Heart v. Ellenbecker
| Decision Date | 11 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 86-3057. |
| Citation | 689 F. Supp. 988 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
| Parties | Arlis Iron HEART, on behalf of herself and her Old Lodge Children, Plaintiffs, v. James ELLENBECKER, as Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Social Services and Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendants. |
B.J. Jones, Albert C. Jones, Krista Clark, Michael T. Swallow, Dakota Plains Legal Services, Mission, S.D., for plaintiffs.
Mark L. Bratt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Legal Services, Dept. of Social Services, John Guhin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Water & Natural Resources, Brent A. Wilbur, May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson, Pierre, S.D., for State defendants.
David L. Zuercher, Asst. U.S. Atty., Pierre, S.D., for Federal defendants.
Dear Counsel:
A motion for summary judgment was filed in this action by the plaintiffs raising the question of first impression of whether South Dakota's policy of categorically denying Indians benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program because a stepparent resides in the home violates the Social Security Act. Because there is no "State law of general applicability" which requires Indian stepparents to support stepchildren, the State of South Dakota may not apply its stepparent responsibility law to Indians in deciding whether a child is dependent for purposes of determining eligibility for AFDC. As no other issues of fact or law remain in the case, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.
The AFDC program is a federal matching program. States wishing to participate in the AFDC program must submit a plan to the federal government meeting the requirements set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 602. Upon approval, participating states are entitled to reimbursement for their expenditures in the program based upon the formula codified at section 403(a)(1) of Title IV-A of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 603(a) (1985 & Supp.1988).
Among the requirements for the approval of a state plan is the requirement that the state agency administering the program must consider income of a dependent child's stepparent living in the same home in determining need. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(31) (1982).1 The plaintiffs in this action concede that the state defendant may consider income of stepparents living in the home in deciding whether the family's income exceeds the state's standard of need. An initial requirement for AFDC eligibility is a finding that a child is "dependent," defined as a child under a certain age who has "been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home ... or physical or mental incapacity of a parent" and who resides with a relative. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1982). A "parent" within the meaning of this section is a person with a "legal duty of support." King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2138, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). The Secretary of the United States' Department of Health and Human Services has promulgated the following regulation on when a stepparent should be considered in determining whether a child is entitled to be considered for AFDC benefits because they have been deprived of parental support:
45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Lewis v. Martin: "State law must be of `general applicability' to make that obligation in reality a solid assumption on which estimates of funds actually available to children on a regular basis may be calculated." 397 U.S. 552, 559, 90 S.Ct. 1282, 1285, 25 L.Ed.2d 561 (1970). The plaintiffs base their challenge to South Dakota's policy on the treatment of Indian stepparents for purposes of determining AFDC eligibility on this federal regulation.
The State of South Dakota has a stepparent responsibility statute which provides:
A stepparent shall maintain his spouse's children born prior to their marriage and is responsible as a parent for their support and education suitable to his circumstances, but such responsibility shall not absolve the natural or adoptive parents of the children from any obligation of support.
SDCL § 25-7-8 (1984).
Based upon this statute, the State of South Dakota through the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Social Services, James Ellenbecker, considers the presence of a stepparent in the home in determining whether a child has been deprived of parental support or care. SDCL § 25-7-8 provides the State with the "law of general applicability" to establish the legal norm of stepparent responsibility as required under 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) for counting a stepparent in deciding whether a child lacks parental support. Thus, the Department's policy in administering the AFDC program requires children to be found ineligible for benefits when a stepparent resides in the home. This policy is codified at section 67:12:01:29 of the Administrative Code of South Dakota. ARSD 67:12:01:29.
Plaintiff Arlis Iron Heart is an American Indian enrolled in the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe. Iron Heart lives with her husband and three minor children, Vietta, Arletta and Yvette Old Lodge. Vietta, Arletta and Yvette are enrolled members of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. The children's father, Calvin Old Lodge, is deceased. Iron Heart is married to Cleveland Iron Heart. Cleveland Iron Heart is an enrolled member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and is stepfather to Arlis Iron Heart's children. The family resides on land held in trust by the United States for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe near Winner, South Dakota.2
Iron Heart applied for AFDC for her children on July 11, 1986. The State of South Dakota denied Iron Heart's application for assistance on the ground that the children were not deprived of the support of a parent because their stepfather, Cleveland Iron Heart, resides in their home, applying the Department's policy on stepparent responsibility.
The parties agree that the State of South Dakota has not assumed civil jurisdiction over the Rosebud Sioux reservation. The Tribal Code of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe contains no stepparent responsibility law, and the Court is unaware of any tribal case law supporting such an obligation. The plaintiffs contend, therefore, that there is no "State law of general applicability" to permit the State of South Dakota to consider a stepparent in their home for purposes of determining AFDC eligibility.
The plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They contend that South Dakota's regulation ARSD § 67:12:01:29 as applied to them violates section 406(a) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended and codified at 42 U.S.C. § 606(a), and 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a).3 The Court assumes jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The plaintiffs move for summary judgment based on the decision of the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services that the State may not consider whether a stepparent is in the home for purposes of determining the deprivation of a dependent child when the State's law of general applicability does not apply to members of Indian tribes and when the Indian tribe has no stepparent responsibility law. The plaintiffs cite Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), for the proposition that this Court must defer to the Secretary's construction of the Social Security Act.
The Supreme Court adopted a two-pronged inquiry in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. to decide whether the policy of a federal agency is entitled to deference. Courts must first decide whether Congress has decided the issue. See 467 U.S. at 842-45, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-83. If Congress has not unambiguously expressed its intent on a challenged policy, "the question for the court is whether the federal agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has recently cited Chevron U.S.A. Inc. with approval in upholding the Secretary of Health and Human Services' interpretation of "child support payments" under the AFDC program. See Todd v. Norman, 840 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir.1988). The Eighth Circuit states the rationale of deferring to the Secretary's interpretation of the Social Security Act as follows:
Perhaps appreciating the complexity of the Social Security Act, Congress gave the Secretary broad authority to prescribe standards in applying its provisions. This conferral of authority recognizes that the Secretary is uniquely qualified to interpret provisions of the Social Security Act and also insulates his administrative interpretations from a judicial override, unless that interpretation is `manifestly contrary to the statute.'
840 F.2d at 612 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)).
Applying the two-prong test of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. to the present facts, the issue for decision is whether the Secretary's view in this case of first impression is...
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...the statute which represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies should not be disturbed by the courts. Heart v. Ellenbecker, 689 F.Supp. 988 (D.S.D.1988). We should apply that rule of restraint in this It is also inconsistent to observe that the conclusions drawn by Huss, th......