Hebrand v. Hebrand

• Decision Date: 25 October 2022
• Docket Number: AC 44703
• Parties: Karl Anders HEBRAND v. Annika HEBRAND
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

216 Conn.App. 210

284 A.3d 702

Karl Anders HEBRAND

v.Annika HEBRAND

AC 44703

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 17, 2022

Officially Released October 25, 2022

Sol Mahoney, Milford, for the appellant (defendant).

Yakov Pyetranker, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Moll, Suarez and Seeley, Js.

SEELEY, J.

The defendant, Annika Hebrand, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to open a 2017 postjudgment modification, following the 2013 dissolution of her marriage to the plaintiff, Karl Anders Hebrand. The defendant claims that (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, in 2017, to modify the dissolution judgment, and (2) the court, in 2020, improperly failed to find fraud in denying her motion to open. Additionally, the defendant set forth a myriad of other claims in support of her efforts to reverse the denial of her motion to open. The plaintiff counters, inter alia, that the defendant's jurisdictional claim is without merit, the court properly determined that the defendant failed to prove her allegations of fraud, and the remainder of her claims are without merit. We agree with the plaintiff, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to open.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The parties married on August 10, 1991, in Gislov, Sweden. On October 25, 2011, the plaintiff commenced the underlying dissolution action, alleging that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. On January 17, 2013, the parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the financial and property matters (2013 agreement).¹ The 2013 agreement provided, in relevant part, that the plaintiff would pay alimony to the defendant until her death or remarriage, or until he attained the age of sixty-five. The plaintiff agreed to pay the defendant a monthly amount equal to 27.5 percent of the first $625,000 of his gross earned annual income from employment and an additional 10 percent of his gross earned annual income between $625,000 and $750,000. The 2013 agreement provided that "[i]n the event that the [plaintiff's] compensation changes substantially ... the [defendant] shall have the right to petition the court for such modification as she believes appropriate." The 2013 agreement also provided for child support to the defendant for the parties’ three minor children. The court, Hon. Stanley Novack , judge trial referee, dissolved the parties’ marriage and incorporated the 2013 agreement into the judgment of dissolution.

On November 15, 2017, the parties jointly moved to modify certain financial aspects of the 2013 agreement. On December 20, 2017, the parties filed a stipulation with the court (2017 modification). The 2017 modification provided that the plaintiff would pay the defendant monthly alimony at a fixed amount of $7000.² The parties expressly stated that they had the opportunity to obtain independent legal counsel and that each had been advised by an attorney with respect to the 2017 modification.

Judge Novack held a hearing on December 20, 2017, where the parties appeared as self-represented litigants.³ In response to a question from the court, the defendant stated that she had consulted with an attorney and indicated that the $7000 per month in alimony was fair. She further stated that she voluntarily agreed to the change in alimony and that she had not been forced into it by anyone. The court then granted the parties’ motion and issued a new order of alimony in accordance with the parties’ stipulation.

On June 29, 2020, the plaintiff moved to modify the judgment.⁴ In his motion to modify, he argued that, subsequent to the 2017 modification, a substantial change in circumstances had occurred.⁵ The plaintiff represented that his income decreased, his expenses increased, the defendant's expenses decreased, and that "[t]he defendant has been living together with another person under circumstances which should result in the modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements have caused such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs for the defendant." The plaintiff sought, inter alia, to reduce or terminate his alimony obligation.

Thereafter, on October 9, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to open the 2017 modification. On February 25, 2021, she filed a second amended motion to open and vacate the 2017 modification. Therein, she set forth fifteen bases for vacating the 2017 modification, including lack of jurisdiction, lack of statutory authority, fraud in the inducement, and mistake. On April 9, 2021, the court, M. Moore, J ., held a hearing on the defendant's motion.

The court issued its order on April 30, 2021. It stated: "The crux of the defendant's argument is that she and the plaintiff discussed modifying the alimony to a reduced figure which would be nonmodifiable in the event she cohabitated or remarried. The stipulation signed by both parties and approved in 2017 has no such provision regarding nonmodifiable alimony. The defendant now claims that the plaintiff committed fraud in the inducement and misrepresentation of material facts." The court concluded that the defendant had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff had made a false representation.

Addressing the remainder of the defendant's arguments, the court explained: "The defendant presented several additional bases for reopening and vacating the [2017 modification]: the [modification] was prohibited by the separation agreement, the motion was not properly filed because no fee was paid, motion was not properly titled, lack of jurisdiction, lack of authority, proper authority not cited in motion, lack of finding of substantial change in circumstances, negligent misrepresentation, lack of jurisdiction for retroactive modification of alimony by agreement, mistake, accident, estoppel by nonmodifiable clause, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendant failed to provide any credible evidence or case law to substantiate the additional claims made in her motion . The motion to open and vacate is denied." (Emphasis added.) This appeal followed.

We begin with the applicable standard of review. "Our review of a court's denial of a motion to open [based on fraud] is well settled. We do not undertake a plenary review of the merits of a decision of the trial court ... to deny a motion to open a judgment. ... In an appeal from a denial of a motion to open a judgment, our review is limited to the issue of whether the trial court has acted unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion. ... In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. ... The manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed so long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cimino v. Cimino , 174 Conn. App. 1, 5, 164 A.3d 787, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 929, 171 A.3d 455 (2017) ; see also Conroy v. Idlibi , 343 Conn. 201, 204, 272 A.3d 1121 (2022). In applying this standard, the court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Lavy v. Lavy , 190 Conn. App. 186, 199, 210 A.3d 98 (2019).

I

The defendant first claims that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the dissolution judgment in 2017. Specifically, she argues that the plaintiff labeled his filing as a motion for order, rather than a motion to modify, and failed to pay the required filing fee. The defendant contends that, as a result of these purported defects, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the 2013 dissolution judgment. We conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider and accept the parties’ 2017 modification and that the defects alleged by the defendant, even if accepted as true, would not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.⁶ Accordingly, this claim must fail.⁷

It is axiomatic that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. ... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction .... The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa , 322 Conn. 757, 770, 143 A.3d 578 (2016). Although we review the decision of the trial court to grant or deny a motion to open under the abuse of discretion standard, an underlying issue of subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law subject to plenary review by this court. Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle , 161 Conn. App. 542, 549, 128 A.3d 590 (2015).

Our Supreme Court expressly has stated that "the Superior Court is a general jurisdiction tribunal with plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in family relations matters under General Statutes § 46b-1 ...."⁸ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa , supra, 322 Conn. at 776–77, 143 A.3d 578. Section 46b-1 provides in relevant part that "[m]atters within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court deemed to be family relations matters shall be matters affecting or involving ... (4) alimony, support, custody and change of name incident to dissolution of marriage, legal separation and annulment ...." It is clear, therefore, that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to consider and grant the postdissolution motion to modify the award of alimony in this case. See Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle , supra, 161 Conn. App. at 549, 128 A.3d 590 ( § 46b-1 (4) provides that Superior Court has jurisdiction over disputes in family relations matters, and General Statutes § 46b-86 (a) provides that court...