Heaton v. Larsen, 79-123
Decision Date | 11 August 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79-123,79-123 |
Citation | 294 N.W.2d 15,97 Wis.2d 379 |
Parties | Timothy P. HEATON and Valerie Heaton, his wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Darwin T. LARSEN, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. * |
Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Jerome L. Rinzel, Cudahy, and Harold A. Dall, Michael A. Mesirow and Kasdorf, Dall, Lewis & Swietlik, S. C., Milwaukee, of counsel, for defendant-appellant-petitioner.
T. Michael Schober and Schober & Radtke, New Berlin, for plaintiffs-respondents.
The issue on appeal is whether an order of the circuit court denying defendant's motion to dismiss the action for want of personal jurisdiction is appealable as of right to the court of appeals or is appealable only on leave granted by the court of appeals. In an unpublished decision dated April 20, 1979, the court of appeals dismissed the defendant's appeal on the ground that the appeal was not from a final order and therefore was not appealable as of right under sec. 808.03(1), Stats., 1 and also refused to grant leave to appeal from the non-final order on the ground the defendant failed to show that any of the criteria set forth in sec. 808.03(2), Stats., 2 were applicable. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals that this order is not a final order appealable as of right.
The underlying action in this case was commenced by the plaintiffs seeking compensatory and punitive damages for an alleged slander committed by the defendant. Following the service of the summons and complaint, the defendant brought a motion pursuant to sec. 802.06(2)(c), Stats., to dismiss the action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 3 Following the procedure set forth in sec. 801.08(1), Stats., 4 the circuit court proceeded to hold a hearing and to decide the jurisdictional issue prior to the trial on the merits of the case. Sec. 801.08(1), Stats., provides that if after the hearing on the defendant's objection, the circuit court decides that it has jurisdiction, the case may proceed on the merits; if the circuit court decides that it lacks jurisdiction, the defendant shall be given the relief required. Sec. 801.08(1), Stats., specifically provides that "(s)uch decision upon a question of jurisdiction shall be by order which is appealable."
The circuit court determined that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant and issued an order denying defendant's motion. The defendant filed a notice of appeal from this order contending that he could appeal the order to the court of appeals as a matter of right, because sec. 801.08(1), Stats., specifically states that a decision upon a question of jurisdiction "shall be by order which is appealable." To protect himself, the defendant also filed an alternative petition for leave to appeal pursuant to sec. 808.03(2), Stats., on the ground that if he did not have an appeal as a matter of right, then the court of appeals should grant him leave to appeal. As we have stated previously, on April 20, 1979, the court of appeals issued an order dismissing the appeal and denying defendant's request for leave to appeal.
This court granted the defendant's petition for review, limiting the issue on review to the question of the appealability of the order deciding the question of personal jurisdiction entered pursuant to sec. 801.08(1), Stats.
The parties agree that the issue presented on appeal is whether appealability of the order is governed by sec. 801.08 or by sec. 808.03, Stats., and whether the order, if governed by sec. 808.03, is a final or non-final order for purposes of appellate review.
The defendant's position is that an order entered pursuant to sec. 801.08, Stats., denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, is appealable as a matter of right to the court of appeals, because sec. 801.08, Stats., specifically provides that the question of jurisdiction shall be decided by an order which is appealable.
The plaintiffs' position is that defendant's appeal rights must be determined under sec. 808.03, Stats., which governs appeals to the court of appeals. The plaintiffs argue that sec. 808.03, Stats., the newer general appeal statute, controls instead of sec. 801.08, Stats., a section in the Rules of Civil Procedure regulating court procedure; and that the order in the instant case is not a final order appealable of right under sec. 808.03(1), Stats., but is appealable by permission of the court of appeals under sec. 808.03(2), Stats.
Although the parties disagree as to the resolution of the issue, they do agree that the instant case poses questions of statutory interpretation. We think it would be helpful in resolving the issue if we review the legislative history of secs. 801.08 and 808.03, Stats.
Sec. 801.08(1), Stats., began its existence on September 1, 1956, as sec. (Rule) 262.17(4) and (5), which was adopted by Supreme Court order pursuant to sec. 251.18, Stats.1955. 5 Rules, 271 Wis. vii. Sec. (Rule) 262.17(2)-(5), provided as follows:
Sec. (Rule) 262.17 was designed to supplant the holdings of several cases decided by this court which operated to convert a defendant's intended special appearance to object to personal jurisdiction into a general appearance which waived all defects in the service of process. These cases created technical traps for the unwary. See Clausen & Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, chs. 801-803, 59 Marq.L.Rev. 14-15, 52-53 (1976). The injustice caused by these procedural traps became graphically clear in Ozaukee Finance Co. v. Cedarbury Lime Co., 268 Wis. 20, 24, 66 N.W.2d 686 (1954), in which three justices dissented noting that the majority had "practically abolishe(d) special appearances in Wisconsin."
Rule 262.17 had been proposed to the court by the Judicial Council to permit a defendant to raise by demurrer, motion or answer the claim that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person and to permit a defendant to combine an objection to personal jurisdiction with a matter relating to the merits of the action, without waiving the jurisdictional objection. 6 Punke v. Brody, 17 Wis.2d 9, 16, 115 N.W.2d 601 (1962); Pavalon v. Thomas Holmes Corp., 25 Wis.2d 540, 547, 131 N.W.2d 331 (1964); Bazan v. Kux Machine Co., 52 Wis.2d 325, 339, 190 N.W.2d 521 (1971).
At the same time that the court adopted sec. (Rule) 262.17, described above, the court also amended sec. (Rule) 274.33 again adopting the Judicial Council proposal, to conform to the change in sec. (Rule) 262.17. Sec. 274.33(3), which governed orders appealable to the supreme court, was amended to permit an appeal to the supreme court when the trial court "decides a question of jurisdiction." 271 Wis. x. 7 An order appealable under sec. 274.33 was in effect appealable as a matter of right to the supreme court since there were no permissive appeals. The Judicial Council's notes (dated 10/21/55) to its proposed draft of sec. (Rule) 274.33(3), Stats., states:
Secs. (Rules) 262.17 and 274.33 remained unchanged until 1959 when the legislature repealed and recreated chapter 262, Stats. Laws of 1959, ch. 226. This 1959 revision was largely the work of Professor G. W. Foster, Jr., of the University of Wisconsin Law School...
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