Heaton v. Fillion, C.A. No. PC/2002-1510 (RI 7/30/2004)
| Decision Date | 30 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. PC/2002-1510. |
| Parties | TORI-LYNN HEATON v. JOSEPH FILLION, <I>alias</I>; CITY OF CRANSTON/CRANSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; JOSEPH GRANATA, Treasurer, CITY OF CRANSTON. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This matter comes before the Court on the municipal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts IV, VI, and XI of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, ("the Complaint") pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure.
This is an action wherein Plaintiff claims, inter alia,1 intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV), negligent supervision, hiring, and training (Count VI), and recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count XI).
Tori-Lynn Heaton (hereinafter "Plaintiff") is a Cranston police officer and the ex-wife of Joseph Fillion (hereinafter "Fillion"). In addition to Fillion, the City of Cranston (hereinafter "City"), the Cranston Police Department (hereinafter "Department"), and Joseph Granata, the City Treasurer, have been named as Defendants. The municipal Defendants have filed the instant motion to dismiss with respect to Counts IV, VI, and XI, asserting that Plaintiff has not alleged facts in her Complaint that would entitle her to recovery for these claims.
The Complaint alleges that while married and employed as Cranston police officers, Fillion subjected Plaintiff to domestic abuse while off-duty. In response, the Plaintiff obtained a protective order on March 26, 1999. While the protective order was in force, Fillion was permitted back on the police force and issued a weapon. Allegedly, on July 23, 1999, Fillion trespassed on the Plaintiff's property and attacked her and a guest. It is undisputed that both Fillion and the Plaintiff were off duty at the time of the alleged attack, and that the restraining order against Fillion was still in place. The Complaint further alleges that after the attack on July 23, 1999, the Cranston Police Department refused to take Fillion into custody and allowed its police officers to participate in the sale of tickets to a fundraiser for Fillion's defense.
Subsequent to the alleged July 23, 1999 incident, Plaintiff applied for injured on duty ("IOD") status to receive compensation for her injuries. The municipal Defendants denied Plaintiff's request for IOD status on the basis that the events at issue occurred when both Plaintiff and Fillion were off duty. Plaintiff proceeded to file a grievance of that decision, which was denied at arbitration.
On March 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed this Complaint with the Superior Court seeking recovery for her injuries based on ten different common law and statutory claims. Plaintiff has since amended her Complaint three times to include thirteen common law and statutory claims. The claims that are now before the Court are set forth in the Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, filed on February 3, 2004.
In determining whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court "assumes the allegations contained in the complaint to be true and views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Giuliano v. Pastina, Jr., 793 A.2d 1035, 1036-37 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 297-98 (R.I. 2001)). This Court should not grant the motion "unless it appears to a certainty that [the plaintiffs] will not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which might be proved in support of [their] claim." Id. at 1037 (quoting Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 227 A.2d 582, 584 (R.I. 1967)). "The standard for granting a motion to dismiss is a difficult one for the movant to meet." Diciantis v. Wall, 795 A.2d 1121 (R.I. 2002).
Defendants argue that the Cranston Police Department is not a proper party defendant because it is a department of city government. It is Defendants' position that the City of Cranston Police Department should be dismissed from the case because the Treasurer, and not the Department, is the appropriate legal entity to be sued in this case. Additionally, Defendants assert that the Department is not a legal entity with the capacity to be sued.
In Peters v. Jim Walter Door Sales of Tampa, Inc., 525 A.2d 46 (R.I. 1987), the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, for purposes of claims, a school committee is a subdivision of the city. Therefore, the city itself and not the school committee were deemed to be the proper party defendant. Similarly, as the Cranston Police Department is only a department or subdivision of the municipality, this Court finds that the Police Department is not a proper party defendant in this suit, and the motion to dismiss filed on its behalf should be granted.
Count IV of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress by the Cranston Police Department in permitting and/or condoning the sale of tickets to a fundraiser for Fillion's defense. Additionally, the Complaint asserts that the Department engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct by refusing to take Fillion into custody after he attacked Plaintiff and her friend on July 23, 1999. According to Plaintiff, by permitting its officers to act contrary to the Department's normal protocol in domestic abuse cases and to actively support Fillion through condoning fundraising for his defense, the Department communicated to Plaintiff that she, as a fellow officer, would not have the support of the Department.
It is well settled that in order "to prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show `extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant.'" Jalowy v. The Friendly Home, Inc., 818 A2d 698, 706 (R.I. 2003) (quoting DiBattista v. State, 808 A.2d 1081 (R.I. 2002)). The Supreme Court reiterated in that case the very high standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) Torts § 46 (1965) with regard to the evidence necessary to satisfy this element of the claim:
Jalowy, 818 A.2d at 707 (quoting Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 863 (R.I. 1998)) (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts, § 46 cmt. d at 73).
Whether defendants' conduct meets this standard is a matter of law to be decided by the court. Id. However, in deciding this question of law, the court "may need to rely on the jury to determine whether the party bearing the burden of proof has proven the existence of certain duty-triggering facts." Id. (citing Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1055-56 (R.I. 1998)).
In Jalowy, the court decided that the trial justice properly concluded that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claim therein arose by reason of the defendant's decision to preclude visits by the son of an elderly resident, ostensibly due to the alleged disruptive behavior of the plaintiff.
The trial justice in Jalowy had the benefit of a jury finding that the action of the defendant was non-retaliatory.2 In contrast, this issue comes up in the instant matter in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Thus, a jury has yet to consider the facts to determine if they meet the threshold to trigger the duty set forth in Jalowy. Until a jury determines what the facts are relative to the conduct alleged by the Plaintiff to be "extreme and outrageous," this Court would be acting prematurely in dismissing this claim under the Jalowy standard. For that reason, the claim set forth in Count IV of the Complaint should survive this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count VI of Plaintiff's Complaint, alleges that the Defendants are liable for negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Fillion. Specifically, paragraph 53 of Plaintiff's Complaint states:
"On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges all acts of which he complains occurred outside the scope and course of Fillion's employment, but are related to the terms and condition of Fillion's employment in that the Cranston Police Department did not take protective action when it became aware of Fillion's propensity to violence but rehired him."
It is Plaintiff's position that the Defendants' failure to responsibly hire, train, and supervise employees in such a manner as to reduce the chance of police misconduct and/or abusive behavior, resulted in Plaintiff's psychological and physical harm.
In Welsh Manufacturing v. Pinkerton's, our Supreme Court quoted favorably from the D.C. Appellate Court's decision in Fleming v. Bronfin:
"`One dealing with the public is bound to use reasonable care to select employees competent and fit for the work assigned to them and to refrain from retaining the services of an unfit employee.
When an employer neglects this duty and as a result injury is occasioned to a third person, the employer may be liable even though the injury was brought about by the willful act of the employee beyond the scope of his employment.'" 474 A.2d 436, 440 (R.I. 1984) (quoting Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. Mun.App. 1951)).
Although the employer is bound to adhere to this duty, our Supreme Court...
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