Hebrand v. Hebrand
Decision Date | 25 October 2022 |
Docket Number | AC 44703 |
Parties | KARL ANDERS HEBRAND v. ANNIKA HEBRAND |
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Argued May 17, 2022
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Hon. Stanley Novack, judge trial referee; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief in accordance with the parties' separation agreement; thereafter, the court Hon. Stanley Novack, judge trial referee, granted the parties'joint motion to modify alimony and other financial orders; subsequently, the court, M. Moore J., denied the defendant's motion to open the modified order of alimony and other financial orders, and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Sol Mahoney, for the appellant (defendant).
Yakov Pyetranker, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Moll Suarez and Seeley, Js.
The defendant, Annika Hebrand, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to open a 2017 postjudgment modification, following the 2013 dissolution of her marriage to the plaintiff, Karl Anders Hebrand. The defendant claims that (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, in 2017, to modify the dissolution judgment, and (2) the court, in 2020, improperly failed to find fraud in denying her motion to open. Additionally, the defendant set forth a myriad of other claims in support of her efforts to reverse the denial of her motion to open. The plaintiff counters, inter alia, that the defendant's jurisdictional claim is without merit, the court properly determined that the defendant failed to prove her allegations of fraud, and the remainder of her claims are without merit. We agree with the plaintiff, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to open.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The parties married on August 10, 1991, in Gislov, Sweden. On October 25, 2011, the plaintiff commenced the underlying dissolution action, alleging that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. On January 17, 2013, the parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the financial and property matters (2013 agreement).[1] The 2013 agreement provided, in relevant part, that the plaintiff would pay alimony to the defendant until her death or remarriage, or until he attained the age of sixty-five. The plaintiff agreed to pay the defendant a monthly amount equal to 27.5 percent of the first $625,000 of his gross earned annual income from employment and an additional 10 percent of his gross earned annual income between $625,000 and $750,000. The 2013 agreement provided that "[i]n the event that the [plaintiffs] compensation changes substantially . . . the [defendant] shall have the right to petition the court for such modification as she believes appropriate." The 2013 agreement also provided for child support to the defendant for the parties' three minor children. The court, Hon. Stanley Novack, judge trial referee, dissolved the parties' marriage and incorporated the 2013 agreement into the judgment of dissolution.
On November 15, 2017, the parties jointly moved to modify certain financial aspects of the 2013 agreement. On December 20, 2017, the parties filed a stipulation with the court (2017 modification). The 2017 modification provided that the plaintiff would pay the defendant monthly alimony at a fixed amount of $7000.[2] The parties expressly stated that they had the opportunity to obtain independent legal counsel and that each had been advised by an attorney with respect to the 2017 modification.
Judge Novack held a hearing on December 20, 2017, where the parties appeared as self-represented litigants.[3] In response to a question from the court, the defendant stated that she had consulted with an attorney and indicated that the $7000 per month in alimony was fair. She further stated that she voluntarily agreed to the change in alimony and that she had not been forced into it by anyone. The court then granted the parties' motion and issued a new order of alimony in accordance with the parties' stipulation.
On June 29, 2020, the plaintiff moved to modify the judgment.[4] In his motion to modify, he argued that, subsequent to the 2017 modification, a substantial change in circumstances had occurred.[5] The plaintiff represented that his income decreased, his expenses increased, the defendant's expenses decreased, and that "[t]he defendant has been living together with another person under circumstances which should result in the modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements have caused such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs for the defendant." The plaintiff sought, inter alia, to reduce or terminate his alimony obligation.
Thereafter, on October 9, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to open the 2017 modification. On February 25, 2021, she filed a second amended motion to open and vacate the 2017 modification. Therein, she set forth fifteen bases for vacating the 2017 modification, including lack of jurisdiction, lack of statutory authority, fraud in the inducement, and mistake. On April 9, 2021, the court, M. Moore, J., held a hearing on the defendant's motion.
The court issued its order on April 30, 2021. It stated: The court concluded that the defendant had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff had made a false representation.
Addressing the remainder of the defendant's arguments, the court explained: (Emphasis added.) This appeal followed.
We begin with the applicable standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cimino v. Cimino, 174 Conn.App. 1, 5, 164 A.3d 787, cert, denied, 327 Conn. 929, 171 A.3d 455 (2017); see also Conroy v. Idlibi, 343 Conn. 201, 204, 272 A.3d 1121 (2022). In applying this standard, the court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Lavy v. Lavy, 190 Conn.App. 186, 199, 210 A.3d 98 (2019).
The defendant first claims that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the dissolution judgment in 2017. Specifically, she argues that the plaintiff labeled his filing as a motion for order, rather than a motion to modify and failed to pay the required filing fee. The defendant contends that, as a result of these purported defects, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the 2013 dissolution judgment. We conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider and accept the parties' 2017 modification and that the defects alleged by the defendant, even if accepted as true, would not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.[6] Accordingly, this claim must fail.[7]
It is axiomatic that (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 770, 143 A.3d 578 (2016). Although we review the decision of the trial court to grant or deny a motion to open under the abuse of discretion standard, an underlying issue of subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law subject to plenary review by this court. Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle, 161 Conn.App. 542, 549, 128 A.3d 590 (2015).
Our Supreme Court expressly has stated that "the Superior Court is a general jurisdiction tribunal with plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in family relations matters...
To continue reading
Request your trial