Judge Rogers * * * seems to have any independent recollection.' Appellants' contention, which is that the judgment was actually signed June 26, 1956, is based on the appearance, underneath the copy of the signature of the trial judge shown in the original transcript, of the notation: '(s) and filed June 26, 1956', and on the further fact that on the 20th day of August, 1956, the trial court extended the time to file the statement of facts in order to comply with Rule 306a, T.R.C.P. This motion was granted fifty-five days after June 26, 1956, the date appellants contend the judgment was signed, but sixty-eight days after June 13, 1956, the date of rendition recited in the judgment. The appellants say, 'The trial judge knew the date on which he rendered judgment. His act in extending the time would have been void and ineffective under Rule 381 if judgment was rendered on June 13. Granting the request for an extention of time to file amounted to a holding by the trial judge who knew the facts that judgment was not rendered on June 13, and with the other facts shown above [the notation of filing on June 26] fixes the date of rendition and signing the judgment as June 26.'

Nothing is better settled than that appellate jurisdiction, including timely filing of the appeal bond, must affirmatively appear from the record. 3-A Tex.Jur., Sec. 384, page 477. It is clear the judgment appealed from was actually rendered on June 13, 1956. It is also clear that no appeal bond was filed within thirty days after that date. So, unless we are free to determine of the basis of the foregoing that the written draft of the judgment was not signed until such a time that the date of the filing of the appeal bond, July 24, 1956, was within thirty days after the date of such actual signing, we are plainly without jurisdiction.

On the record before us, we feel bound to accept for all purposes the date of rendition of the judgment recited therein, to wit: June 13, 1956, from which it follows that we are without jurisdiction to enter any order other than to dismiss the appeal.

Under Rule 356, T.R.C.P., the appeal bond must be filed within thirty days after the date of rendition of the judgment appealed from. Under Rule 306a, for the purpose of determining the time for the various steps on appeal, the date of the rendition of judgment or order appealed from is deemed to be the date upon which the written draft is signed by the trial judge 'as...