Hearndon v. Graham

Decision Date14 April 1998
Docket NumberNo. 92-3842,92-3842
Parties23 Fla. L. Weekly D1039 Paula Jean HEARNDON, Appellant, v. Kenneth L. GRAHAM, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Norm LaCoe and Horace N. Moore, Sr., Gainesville, for Appellant.

Michael W. Jones, Gainesville, for Appellee.

VAN NORTWICK, Judge.

Paula Jean Hearndon appeals the trial court's order dismissing her complaint against Kenneth Graham, Hearndon's stepfather, for injuries that resulted from sexual abuses he allegedly committed upon her beginning in 1968 when she was 8, and continuing until 1975 when she turned 15 (at which time, according to the complaint, Graham allegedly murdered Hearndon's mother). The complaint was dismissed with prejudice on the sole ground that the alleged cause of action was barred, as a matter of law, by the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(o), Florida Statutes (1987). Hearndon argued to the trial court that it should apply the doctrine of delayed discovery of an injury to toll the statute of limitations in her case on the basis that, as an adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse, she suffered from so-called "traumatic amnesia," or a related syndrome, caused by the abuses allegedly perpetrated by Graham, thereby explaining why earlier commencement of the action had not been possible. The trial court dismissed Hearndon's complaint citing the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Neither party brought to the court's attention the then newly enacted amendment to the statute of limitations contained in chapter 92-102, section 1, Laws of Florida, codified in section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes (1993). On appeal, however, in addition to arguing that the trial court erred in failing to apply the delayed discovery rule, Hearndon also urges that we should reverse the order of dismissal on the basis of that amendment as well. 1 For the following reasons, we affirm and certify a question of great public importance.

Lindabury v. Lindabury

An action for damages from child abuse is governed by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to civil actions for injury or damages caused by an intentional tort. See § 95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (1987). Under section 95.031, "the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues." The cause of action will have accrued "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). Generally, the last element in the case of the tort cause of action of battery is complete upon the physical contact which constitutes the battery. See Lindabury, 552 So.2d at 1117; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 899, 1 cmt. c (1979).

Lindabury involved an action brought in 1985 in which Lindabury sought damages from her father and her mother based on alleged sexual batteries perpetrated by her father beginning in 1955 and continuing through 1965, the memories of which she allegedly had repressed but had "rediscovered" when she sought psychological counseling just prior to filing the complaint. Reading subsection 95.11(3)(o), Florida Statutes (1987), in conjunction with subsection 95.031(1), the Lindabury court found that "[i]t is beyond contradiction that the alleged incestuous acts, if taken as true, damaged the appellant at the time they occurred," Lindabury, 552 So.2d at 1117, and that the last contemporaneous injury suffered by Lindabury was sufficient to complete the cause of action and commence the limitations period. Thus, the court held that Lindabury's cause of action accrued no later than 1965 and that the action was therefore time-barred as a matter of law. Id. at 1117-18. Judge Jorgenson dissented, however, advocating factual if not judicial recognition of the blocking effect such heinous acts might have on the victim's ability to remember, and endorsing the application of the delayed discovery rule to permit the action to proceed. Id. at 1118-21 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).

Chapter 92-102, Laws of Florida

As noted above, by chapter 92-102, Laws of Florida, the Florida Legislature amended section 95.11 to add subsection (7) specifically dealing with intentional torts based on acts of abuse. As a result, subsection (7) now provides, as follows:

FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE. An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01 or s. 415.102, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later. (emphasis added)

Most significantly, however, section 2 of chapter 92-102 further provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a plaintiff whose abuse or incest claim is barred under section 1 of this act has 4 years from the effective date of this act to commence an action for damages." The effective date of chapter 92-102 was April 8, 1992. Hearndon argues that she is entitled to the benefit of these amended provisions.

In Roof v. Wiley, 622 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), the Second District ruled that with the passage of chapter 92-102, the Legislature removed the statute of limitations bar to the right of victims of certain forms of past intentional abuse to commence an action, even though the cause of action had been time-barred prior to the 1992 amendment of section 95.11. Forming the underpinnings of that decision was the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945), which held in civil cases that where the lapse of time has not vested a party with title to real or personal property, "a state legislature, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, may repeal or extend a statute of limitations, even after right of action is barred thereby, restore to the plaintiff his remedy, and divest the defendant of the statutory bar." Id., 325 U.S. at 311-12, 65 S.Ct. at 1141. In so ruling, the Supreme Court reaffirmed an earlier decision in Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483 (1885); see also International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 441, 50 L.Ed.2d 427 (1976).

Notwithstanding, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the Second District's decision in Roof. In Wiley v. Roof, 641 So.2d 66 (Fla.1994) (Wiley ), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Legislature's attempt in chapter 92-102 to revive time-barred claims founded on alleged childhood abuse or incest, expressly adopting the dissenting view expressed in Campbell v. Holt and holding that once an action has been barred by the statute of limitations, "a property right to be free from a claim has accrued" and the Legislature cannot subsequently "change [its] mind" and resurrect it. Id. at 68. Thus, under the rule established in Wiley, section 95-11(7) cannot benefit Hearndon here.

Equitable Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations

By itself, however, Wiley is not dispositive of the issue before us. Wiley addressed only the issue of the Legislature's power to resurrect a time-barred cause of action once the statute of limitations defense has vested. It did not address the judicial prerogative to recognize an exception to or to toll the running of the statute of limitations to prevent an injustice in certain extraordinary circumstances by the application of the equitable doctrine of delayed discovery.

As in Lindabury, the appellant argues here that the operation of the statute of limitations should be tolled by the equitable doctrine of delayed discovery based upon the appellant's traumatic amnesia caused by the very abuse for which she seeks recovery. In recent years, courts have recognized exceptions to the statute of limitations in cases where it has been alleged and proven that the plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered his or her cause of action within the limitations period. This is commonly seen in medical malpractice and wrongful death actions. See, e.g., Sara L. Johnson, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Applicability of "Foreign Object" Exception in Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitations, 50 A.L.R.4th 250 (1986). Courts have also applied the delayed discovery rule in instances of childhood sexual abuse involving alleged traumatic amnesia or posttraumatic stress disorder. See, e.g., Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Emotional or Psychological "Blocking" or Repression as Tolling Running of Statute of Limitations, 11 A.L.R. 5th 588 (1993); Annotation, Posttraumatic Syndrome as Tolling Running of Statute of Limitations, 12 A.L.R.5th 546 (1993); Michael Krauss, Fundamental Fairness in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 8 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev., 205 (1997); Gary Hood, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Civil Suits Brought by Adult Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse: A Simple Solution, 1994 U. Ill. L.Rev. 419 (1994). In the majority of these cases, as in the present one, the plaintiff claims to have repressed all memory of the injury and the incident causing the injury until some time after the age of majority and after the limitations period has run. Although no Florida court has directly addressed the effect of traumatic amnesia on a limitations period, the delayed discovery rule was thoroughly examined by Judge Jorgenson in his Lindabury dissent. There, he urged against the mechanical application of the statutory limitations period in instances where adult victims of childhood incest have presented sufficient evidence from which the fact finder could determine that the victim, "suffering from posttraumatic stress syndrome, blocked or repressed conscious memory of the alleged abuse throughout the limitations period." 552 So.2d at...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • June 26, 2000
    ...Lindabury, explaining that the majority of courts have applied the discovery rule in repressed memory cases. Hearndon v. Graham, 710 So.2d 87 (Fla.Ct. App.1998). The Washington legislature nullified Tyson by enacting a discovery rule in such cases, and the Tyson majority opinion has not bee......
  • Major League Baseball v. Morsani
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • July 12, 2001
    ...County Administrator v. Sullivan, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Sept. 25, 1997),2 and the district court's decision in Hearndon v. Graham, 710 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998),3 the court certified the above II. THE APPLICABLE LAW The standard of review governing a trial court's ruling on a moti......
  • Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 98-01327.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • March 31, 1999
    ...estoppel defenses to the statute of limitations. The First District Court of Appeal dealt with a similar issue in Hearndon v. Graham, 710 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). In Hearndon, the court held that the defense of delayed discovery was precluded by section 95.051. See id. at 92. That cour......
  • Hearndon v. Graham
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • September 14, 2000
    ...THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OF DELAYED DISCOVERY RECOGNIZED IN CHAPTER 92-102, LAWS OF FLORIDA? Hearndon v. Graham, 710 So.2d 87, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified question concerns the effect of our decisio......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT