Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 960029

• Decision Date: 17 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 960029,960029
• Citation: 942 P.2d 307
• Parties: 319 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 HEBER CITY CORPORATION, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lowell R. SIMPSON and Sandra S. Simpson, husband and wife, and Jay Simpson and Glenna R. Simpson, husband and wife, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 307

942 P.2d 307

319 Utah Adv. Rep. 27

HEBER CITY CORPORATION, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lowell R. SIMPSON and Sandra S. Simpson, husband and wife and Jay Simpson and Glenna R. Simpson, husband and wife, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 960029.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 17, 1997.

Harold A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Brant H. Wall, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:

Lowell R. Simpson, Sandra S. Simpson, Jay Simpson, and Glenna R. Simpson ("the Simpsons") appeal a decision of the district court finding that a road adjacent to their property and historically used to access the airport servicing Heber City (the "Airport Road") was not a "public highway" as defined by section 27-12-89 of the Utah Code and was therefore properly closed by Heber City. We have jurisdiction to hear this case under section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code. We reverse and remand.

This controversy arose out of Heber City's decision in 1992 to extend the length of its municipal airport's runway and expand the airport's protection zone. ¹ To effect this expansion, Heber City sought to acquire by condemnation a portion of the Simpsons' property. ² During the condemnation proceeding, the public nature of the Airport Road became an issue because the Simpsons contested the adequacy of the compensation offered by Heber City. Specifically, they asserted that the valuation of the condemned property interests should take into account the fact that the property had direct access to Highway 189 via the Airport Road. ³ The Simpsons argued that a purchaser of the condemned portion of their property would have paid a premium for its access to Highway 189 via a public highway. The Airport Road connected the airport to Highway 189 and ran exclusively over property owned by Heber City. Heber City, however, had previously acted unilaterally to close the Airport Road. ⁴ The road had to be closed to satisfy the requirements of the protection zone. The Airport Road had also connected the Simpsons' condemned property to Highway 189. The Simpsons were not, however, landlocked by the closure because their remaining property accessed Highway 189 via Daniels Canyon Road, which is a public highway.

Heber City disputed whether the Airport Road was a public highway within the definition of section 27-12-89 of the Code, which requires continuous use as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. In effect, the City argued that it could close the road without compensating for the loss of direct access it provided because it was a private road owned by the City and running over City property.

The parties agreed that this critical point of contention needed to be resolved before the issue of just compensation could be determined. Therefore, they stipulated that the trial could be bifurcated, separating the issue of whether the Airport Road was a public highway from the compensation portion of the condemnation proceedings. The district court entered an order bifurcating these issues.

During the trial concerning the "public" status of the Airport Road, the Simpsons presented numerous witnesses who testified that they had used the Airport Road for a variety of reasons other than for accessing the airport. These included attending shooting events at a gun club on property adjacent to the road, using it as a kind of "lover's lane," accessing businesses located along the road, riding horses, picnicking, and watching airplanes take off and land. The witnesses testified that the public used the road for these purposes from the opening of the road in 1947 until its closure in 1989.

In addition, the Simpsons presented the testimony of Robert Mathis, who had been the Wasatch County Planner from 1976 through the time of the trial. Mr. Mathis testified that when he became the Wasatch County Planner, the Airport Road was designated on the county maps as a class B road. This designation means that the road is a public road entitled to state funds for maintenance and construction. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-22 (defining class B roads); id. § 27-12-127 (creating fund for class B and C roads); Utah Admin. Code R926-3-4(1) (establishing permissible uses of class B and C funds). According to Mr. Mathis, Wasatch County received money from the state for maintaining this road from sometime prior to 1976 through the time the Airport Road was closed in 1989. Mr. Mathis also testified that the County and Heber City disagreed as to whether formal proceedings to vacate the road were necessary before the road could be closed, with Heber City taking the position that no such proceedings were required. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90 (providing procedure for vacating public road).

Following the conclusion of the trial on the public highway issue, the district court issued a memorandum decision finding that the Airport Road was not a public highway as defined by section 27-12-89 of the Code. In its memorandum decision, the district court stated:

The Court acknowledges that this is a close decision. There is evidence of public use of the airport roadway over an extended period of time. However, in the interest of fairness and justice, it would appear this was simply the type of roadway that should be exempted from the technical provisions of U.C.A. § 27-12-89.

Thereafter, the court entered an order denying the Simpsons the right to claim compensation for the Airport Road access to Highway 189. ⁵ The Simpsons moved for a new trial, but the district court denied this motion. The parties stipulated that the court's order constituted a final judgment under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the district court entered an order to that effect. The Simpsons appealed to this court.

We first state the appropriate standard of review. Here, the district court examined section 27-12-89, made the requisite findings of fact, and determined that the facts found by it did not meet the statutory definition of a public highway. We review this ultimate determination, which is a mixed question of fact and law, for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Historically, we have given trial courts a fair degree of latitude in determining the legal consequences under section 27-12-89 of facts found by the court. See, e.g., Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646, 648-49 (1966) (upholding conclusion that street had been dedicated to public use); Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P.2d 720, 723 (1954) (upholding conclusion that road was not public highway). Under section 27-12-89, a road is deemed "dedicated and abandoned" to the public if it "has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Granting discretion to the trial court is appropriate under that section, as its legal requirements, other than the ten-year requirement, are highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938, 940. The issues presented under section 27-12-89, therefore, do not lend themselves well to close review by this court, as we would be hard-pressed to establish a coherent and consistent statement of the law on a fact-intensive, case-by-case review of trial court rulings. See id. Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's decision regarding whether a public highway has been established under section 27-12-89, we review the decision for correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its application of the facts to the statute. Finally, we "require[ ] proof of dedication by clear and convincing evidence." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) (citing Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 639 (1972)).

The Simpsons argue that the Airport Road was a public highway by virtue of section 27-12-89 of the Utah Code. That section provides, "A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89. Thus, for a road to become a public highway by dedication under section 27-12-89, there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period of ten years. To prevail on this appeal, the Simpsons must show that the district court could not correctly conclude that they failed to establish one or more of these three elements. ⁶

We begin our analysis under section 27-12-89 with the continuous use requirement. The witnesses presented at trial testified to using or observing others using the Airport Road frequently and without interruption from just after the road's construction in 1947 until its closure in 1989. For example, Ray Lloyd, a local resident who had lived in the vicinity of the Airport Road for over fifty years, testified that he drove on the Airport Road to attend shooting events at a gun club from 1948 to 1955. During that time, no one ever challenged his right to drive on the road. ⁷ He further testified to observing other people use the road over an extended period of time for various purposes including riding horses, hauling hay, and necking.

Other witnesses testified to significant commercial traffic on the Airport Road to various businesses located along the road. The testimony of Jay Simpson reveals substantial traffic on the Airport Road to a junkyard. He testified as follows:

Q Did you ever see or observe a junk yard or a used car type business or area?

A Oh yes.

Q Where was that located in reference to the road that we are talking about?

A That was off from the oil, south of the oil south of Lloyd Brothers Garage or their yard. Approximately, 300 feet and they probably had 3 or 4 acres of ground that they had junk cars on. Everybody went down there for a part, it seemed like.

Q And over what period of, or how many years would you say you have observed this type of use of the road that you have described?

A Early years there wasn't that many,...