Hearne v. Smylie

• Decision Date: 10 January 1964
• Docket Number: No. 3815.,3815.
• Citation: 225 F. Supp. 645
• Parties: Walter R. HEARNE and Stanley E. Whitman, Plaintiffs, v. Robert E. SMYLIE, Governor of the State of Idaho, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

225 F. Supp. 645

Walter R. HEARNE and Stanley E. Whitman, Plaintiffs, v. Robert E. SMYLIE, Governor of the State of Idaho, et al., Defendants.

No. 3815.

United States District Court D. Idaho, S. D.

January 10, 1964.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

McDevitt & McDevitt, H. J. McDevitt, Pocatello, Idaho, Anthony A. Nelson, Boise, Idaho, for plaintiffs.

Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., of Idaho, Keith Schofield, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, Idaho, for defendants Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., Arnold Williams, Secretary of State, Joe Williams, State Auditor, Marjorie Moon, State Treasurer.

Martin V. Huff, Asst. Prosecuting Atty., of Ada County, Boise, Idaho, for County Commissioners & Auditor of Ada County.

Hugh Maguire, Pros. Atty., Bannock County, Pocatello, Idaho, for the County Commissioners and Auditor of Bannock County.

Elam, Burke, Jeppesen & Evans, Blaine F. Evans, Boise, Idaho, for Governor Robert E. Smylie.

Before KOELSCH, Circuit Judge, and MATHES and FRED M. TAYLOR, District Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Hearne, a resident of Pocatello and a qualified voter in Bannock County, Idaho, and plaintiff Whitman, a resident of Boise and a qualified voter in Ada County, Idaho, commenced this action on November 1, 1962, seeking a declaratory judgment and equitable relief against the Governor, the Attorney General, and various other State and county officials of the State of Idaho. In keeping with the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2281, a three-judge court was convened. Thereafter, issues were joined and litigated. The case is now before us for decision following a trial upon the merits.

The declaratory relief which plaintiffs ask embraces a determination and declaration that certain of the provisions of the Idaho Constitution and statutes, providing for the apportionment and manner of election of State legislators, contravene the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by operating to deny to plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. See: Idaho Const. Art. III, §§ 2, 4, 5; and Idaho Code § 67-203, as amended, and its predecessors.

Corollary to this adjudication, the Court is asked to declare the present Idaho Legislature to be illegally constituted and illegitimate, and to enjoin all further election of members of the Legislature under the present system.

Plaintiffs invoke Federal jurisdiction upon the following grounds:

"The jurisdiction of this Court and the Plaintiffs' right to bring this action are found under the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC Sec. 1983 and 1988. The Court has additional jurisdiction under 28 USC Sec. 1343. Relief hereunder is further sought pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC Sec. 2201 and 2202."

As Mr. Justice Holmes observed for a unanimous Court in The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22, 33 S.Ct. 410, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913): "Of course the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon and therefore does determine whether he will bring a `suit arising under' the * * * Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States * * *." 228 U.S. at 25, 33 S.Ct. at 411, 57 L.Ed. 716. And since Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946) — at least — it appears to have been settled that the mere assertion by a plaintiff of any claim of violation of any provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Plaintiffs' action then plainly falls within the general "federal-question" jurisdiction of this Court 28 U. S.C. § 1331 and, State action being challenged cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), Federal jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) is properly invoked under the Civil Rights Act see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that this Court does have general jurisdiction of the subject matter of plaintiffs' claims. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

It is well to recall in passing, however, that the Declaratory Judgment Act 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 does not confer any added jurisdiction upon the Federal courts, but merely enlarges "the range of remedies available" in cases involving subject matter within the scope of Federal jurisdiction elsewhere conferred Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950). Stated more specifically, the Declaratory Judgment Act "merely gave the federal courts competence to make a declaration of rights even though no decree of enforcement be immediately asked. It merely permitted a freer movement of the federal courts within the recognized confines of the scope of equity. The Declaratory Judgment Act `only provided a new form of procedure for the adjudication of rights in conformity' with `established equitable principles.'" Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551-552, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 1199, 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946).

It has been held, moreover, that plaintiffs qua individuals have standing to sue — to bring this action in this Court. Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 204-208, 82 S.Ct. at 703-705, 7 L.Ed.2d 663. As Mr. Justice Brennan declared for the majority of the Court in Baker: "It would not be necessary to decide whether * * * plaintiffs' allegations of impairment of their votes by the * * existing apportionment will, ultimately, entitle them to any relief, in order to hold that they have standing to seek it." 369 U.S. at 208, 82 S.Ct. at 705, 7 L.Ed. 2d 663.

Furthermore, it has been held that claims such as plaintiffs here assert do not present a "political question", but tender a justiciable "controversy" within the judicial power conferred by Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963); Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 208-237, 250, 266, 82 S.Ct. at 705-721, 727, 737, 7 L.Ed.2d 663.

Bound by precedent to consider the case at bar as one tendering a justiciable controversy within the subject-matter jurisdiction of this Court and one presented by plaintiffs who have standing to sue, we look once more to Baker v. Carr for additional guidance, but find that the Court there did not decide what, if any, judicial relief should or could be granted upon the claims there asserted. See 369 U.S. at 195-198, 237, 241, 265-266, 82 S.Ct. at 698-700, 720-721, 722-723, 736-737, 7 L.Ed.2d 663.

Reaching the merits of the case at bar, as Baker v. Carr requires this Court to do, we confront first plaintiffs' prayer for a declaratory judgment. For more than half a century, Article III of the Idaho Constitution has provided, inter alia:

"§ 2. Membership of house and senate. — The senate shall consist of one (1) member from each county. The legislature may fix the number of members of the house of representatives at not more than three (3) times as many representatives as there are senators. The senators and representatives shall be chosen by the electors of the respective counties or districts into which the state may, from time to time, be divided by law.

* * * * * *

"§ 4. Apportionment of legislature. — The members of the first legislature shall be apportioned to the several legislative districts of the state in proportion to the number of votes polled at the last general election for delegate to congress, and thereafter to be apportioned as may be provided by law: provided, each county shall be entitled to one representative.

"§ 5. Senatorial and representative districts. — A senatorial or representative district, when more than one county shall constitute the same, shall be composed of contiguous counties, and no county shall be divided in creating such districts."

Section 67-203 of the Idaho Code implements these provisions of the State Constitution.

Plaintiffs assert that the quoted sections of Idaho's Constitution and § 67-203 of the Idaho Code "as applied to the present facts of the State of Idaho and the 1960 census, establishes an arbitrary and capricious apportionment of representatives in the Senate and House without reference to any logical or reasonable formula whatever, resulting in gross under representation in both houses of the larger urban areas and gross over representation in both houses of the sparsely populated areas", with the result, say plaintiffs, that the challenged provisions of the Idaho Constitution and statutes operate to deny them due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, in defiance of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

It is well settled that even where jurisdiction exists to adjudicate a controversy and award relief authorized by the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, whether to entertain the action and grant relief is a matter within the discretion of the Court. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 82 S.Ct. 580, 7 L.Ed.2d 604 (1962); Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 431, 68 S.Ct. 641, 92 L.Ed. 784 (1933); Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 462, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945); Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316, 324, 65 S.Ct. 298, 89 L.Ed. 264 (1945).

We have considered the briefs of counsel, as well as such "evidence" as was adduced upon the "trial" of this cause, and have concluded that the only proper course is for this Court to exercise its discretion against making any declaratory judgment. Several reasons impel us to this conclusion.

First, we lay aside plaintiffs' point that Idaho's system of legislative apportionment violates the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument in support of this contention completely escapes us and, in our opinion, does not merit discussion.

So we treat with plaintiffs' contention that Idaho's apportionment method defies the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment's "equal protection" clause. As Mr. Justice Van Devanter wrote for a unanimous Court in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic...