Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.
Decision Date | 29 December 1967 |
Citation | 248 Or. 467,85 Or.Adv.Sh. 823,435 P.2d 806 |
Parties | Michael R. HEATON, Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a corporation, Catlin Wolfard, Jean Wolfard, James C. Wolfard and Robert C. Wolfard, dba Oregon City Motor Co., Respondents. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
John R. Faust, Jr., Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Cake, Jaureguy, Hardy, Buttler & McEwen, Portland.
Roland F. Banks, Jr., Portland, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Mautz, Souther, Spaulding, Kinsey & Williamson, Portland, and Hibbard, Jacobs, Caldwell & Kincart, Oregon City.
Before PERRY, C.J., and SLOAN, O'CONNELL, GOODWIN, DENECKE, HOLMAN and LUSK, JJ.
The plaintiff appeals a judgment entered after an involuntary nonsuit in a products-liability case involving a wheel on a Ford 4-wheel-drive pickup truck. The principal question is whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to support his allegation that the wheel was dangerously defective.
Plaintiff purchased the truck new in July 1963 to use for hunting and other cross-country purposes as well as for driving upon paved highways. He drove the truck some 7,000 miles without noticing anything unusual about its performance. Prior to the day of the accident the truck had rarely been off the pavement, and plaintiff swore that it had never been subjected to unusual stress of any kind.
On the day of the accident, however, the truck, while moving on a 'black-top' highway at normal speed, hit a rock which plaintiff described as about five or six inches in diameter. The truck continued uneventfully for about 35 miles, when it left the road and tipped over.
After the accident, the rim of the wheel was found to be separated from the 'spider.' Witnesses described the 'spider' as the interior portion of the wheel which is attached to the vehicle by the lug nuts. The twelve rivets connecting the rim to the spider appeared to have been sheared off. The spider, according to one witness, showed signs of having been dragged along the ground. There was also a large dent in the rim and a five-inch cut in the inner tube at a spot within the tire that was adjacent to the dent in the rim. Only three of the rivets which had held the rim on the spider were found after the accident.
The motion for a nonsuit challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's proof. The plaintiff's version of the evidence is that the wheel came apart and caused an accident after encountering a five-or-six-inch rock on a hard-surfaced road at highway speed. (There is other evidence in the case, but on the point in issue it does not help the plaintiff.)
In Wights v. Staff Jennings, 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965), we held that a nonprivity user of a dangerously defective product could recover for injuries caused by the defect. Liability was specifically rationalized as strict liability in tort, although the breach of the seller's duty was a breach of warranty. There, because the product was one which, if defective, was in fact ultrahazardous (involving a high degree of danger of explosion), we did not have to decide whether a lesser degree of danger, i.e., 'unreasonably dangerous' as defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), would support liability. In the case at bar, we now adopt Section 402A and hold that if the product is in fact unreasonably dangerous the manufacturer is liable for the harms caused by such a defect. It is not necessary to prove that the product is 'ultrahazardous,' nor that it was placed on the market 'negligently.' It is necessary, however, to prove that it is dangerously defective.
An article is dangerously defective when it is in a condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. Unreasonable, in this context, means dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary purchaser. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment g. Such a definition is conceptually related to the traditional warranty of merchantable quality in the law of sales. 1
In some cases the plaintiff can produce direct evidence of a mistake in fabrication or of a design which is unreasonably dangerous. 2 The user has the right to expect a reasonably safe design and reasonable quality controls in fabrication according to that design. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A; § 395, Comment f.
In the type of case in which there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, available to prove exactly what sort of manufacturing flaw existed, or exactly how the design was deficient, 3 the plaintiff may nonetheless be able to establish his right to recover, by proving that the product did not perform in keeping with the reasonable expectations of the user. 4 When it is shown that a product failed to meet the reasonable expectations of the user the inference is that there was some sort of defect, a precise definition of which is unnecessary. If the product failed under conditions 5 concerning which an average consumer of that product could have fairly definite expectations, then the jury would have a basis for making an informed judgment upon the existence of a defect. The case at bar, however, is not such a case.
In this case plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of flawed manufacture or dangerous design. His own expert witness expressed an opinion that the wheel was not defective. He now urges that this court should declare the wheel unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law for the reason that it failed to perform as an ordinary consumer would have expected it to perform. While the Restatement indicates that such a failure would permit a finding that a product is generally defective, it is for the jury rather than the court to say in the ordinary case whether a given product failed to meet the standard. See Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal.App.2d 639, 55 Cal.Rptr. 94 (1966); Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549 (1953) (by implication).
The court's function is to decide whether the evidence furnishes a sufficient basis for the jury to make an informed decision. If the record permits, the jury determines whether the product performed as an ordinary consumer would have expected. In the case at bar the record furnishes no basis for a jury to do anything but speculate.
Where the performance failure occurs under conditions with which the average person has experience, the facts of the accident alone may constitute a sufficient basis for the jury to decide whether the expectations of an ordinary consumer of the product were met. High-speed collisions with large rocks are not so common, however, that the average person would know from personal experience what to expect under the circumstances. Nor does anything in the record cast any light upon this issue. The jury would therefore be unequipped, either by general background or by facts supplied in the record, to decide whether this wheel failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have expected. To allow the jury to decide purely on its own intuition how strong a truck wheel should be would convert the concept of strict liability into the absolute liability of an insurer.
The argument has been made that the question of the ordinary consumer's expectations should be treated for jury purposes in the same way that the question of reasonable conduct in a negligence case is treated. But in deciding in a negligence case what is reasonable conduct, the jury is deciding in a context of 'right and wrong' how someone Should have behaved. In making this decision they are presumed to know the relevant factors. If not, such information is provided, as in a medical malpractice case where there is expert testimony as to the proper standards.
In the defective-product area, courts have already decided how strong products Should be: they should be strong enough to perform as the ordinary consumer expects. In deciding what the reasonable consumer expects, the jury is not permitted to decide how strong products should be, nor even what consumers should expect, for this would in effect be the same thing. The jury is supposed to determine the basically factual question of what reasonable consumers do expect from the product. Where the jury has no experiential basis for knowing this, the record must supply such a basis. In the absence of either common experience or evidence, any verdict would, in effect, be the jury's opinion of how strong the product Should be. Such an opinion by the jury would be formed without the benefit of data concerning the cost or feasibility of designing and building stronger products. Without reference to relevant factual data, the jury has no special qualifications for deciding what is reasonable.
Assuming that the other requirements of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A have been met, the jury should be allowed to find the product defective when the record contains sufficient evidence of one or more of the following: (1) a dangerous defect in manufacture; (2) an unreasonably dangerous design; (3) circumstances in which, from common knowledge, the average user reasonably could have expected the product to perform safely.
In the only case we have found in which somewhat similar facts have been treated as sufficient to support a finding that a wheel which suffered a rim-spider separation was defective, there was evidence of wear prior to the accident. There was no direct evidence of an impact with a damaging obstacle. The court held that it could be inferred that the wheel was defective (presumably because of a manufacturing flaw). Hooper v. General Motors Corp., supra.
While the matter was never presented to the trial court, and thus requires no extended discussion in this appeal, the plaintiff has referred in this court to certain advertising published by the defendant, to reinforce the ...
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