Heavner v. Burns
| Decision Date | 05 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 5:21-CV-00159-KDB-DCK |
| Parties | BRENT SHAUN HEAVNER, Plaintiff, v. SETH WILLIAM BURNS; CITY OF HICKORY, NC; THURMAN WHISNANT; AND HICKORY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19). The Court has carefully considered this motion and the parties' briefs and exhibits. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the motion.
In this action, Plaintiff Brent Heavner alleges that Defendants police officer Seth Burns; police chief Thurman Whisnant; the City of Hickory, North Carolina; and the Hickory Police Department are liable to him under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and/or numerous North Carolina state law causes of action. All of Heavener's claims arise from injuries that occurred after he escaped from the back of Burns' moving police car following his arrest for shoplifting and then collided with Burns car in the parking lot to which Heavner fled. While the Court agrees with Heavner that a claim under Section 1983 might survive summary judgment if there was evidence from which a jury could find that a police officer used his police car as a weapon against an unarmed escaped arrestee, Heavner has offered no evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that officer Burns consciously used his police car to hit him. Instead, the only evidence in the record is that the impact occurred accidentally, as Burns testifies. Although any unintended injury during the course of a lawful arrest is of course unfortunate, Plaintiff cannot maintain a legal claim for accidental injuries that plainly resulted from circumstances of his own making.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States v. 8.929 Acres of Land in Arlington Cnty Virginia, 36 F.4th 240, 252 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)); see United States, f/u/b Modern Mosaic, LTD v. Turner Construction Co., et al., 946 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2019). A factual dispute is considered genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252. “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id., (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact through citations to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits in the record. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (); United States ex rel. Gugenheim v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC, 36 F.4th 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2022). If the movant satisfies his initial burden to demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case,” the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252, quoting Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Hixson v. Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2021). Rather, the nonmoving party must establish that a material fact is genuinely disputed by, inter alia, “citing to particular parts of the materials of record” and cannot rely only on “conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252, quoting Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
Still, summary judgment is not intended to be a substitute for a trial of the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In determining if summary judgment is appropriate, “courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and refrain from weigh[ing] the evidence or mak[ing] credibility determinations.” Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lee v. Town of Seaboard, 863 F.3d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 2017). “Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015) (). In the end, the relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
On October 8, 2018, Heavner went to a Walmart located in Hickory, North Carolina from which he had been previously banned for shoplifting. (Doc. No. 1-1, ¶ 19, Doc. No. 20-4 (“Burns Affidavit”), ¶ 4). Hickory police officer Burns was dispatched to the Walmart when the manager on duty called to report that Heavner was in the store. (Burns Aff. ¶ 4). On his way to Walmart, Burns looked up Heavner in his computer system, which informed him of Heavner's previous weapons charges, drug charges and past felonies and warned Burns to approach Heavner with caution (Burns Aff. ¶ 5).
When Burns arrived at Walmart, he spoke with the manager, who pointed out Heavner. (Burns Aff. ¶ 6). Burns then talked to Heavner, who was intoxicated. (Burns Aff. ¶ 9; Doc. No. 20-3 (“Heavner Deposition”) pp. 29-30). Shortly after their conversation began, Burns conducted a pat down in order to determine whether Heavner had any weapons on him (based on the information Burns had obtained about Heavner's history). (Burns Aff. ¶ 7). During the pat down, Burns found and removed a pocket knife from Heavner. (Burns Aff. ¶ 8). Burns also felt a bulge of plastic in Heavner's crotch area as well as a lump in Heavner's left sleeve, which turned out to be a pair of boxers. (Id.). Once Burns found the concealed merchandise, Heavner was placed in handcuffs and taken to the store's “loss prevention office.” Burns testifies that out of a “concern for Heavner's well-being and comfort” he made sure the handcuffs were not too tight. (Id.).
In the loss prevention office, Burns further searched Heavner and found several more items, including a camera and several S.D. memory cards. (Burns Aff. ¶ 10). In total, Burns recovered $204.58 in hidden merchandise. (Id.). While in the office, Burns also reviewed a letter from the Walmart store manager, dated May 11, 2018 and signed by Heavner, which banned Heavner from the Walmart. (Burns Aff. ¶ 11; Heavner dep. pp. 24, 26, Ex. 1). Based on the District Attorney's instructions to charge as felony breaking and entering suspected shoplifting from a store from which the suspect had been banned, Burns placed Heavner under arrest for that crime. (Burns Aff. ¶ 12). According to Burns, once Heavner was notified he was being charged with a felony, he became “agitated.” (Id.).
Burns escorted Heavner out of the Walmart and placed him in the back of his patrol car with his handcuffs still on. (Id. ¶ 13). At some point after Burns and Heavner were in the vehicle, Burns rolled down the window for Heavner (at Burn's suggestion) because of how hot it was in the car. (Id. ¶ 14). Just before Burns was about to make a right turn onto 4th street SW, he heard the open-door chime go off. (Id. ¶ 15). Burns turned around and saw that Heavner had removed his handcuffs, reached through the window and opened the door from the outside. (Id.; Heavner dep. p. 38). Heavner then jumped out of the vehicle while it was travelling approximately thirty to thirty-five miles per hour. (Id.).
When Heavner jumped out of the vehicle, Burns' vehicle was just before the intersection. (Burns Aff. ¶ 16). Burns saw Heavner running northeast towards the southeast corner of the Purple Ribbon Thrift Store. (Id. ¶ 17). Burns testifies that he wanted to locate Heavner as quickly as possible because he was concerned about Heavener's well-being after jumping out of a moving vehicle while intoxicated, and because he did not know if Heavner posed a threat to the community. (Id. ¶ 25). Burns decided to drive around the back of the Purple Ribbon Thrift Store so that he could get off the road and regain visual contact. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 24). The parking lot behind the thrift store was the closest area where Burns could get his vehicle off the road while going in the direction he saw Heavner flee. (Id.).
Burns drove around the corner of the Purple Ribbon Thrift Store and saw Heavner running towards his vehicle. (Id. ¶ 18). Burns attempted to evade Heavner but was unable to do so. (Id. ¶ 26). Burns struck Heavner with the front of his car and Heavner went over the hood and fell to the ground. (Id. ¶ 18). Only one to two seconds elapsed from the time when Burns saw Heavner and the collision occurred. (Id. ¶ 27). Burns testifies that the collision was an accident and that he was not trying to hit, ram, block, or cut off Heavner. (Id. ¶ 26).
After hitting Heavner, Burns got out of his vehicle and saw Heavner on the ground on all fours. (Id. ¶ 19). He realized Heavner...
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