Hebrink v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. C9-02-2189.,C9-02-2189.
• Citation: 664 N.W.2d 414
• Parties: James T. HEBRINK, Appellant, v. FARM BUREAU LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

664 N.W.2d 414

James T. HEBRINK, Appellant, v. FARM BUREAU LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Respondents.

No. C9-02-2189.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

July 8, 2003.

Brandon Vaughn Lawhead, Lawhead Law Offices, Austin, MN, for appellant.

Scott B. Lundquist, Minneapolis, MN, for respondents.

Considered and decided by SHUMAKER, Presiding Judge, ANDERSON, Judge, and HALBROOKS, Judge.

OPINION

G. BARRY ANDERSON, Judge.

Appellant challenges the district court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent. Appellant argues that the district court erred in (1) granting summary judgment on respondent's disguised and improperly noticed motion for summary judgment; (2) holding that the policy definition of "physicians" was unambiguous; and (3) barring evidence that the agent negligently assisted appellant in completing the disability insurance application. Because respondent's motion in limine, requesting that the court bar evidence regarding appellant's treatment by a physician, was actually a motion for summary judgment, and the district court abused its discretion in excluding all evidence regarding the agent's alleged negligence, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

Appellant James T. Hebrink purchased a disability-insurance policy from Stanley S. Thompson, an insurance agent for respondent Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company, on June 10, 1999. Thompson filled out the application as appellant gave him the information. According to appellant, he informed Thompson that he had received prior chiropractic treatment, but Thompson told him that this information was not sought in the application. Appellant signed the application and Farm Bureau issued the policy.

On August 31, 1999, appellant was injured while working on a cement project on his driveway. Appellant went to see Dr. M.O. Reeve, a chiropractor, on September 3, 1999. Dr. Reeve later referred appellant to the Mayo Clinic, where he was diagnosed as having "a right S-1 radiculopathy resulting in considerable pain and mild weakness, which did not resolve with an extensive period of maximal conservative therapy." As a result, appellant underwent surgery on April 5, 2000. Appellant was released the following day and was once again placed in the care of Dr. Reeve.

In March 2000, appellant made a claim under his insurance policy. Appellant's chiropractor submitted a physician's statement to Farm Bureau, indicating that appellant had also been treated for back problems in November of 1998, but that his problem had resolved in four treatments. Based on this disclosure, Farm Bureau cancelled appellant's policy. Specifically, Farm Bureau asserted that appellant failed to disclose his prior back problems, and that had he done so, no policy would have been issued.

On June 25, 2001, appellant served Farm Bureau with a complaint, alleging breach of contract and negligence by its agent. In its answer, Farm Bureau denied all claims. Farm Bureau claimed that there was no breach of contract because appellant made material misrepresentations on the application by failing to reveal a pre-existing condition. The answer did not assert that appellant failed to establish he was "totally disabled" because he was not under the care of a "physician" for 90 days.

A pretrial conference was held on August 7, 2002. On August 12, 2002, Farm Bureau filed a motion in limine, requesting that the district court bar (1) appellant from submitting any testimony relating to "total disability" within the meaning of the policy definition because it was undisputed that appellant had not been under the care of a physician for more that 90 days, and (2) all evidence relating to negligence of the insurance agent because the alleged negligence, if any, did not proximately cause appellant's damages.

On the scheduled trial date, August 19, 2002, the district court considered and granted Farm Bureau's motion in limine, barring evidence on "total disability" and negligence of the agent. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment, sua sponte, explaining as follows:

Given the clear understanding that chiropractors are not permitted to practice medicine while physicians are in the state of Minnesota, the Court finds as a matter of law no ambiguity exists in the definition "physician" as stated in the Farm Bureau's Insurance policy issued to [appellant]. Based upon this finding, [appellant] is unable to prove he complied with the 90 and 120 day policy requirement for treatment by a physician. The court's decision, therefore, becomes a final determination on Plaintiff's cause of action. A judgment of dismissal will be entered.

This appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment, sua sponte, in favor of respondent?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion in barring appellant from introducing evidence regarding the insurance agent's alleged negligence?

III. Should this court accept appellant's "offer of proof?"

ANALYSIS

I.

On appeal from summary judgment, we ask whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). Also, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993) (citation omitted).

Farm Bureau submitted a motion in limine seeking to bar appellant from submitting any testimony relating to "total disability" within the meaning of the policy, because it was undisputed that appellant had not been under the care of a physician for more than 90 days. The district court found, apparently as a matter of law, that a chiropractor is not a physician, so appellant cannot prove that he was treated by a physician for more than 90 days and ordered summary judgment, sua sponte.

Appellant argues that Farm Bureau's motion in limine was, in reality, a summary-judgment motion, that he was not given a fair opportunity to oppose the motion, and that the motion improperly raised a new defense.

Farm Bureau moved in limine for an order

barring the plaintiff from submitting any testimony relating to "total disability" within the meaning [of] the policy definition because it is undisputed that plaintiff was not under the care of [a] physician [for] more than 90 days [.]

(Emphasis added.) In its memorandum of law in support of the motion, Farm Bureau supported its request by noting:

[Appellant] does not intend to introduce any evidence from Dr. Lynch regarding disability. The only evidence is limited to the medical records and objective facts themselves. The evidence establishes the entire disability occurred within the ninety day waiting period and thus no benefits would be payable under the policy.

The purpose of a motion in limine is to prevent "injection into trial of matters which are irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial." Black's Law Dictionary 1013 (6th ed.1991). Here, there is no reference in either the motion in limine or the memorandum in support of the motion to any rules of evidence or other authority that would make the evidence regarding "total disability" inadmissible. Nor did Farm Bureau argue that the evidence would be irrelevant or prejudicial. Instead, the gist of Farm Bureau's motion was that the evidence regarding "total disability" should be excluded because appellant could not prove that he met the policy condition by relying on evidence then in the record. This was not a proper motion in limine but, rather, was tantamount to a motion for summary judgment. Cf. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 761 (stating that a summary-judgment motion must be granted "when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issues of material fact and either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law").

Because Farm Bureau's motion in limine functioned as a motion for summary judgment, compliance with Rule 56.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 115.03 of the General Rules of Practice of District Court was required. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (stating that summary judgment motions shall comply with the notice requirements of Rule 115.03 of the General Rules of Practice of the District Courts); Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.03(a) (setting the notice requirements for dispositive motions). Rule 115.03(a) provides that no dispositive motion shall be heard unless the moving party serves proper notice and the specified documents on opposing party at least 28 days prior to the scheduled hearing. Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.03(a). Rule 56.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary-judgment motions shall be governed by Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.03, but that "in no event shall the motion be served less than 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. Absent a clear waiver by the adversary, the time-period requirements of rule 56.03 are mandatory. Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 278-79, 230 N.W.2d 588, 591 (1975).

Farm Bureau filed the motion only seven days before the trial date, and there is no evidence in the record indicating that appellant waived the notice requirement. Farm Bureau's motion was improperly noticed and should not have been considered by the district court.

Notwithstanding this fact, we recognize that there are times when the district court has the authority to grant summary judgment, sua sponte. The district court has the authority to grant summary judgment, sua sponte, when (a) no genuine issues of material fact remain, (b) one of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law, and (c) the absence of a formal motion creates no prejudice to the party against whom summary judgment is granted. Id. at 280-81, 230 N.W.2d at 591-92; Modern Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Loop Belden Porter, 493 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Minn.App.1992). The...