Heath v. Matson Navigation Company, Civ. No. 70-3134.
Decision Date | 24 September 1971 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 70-3134. |
Citation | 333 F. Supp. 131 |
Parties | William K. HEATH, Plaintiff, v. MATSON NAVIGATION COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Paul F. Cronin, Gerald Y. Sekiya, Bortz, Case, Stack, Kay, Cronin & Clause, Honolulu, Hawaii, for plaintiff.
C. F. Damon, Jr., Damon, Shigekane, & Char, Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendant.
On Thanksgiving night, November 27, 1969, at approximately nine p.m. and while at sea, plaintiff William K. Heath, an able-bodied seaman aboard the S. S. Hawaiian Merchant, while walking up the port, forward side of the ship to assume his duties as bow lookout, fell over a fire hose which had been left out on the main weather deck. As a result of his fall Heath sustained a back injury.
On the morning of that same day, the fire hose had been used to discharge some molasses overboard. The operation was completed around noon but the fire hose was left on deck. Then, some nine hours later, Heath tripped over the hose and fell to the deck.
Plaintiff sues in admiralty under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1958), alleging negligence of Matson Navigation Company, owner of the Hawaiian Merchant, in failing properly to use and stow the fire hose.1 Plaintiff further alleges unseaworthiness under General Maritime Law.
Matson admits liability in this case, but adds the following caveat:
"In so admitting liability, defendant does not waive its third defense * * * that any injuries or damages suffered by Plaintiff were caused in whole or in part or were contributed to by Plaintiff."
Plaintiff now moves this court to enter a partial summary judgment holding Matson's Third Defense inapplicable to this case. Plaintiff argues that Matson's use of the fire hose over which Heath fell violated certain Coast Guard regulations as to the use and storage of fire hoses, and therefore under Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 394, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1958), such violations, as a matter of law, bar a defense of contributory negligence in a Jones Act case.
Plaintiff contends that Matson's admission, together with depositions and other materials presented to the court, indicate violations of three of the United States Coast Guard Rules and Regulations for Cargo and Miscellaneous Vessels Subchapter I, 46 CFR §§ 95.10-10(g), (h) and (j), 1971, which read as follows:
Since § 95.10-10(g) lists only three permissible uses for firehose—none of which is pumping molasses—it would appear that Matson's molasses pumping operation through a firehose did violate a Coast Guard regulation.
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff has shown violation of one or more of the Coast Guard regulations on firehose aboardship, the Supreme Court's decision in Kernan furnishes no support for plaintiff's argument that Matson is thereby barred from raising the defense of contributory negligence.
In Kernan, a seaman died on a tug operated by American Dredging Co. The tug was towing a scow at night in the Schuylkill River near Philadelphia. Flammable vapors hung just above the river's surface because of oil spilled from nearby refineries and petroleum storage and loading facilities. An open-flame kerosene lamp on the deck of the scow, hanging no more than three feet above the water, ignited the flammable vapors, spreading flames to the tug and setting it on fire.
A navigation rule of the Coast Guard Commandant required lamps of the type involved to be carried no less than eight feet above the water. The District Court found that had the particular lamp been carried at the required minimum height it would not have set fire to the petroleum vapors.
A limitation action was brought by the tug owner and Kernan's widow filed her claim for damages. The District Court denied the claim, holding that violation of a statute does not give rise to liability unless the harm resulting from the violation was of a kind the statute had been designed to minimize. Thus, since the particular regulation was for navigational purposes only, and was not meant to protect against accidents of the type that had occurred, the widow could not recover. 141 F.Supp. 582 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd 235 F.2d 618 (3 Cir. 1956).
There was no issue of contributory negligence in Kernan. As the Supreme Court noted:
355 U.S. at 431, 78 S.Ct. at 397.
The sole issue presented to and resolved by the Court was whether liability under the Jones Act and FELA is imposed without regard to negligence where a hazardous condition resulting from a violation of a Coast Guard Regulation causes the death of a seaman. The Court analyzed a series of cases interpreting § 1 of the FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1954), imposing such statutory liability where violations of the Boiler Inspection and Safety Appliances Acts were involved.2 In Kernan this doctrine was extended and held applicable to a case where a seaman's death was attributable to violation of a Coast Guard regulation.
Plaintiff urges that this court extend § 3 of the FELA in a manner familiar to the Supreme Court's extension of § 1 in Kernan. Section 3 provides:
The language of § 3 is clear with regard to the unavailability of a defense of contributory negligence to a defendant in an FELA suit. It is thus not surprising that plaintiff has not cited and this court has not found any case holding that the defense of contributory negligence is unavailable where violation of a non-safety statute or regulation is involved. Section 3 is not even mentioned in the majority opinion in Kernan. The Court does refer to § 43—which contains similar language regarding unavailability of the defense of assumption of risk where violation of a safety statute is shown—but in no way suggests that its holding with respect to statutory negligence is intended to apply to §§ 3 and 4 of the FELA as well as to § 1. Rather, the reference to § 4 is made to rebut the argument made in the dissent that the limitations of §§ 3 and 4 ought to carry over to § 1.4
The Court itself noted that the sections of the FELA in issue were neither symmetrical nor overlapping in the extent of their coverage:5
The portion of the Kernan decision from which the above statement was abstracted deals with statutory liability, not with contributory negligence, as a careful reading of the entire sentence out of Kernan makes clear:
"In FELA cases based upon violations of the Safety Appliances Acts or the Boiler Inspection Act, the Court has held that a violation of either statute creates liability under FELA if the resulting defect or insufficiency in equipment contributes in fact to the death or injury in suit, without regard to whether the injury flowing from the breach was the injury the statute sought to prevent." 355 U.S. at 432-433, 78 S.Ct. at 398.
Neal is further inapposite because it was not a Jones Act case. The court there held that the Jones Act was not applicable to longshoremen and that defendant's...
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