Heavrin v. State
| Decision Date | 31 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 22S00-9505-CR-550,22S00-9505-CR-550 |
| Citation | 675 N.E.2d 1075 |
| Parties | Jeramy HEAVRIN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Steven A. Gustafson, New Albany, for Appellant.
Pamela Carter, Attorney General, James A. Joven, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
Defendant Jeramy Heavrin was found guilty of Murder 1 for the strangulation death of Jennifer Johnson. Defendant was sentenced to sixty years in jail. 2
On July 11, 1994, defendant entered Johnson's home and strangled her to death. Defendant claimed that he went to Johnson's home to ask her out on a date, that she vehemently protested his proposal and that a physical altercation between the two broke out as a result. Defendant claimed that during the fight, Johnson's shirt got wrapped around her neck and he accidentally strangled her. After hearing the evidence presented at trial, the jury did not agree with defendant's claim that he accidentally strangled Johnson and found him guilty of Murder.
Defendant first claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of Reckless Homicide. 3
During trial, defendant requested a proposed instruction on the lesser included offense of Reckless Homicide. The trial court rejected this request, but did instruct the jury on Murder, Voluntary Manslaughter, Aggravated Battery, Involuntary Manslaughter, Battery, and Criminal Recklessness. Defendant claims the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on Reckless Homicide is in direct conflict with our recent holding in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.1995).
In Wright, we affirmed the trial court's conviction of defendant for Reckless Homicide, a lesser included offense of Murder. In so holding, we set forth a three step analysis to determine whether a jury should be instructed on a lesser included offense. The three step analysis is as follows:
First, a trial court must compare the statute defining the crime charged with the statute defining the alleged lesser included offense. If (a) the alleged lesser included offense may be established "by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements" defining the crime charged ... or (b) the only feature distinguishing the alleged lesser included offense from the crime charged is that a lesser culpability is required to establish the commission of the lesser offense then the alleged lesser included offense is inherently included in the crime charged. If an offense is inherently included in the crime charged, then a trial court should proceed to step three below....
Second, if a trial court determines that an alleged lesser included offense is not inherently included in the crime charged under step one, then it must compare the statute defining the alleged lesser included offense with the charging instrument in the case. If the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense, then the alleged lesser included offense is factually included in the crime charged, and the trial court should proceed to step three below. Lynch v. State (1991), Ind., 571 N.E.2d 537, 538. If the alleged lesser included offense is neither inherently nor factually included in the crime charged, then the trial court should not give a requested instruction on the alleged lesser included offense. See Straub v. State (1991), Ind., 567 N.E.2d 87, 90.
Third, if a trial court has determined that an alleged lesser included offense is either inherently or factually included in the crime charged, it must look at the evidence presented in the case by both parties. If there is a serious evidentiary dispute about the element or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense and if, in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater, then it is reversible error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on the inherently or factually included lesser offense. Aschliman [v. State], 589 N.E.2d [1160] at 1162 [(Ind.1992)]; Lynch, 571 N.E.2d at 539. If the evidence does not so support the giving of a requested instruction on an inherently or factually included lesser offense, then a trial court should not give the requested instruction.
Reckless Homicide is an inherently included offense of Murder. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. Thus, under the Wright analysis, a Reckless Homicide instruction would have been necessary if there was a serious evidentiary dispute about the elements distinguishing Murder from Reckless Homicide and if, in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that Reckless Homicide was committed but not Murder. Here the important question is whether or not there was a serious evidentiary dispute as to whether defendant strangled Johnson recklessly but not knowingly. Defendant claims this issue was seriously in dispute as defendant always claimed that he merely accidentally strangled Johnson and no eyewitnesses were presented to claim anything to the contrary. The state argues in response that the evidence did show that defendant knowingly strangled Johnson as defendant told police that he "choked" Johnson.
Though not entirely free from doubt, we agree with the state that the evidence was substantial enough to support the trial court's refusal to give the reckless homicide instruction.
Reckless homicide is a killing committed with a plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. Ind.Code § § 35-42-1-5 and 35-41-2-2(c). Murder, on the other hand, requires as a minimum a killing committed by a perpetrator who engaged in the killing with an awareness of a high probability that he was doing so. Ind.Code §§ 35-42-1-1 and 35-41-2-2(b). Thus, an instruction on reckless homicide was not warranted if there was no serious evidentiary dispute but that defendant committed the attacks with an awareness of a high probability that he was engaged in killing. Ingram v. State, 547 N.E.2d 823, 829-830 (Ind.1989). We find that the defendant's statement to the police that he choked Johnson with her T-shirt, the fact that ligature strangulation was the cause of death, and the other evidence at trial concerning the choking and strangulation, gave the trial court sufficient justification to conclude that there was no serious evidentiary dispute that the defendant was acting with an awareness of a high probability that he was engaged in killing.
Defendant claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he knowingly or intentionally killed Johnson.
When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence establishing the elements of a crime--including the intent element--we consider only the evidence supporting the verdict along with any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Johnson v. State, 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1101 (Ind.1992). On review we will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Lay v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (Ind.1995). "If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm." Id. (citing Garrett v. State, 602 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Ind.1993)).
A person acts intentionally if "when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so." Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(a) (1993). A person acts knowingly if "when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so." Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(b). Intent and knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence and inferred from the circumstances and facts of each case. Mitchell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind.1990). Also, one is presumed to have intended the reasonable results of his or her own acts. Johansen v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1128, 1132 (Ind.1986).
Consistent with our analysis of the reckless homicide instruction issue, we think that the jury here could have reasonably inferred from the evidence presented that defendant knowingly or intentionally strangled Johnson, despite the fact that defendant claims that he accidentally strangled her. The jury easily could have concluded that defendant was aware of the high probability that physically fighting with Johnson while her "shirt was wrapped around her neck" (as defendant claims) could result in strangulation. See Bryan v. State, 450 N.E.2d 53, 63 (Ind.1983) (). Applying the standard of review as discussed above for sufficiency of the evidence claims, we conclude that defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of Murder is without merit.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting several statements that defendant gave to police.
Defendant made three statements to the police that were admitted at trial. The first statement was given to police on July 11, 1994. On that evening, defendant went to the police department to report that he had chased several individuals from his house that morning. Before giving police his full statement regarding this incident, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and then signed a waiver of rights form. 4 Afterwards, defendant gave his statement regarding this alleged incident, which the police tape recorded. Defense counsel objected to the admittance of this taped statement at trial on the basis that it was not made knowingly or intelligently because defendant was not made aware at that time that he was considered a suspect in the death of Johnson and that it was made under the threat of...
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...acts intentionally if "when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so." I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a-b); Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind.1996). Both intentional and knowing actions may be inferred from the circumstances. Mitchell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind......
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