Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v. United States

Decision Date14 December 1964
Docket NumberNo. 515,515
Citation85 S.Ct. 348,13 L.Ed.2d 258,379 U.S. 241
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Archibald Cox, Sol. Gen., for appellees.

Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court

This is a declaratory judgment action, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and § 2202 (1958 ed.) attacking the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat 241, 241.1 In addition to declaratory relief the complaint sought an injunction restraining the enforcement of the Act and damages against appellees based on allegedly resulting injury in the event compliance was required. Appellees counterclaimed for enforcement under § 206(a) of the Act and asked for a three-judge district court under § 206(b). A three-judge court, empaneled under § 206(b) as well as 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958 ed.) sustained the validity of the Act and issued a permanent injunction on appellees' counterclaim restraining appellant from continuing to violate the Act which remains in effect on order of Mr. Justice BLACK, 85 S.Ct. 1. We affirm the judgment.

1. The Factual Background and Contentions of the Parties.

The case comes here on admissions and stipulated facts. Appellant owns and operates the Heart of Atlanta Motel which has 216 rooms available to transient guests. The motel is located on Courtland Street, two blocks from downtown Peachtree Street. It is readily accessible to interstate highways 75 and 85 and state highways 23 and 41. Appellant solicits patronage from outside the State of Georgia through various national advertising media, including magazines of national circulation; it mainains over 50 billboards and highway signs within the State, soliciting patronage for the motel; it accepts convention trade from outside Georgia and approximately 75% of its registered guests are from out of State. Prior to passage of the Act the motel had followed a practice of refusing to rent rooms to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue to do so. In an effort to perpetuate that policy this suit was filed.

The appellant contends that Congress in passing this Act exceeded its power to regulate commerce under Art. I s 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United States; that the Act violates the Fifth Amendment because appellant is deprived of the right to choose its customers and operate its business as it wishes, resulting in a taking of its liberty and property without due process of law and a taking of its property without just compensation; and, finally, that by requiring appellant to rent available rooms to Negroes against its will, Congress is subjecting it to involuntary servitude in contravention of the Thirteenth Amendment.

The appellees counter that the unavailability to Negroes of adequate accommodations interferes significantly with interstate travel, and that Congress, under the Commerce Clause, has power to remove such obstructions and restraints; that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid reasonable regulation and that consequential damage does not constitute a 'taking' within the meaning of that amendment; that the Thirteenth Amendment claim fails because it is entirely frivolous to say that an amendment directed to the abolition of human bondage and the removal of widespread disabilities associated with slavery places discrimination in public accommodations, beyond the reach of both federal and state law.

At the trial the appellant offered no evidence, submitting the case on the pleadings, admissions and stipulation of facts; however, appellees proved the refusal of the motel to accept Negro transients after the passage of the Act. The District Court sustained the constitutionality of the sections of the Act under attack (§§ 201(a), (b)(1) and (c)(1)) and issued a permanent injunction on the counterclaim of the appellees. It restrained the appellant from '(r) efusing to accept Negroes as guests in the motel by reason of their race or color' and from '(m)aking any distinction whatever upon the basis of race or color in the availability of the goods, services, facilities privileges, advantages or accommodations offered or made available to the guests of the motel, or to the general public, within or upon any of the premises of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.'

2. The History of the Act.

Congress first evidenced its interest in civil rights legislation in the Civil Rights or Enforcement Act of April 9, 1866.2 There followed four Acts, 3 with a fifth, the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875,4 culminating the series. In 1883 this Court struck down the public accommodations sections of the 1875 Act in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835. No major legislation in this field had been enacted by Congress for 82 years when the Civil Rights Act of 19575 became law. It was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1960.6 Three years later, on June 19, 1963, the late President Kennedy called for civil rights legislation in a a message to Congress to which he attached a proposed bill. Its stated purpose was

'to promote the general welfare by eliminating discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in * * * public accommodations through the exercise by Congress of the powers conferred upon it * * * to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, to regulate commerce among the several States, and to make laws necessary and proper to execute the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.' H.R.Doc.No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 14.

Bills were introduced in each House of the Congress, embodying the President's suggestion, one in the Senate being S. 17327 and one in the House, H.R. 7152. However, it was not until July 2, 1964, upon the recommendation of President Johnson, that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, here under attack, was finally passed.

After extended hearings each of these bills was favorably reported to its respective house. H.R. 7152 on November 20, 1963, H.R.Rep.No.914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., and S. 1732 on February 10, 1964, S.Rep.No.872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. Although each bill originally incorporated extensive findings of fact these were eliminated from the bills as they were reported. The House passed its bill in January 1964 and sent it to the Senate. Through a bipartisan coalition of Senators Humphrey and Dirksen, together with other Senators, a substitute was worked out in informal conferences. This substitute was adopted by the Senate and sent to the House where it was adopted without change. This expedited procedure prevented the usual report on the substitute bill in the Senate as well as a Conference Committee report ordinarily filed in such matters. Our only frame of reference as to the legislative history of the Act is, therefore, the hearings, reports and debates on the respective bills in each house.

The Act as finally adopted was most comprehensive, undertaking to prevent through peaceful and voluntary settlement discrimination in voting, as well as in places of accommodation and public facilities, federally secured programs and in employment. Since Title II is the only portion under attack here, we confine our consideration to those public accommodation provisions.

3. Title II of the Act.

This Title is divided into seven sections beginning with § 201(a) which provides that:

'All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.'

There are listed in § 201(b) four classes of business establishments, each of which 'serves the public' and 'is a place of public accommodation' within the meaning of § 201(a) 'if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action.' The covered establishments are:

'(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;

'(2) any restaurant, cafeteria * * * (not here involved);

'(3) any motion picture house * * * (not here involved);

'(4) any establishment * * * which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or * * * within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment * * * (not here involved).'

Section 201(c) defines the phrase 'affect commerce' as applied to the above establishments. It first declares that 'any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests' affects commerce per se. Restaurants, cafeterias, etc., in class two affect commerce only if they serve or offer to serve interstate travelers or if a substantial portion of the food which they serve or products which they sell have 'moved in commerce.' Motion picture houses and other places listed in class three affect commerce if they customarily present films, performances, etc., 'which move in commerce.' And the establishments listed in class four affect commerce if they are within, or include within their own premises, an establishment 'the operations of which affect commerce.' Private clubs are excepted under certain conditions. See § 201(e).

Section 201(d) declares that 'discrimination or segregation' is supported by state action when carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State or any of its subdivisions.

In addition, § 202 affirmatively declares that all persons 'shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on...

To continue reading

Request your trial
657 cases
  • Greyhound Lines v. City of New Orleans
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
    • December 3, 1998
    ...Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Leading cases have a broad view of congressional commerce power, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964). Congress need have only a rational reason for finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commer......
  • Halpin v. Superior Court
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1972
    ...Insurance Company v. Benjamin (1946) 328 U.S. 408, 423, 66 S.Ct. 1142, 90 L.Ed. 1342; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964) 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258; Weiss v. United States (1939) 308 U.S. 321, 60 S.Ct. 269, 84 L.Ed. 298; cf. American Power & Light ......
  • R. E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 28, 1974
    ...rather than a quantitative standard has been followed to the present. (Perez v. United States, Supra; Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290.) However, the recognition that Congress has th......
  • Mass. Bldg. Trades Council v. United States Dep't of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. (In re MCP No. 165, Occupational Safety & Health Admin.)
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • December 17, 2021
    ... ... W. Bergethon, OFFICE OF THE GEORGIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ... Atlanta, Georgia, Thomas M. Fisher, OFFICE OF THE INDIANA ... ATTORNEY GENERAL, Indianapolis, ... under the Commerce Clause. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, ... Inc. v. United States , 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964) (finding ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
103 books & journal articles
  • Frederick Mark Gedicks, the United States
    • United States
    • Emory University School of Law Emory International Law Reviews No. 19-2, March 2005
    • Invalid date
    ...of the artificial constriction of African American customer demand imposed by such segregation); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding federal statutory prohibition on segregation in public accommodations on ground that segregation has a disruptive affect o......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • The Path of Constitutional Law Suplemmentary Materials
    • January 1, 2007
    ...v. The Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 109 S.Ct. 2491, 105 L.Ed.2d 275 (1989), 872, 909 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964), 218, 341, 446, 723-24, 729, 732, 1067 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 105 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1......
  • Federal hate crime laws and United States v. Lopez: on a collision course to clarify jurisdictional-element analysis.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 157 No. 2, December 2008
    • December 1, 2008
    ...and can be settled finally only by this Court." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (120) Id. (121) Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 46 (2005) (O'Connor, J, dissenting). (122) Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-17. (123) Id. ......
  • Constitutional Challenges to the OSHA COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate
    • United States
    • The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy No. 20-1, January 2022
    • January 1, 2022
    ...(The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (lottery tickets and prize lists). 23. See, e.g. , Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (“‘The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 provisions
  • 29 C.F.R. § 1975.2 Basis of Authority
    • United States
    • Code of Federal Regulations 2023 Edition Title 29. Labor Subtitle B. Regulations Relating to Labor Chapter XVII. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor Part 1975. Coverage of Employers Under the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
    • January 1, 2023
    ...of activities which Congress intended to regulate because the class affects commerce. ("Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States," 379 U.S. 241; "Katzenbach v. McClung," 379 U.S. 294; and "Perez v. United States," supra.) Generally speaking, the class of activities which Congress may r......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT