Heaton v. The Norton County State Bank

• Decision Date: 04 January 1897
• Docket Number: 112
• Citation: 47 P. 576,5 Kan.App. 498
• Parties: MORGAN HEATON AND MATTIE J. HEATON v. THE NORTON COUNTY STATE BANK
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

47 P. 576

5 Kan.App. 498

MORGAN HEATON AND MATTIE J. HEATON v. THE NORTON COUNTY STATE BANK

No. 112

Court of Appeals of Kansas, Northern Department, Western Division

January 4, 1897

January 4, 1897.

Error from Norton District Court. Hon. A. C. T. Geiger, Judge. Reversed.

This action was prosecuted in the court below by the defendant in error, as plaintiff, to recover from the plaintiffs in error as defendants, the possession of certain real estate deeded to it by the defendants, and two hundred dollars as damages for the detention thereof. The consideration recited in the deed was twenty-five hundred dollars. The property was the homestead of the defendants. It was contended by defendant Mattie J. Heaton, in her defense to the action, that the deed given to the plaintiff was executed by her under duress induced by threats, on the part of certain agents of the plaintiff, of the arrest and criminal prosecution of her husband, defendant Morgan Heaton, for an alleged embezzlement of moneys of the plaintiff of which he was at one time a managing officer. The case was tried to the court and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. The defendants prosecute error. The principal errors assigned are indicated in the opinion.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for new trial.

L. H Wilder, and Angevine & Cubbison, for plaintiffs in error.

Waggener Horton & Orr, for defendant in error. A. N. Sullivan, and L. H. Thompson, of counsel.

OPINION

GILKESON, P. J.

The jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine this action is again challenged by the defendant in error, upon the ground that the amount or value of the property in controversy exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars. This question was raised in this court by motion to certify the action to the Supreme Court, which upon hearing was denied. We are satisfied with the ruling made upon that motion at that time. The defendant in error contended then, as it does now, that the consideration mentioned in the deed, the deed being pleaded, establishes the amount in controversy. We think not. The only object in setting out or referring to the deed, is for the purpose of showing title; it was introduced in evidence for this purpose only. There is not an allegation in this petition that refers to the value of the property. How the consideration mentioned in a deed executed long prior to the commencement of the action, can, of itself, establish the value of the property in controversy, we cannot understand. If the consideration of this deed had been natural love and affection, or "the sum of one dollar and other valuable considerations," we do not think the learned counsel for defendant in error would for a moment contend that such consideration established the jurisdiction of this court.

But the vital question in this case is that of duress. In other words, do threats of lawful arrest constitute duress? This we must answer in the affirmative. While it has been held that threats of imprisonment, to constitute duress, must be unlawful imprisonment, we think the question is, whether the threat is of imprisonment which will be unlawful in reference to the conduct of the threatener, who is seeking to obtain a contract by his threat.

"Imprisonment that is suffered through the execution of a threat which was made for the purpose of forcing a guilty person to enter into a contract, may be lawful as against the authorities and the public, but unlawful as against the threatener, when considered with reference to his effort to use for his private benefit, processes provided for the protection of the public and the punishment of crimes. One who has overcome the mind and will of another for his own advantage, under such circumstances, is guilty of a perversion and abuse of the laws which were made for another purpose, and he is in no position to claim the advantage of a formal contract obtained in that way. . . . In such a case there is no reason why one should be bound by a contract, obtained by force, which, in reality, is not his, but another's." Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233; Hargreaves v. Korcek, 44 Neb. 660, 62 N.W. 1086.

In the case of Bane v. Detrick (52 Ill. 19, 27), the court said:

"The mortgage was void for another reason; it was executed through a perversion and abuse of criminal process. It is against public policy that process should be thus used, and no court will allow the results flowing from it to be enjoyed by him who so uses it."

The Supreme Court of California has said: "Under that kind of menace which consists in a threat of an injury to the character of a person, it is entirely immaterial whether such person is guilty or innocent of the crime to be charged." Morrill v. Nightingale, 93 Cal. 452, 28, 28 P. 1068 P. 1068; citing Bone v. Detrick, supra.

In Hackett v. King (6 Allen 58), it was held:

"Though a person is arrested under a legal warrant, and by a proper officer, yet, if one of the objects of the arrest is thereby to extort money, or enforce the settlement of a civil claim, such arrest is a false imprisonment by all who have directly or indirectly procured the same, or participated therein for any such purpose; and a release or conveyance of property obtained by means of such arrest is void."

In Taylor v. Jaques (106 Mass. 291, 294), the court says:

"If he had embezzled their funds, they had a right to have him prosecuted. If he owed them a debt they had a right to accept security for it. But they would have no right to make use of criminal process for the collection of a debt. An arrest, even upon a legal warrant and upon a criminal charge, to compel the payment of a mere debt, would be a misuse of legal process; and the threat of such an arrest may constitute unlawful arrest."

"It is now well settled that when there is an arrest for improper purposes, without a just cause, or where there is an arrest for a just cause, but without lawful authority, . . . for unlawful purposes, it may be construed duress." Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N.H. 511.

"It will thus be seen that an imprisonment for an unlawful purpose will constitute duress, and such being the fact, a threat of arrest and imprisonment, made for unlawful purposes, will constitute menace." Morrill v. Nightingale, supra.

And the Supreme Court of this State has said:

"An arrest by a legal warrant on...