Hechter v. Nationwide Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-cv-2720 |
| Parties | BRITTANIE HECHTER, Plaintiff, v. NATIONWIDE FIRE INSURANCE CO., et al. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendant Dreyfuss Williams & Associates Co.'s ("DWA") Motion For Leave to File Sur-Reply (ECF No 25), Plaintiff Brittanie Hechter's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Remand (ECF No. 15), and DWA's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20). For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES DWA's Motion to For Leave to File Sur-Reply, (ECF No. 25), GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 15), and DENIES AS MOOT DWA's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 20).
On November 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio against Defendants Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Premera Blue Cross, OhioHealth, Michael Coyle, and DWA (collectively "Original Defendants"). (ECF No. 15 at 2.) Plaintiff's Complaint alleged that, on November 30, 2012, she rode as a passenger in Michael Coyle's car. Michael Coyle wrecked the car and plaintiff sustained injuries. (ECF No. 2 at 2.) Plaintiff claimed that Michael Coyle negligently operated his motor vehicle resulting in damages to her. (Id.)
Plaintiff treated at OhioHealth for her injuries. DWA provides legal representation and collects debt for OhioHealth. Premera Blue Cross medically insures Plaintiff under her employee benefit plan.
In her original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that OhioHealth overcharged her and pursued illegal billing practices. Plaintiff maintained that OhioHealth has a practice of identifying patients with personal injury claims or sources of payment other than major medical plans. (ECF No. 2 at 5.) Plaintiff contended that OhioHealth systematically seeks compensation from other sources in order to collect full, undiscounted rates for medical services, as opposed to preferred provider rates. Plaintiff alleged that OhioHealth's billing practices violate Ohio Revised Code § 1751.60(A). (ECF No. 2 at 5, ¶ 23.). Ohio Revised Code § 1751.60(A) requires health care providers who have entered into a preferred provider contract with a health insuring corporation to seek compensation solely from the health insurer.
Plaintiff brought a breach of contract claim against OhioHealth. (ECF No. 2 at 7.) Plaintiff alleged that OhioHealth breached its contract with Premera Blue Cross because it did not charge Plaintiff at the discounted rate required under the agreement. Plaintiff further contended that OhioHealth violated Ohio public policy. (ECF No. 2 at 11.)
Plaintiff pleaded a claim against OhioHealth for its billing practices under Ohio Revised Code § 3923.81(A). (ECF No. 2 at 6, ¶ 24.). Ohio Revised Code § 3923.81(A) provides the following:
If a person is covered by a health benefit plan issued by a sickness and accident insurer, health insuring corporation, or multiple employer welfare arrangement and the person is required to pay for health care costs out-of-pocket or with funds from a savings account, the amount the person is required to pay to a health care provider or pharmacy shall not exceed the amount the sickness and accident insurer, health insuring corporation, or multiple employer welfare arrangement would pay under applicable reimbursement rates negotiated with the provider orpharmacy. This division does not preclude a person from reaching an agreement with a health care provider or pharmacy on terms that are more favorable to the person than negotiated reimbursement rates that otherwise would apply as long as the claim submitted reflects the alternative amount negotiated, except that a health care provider or pharmacy shall not waive all or part of a copay or deductible if prohibited by any other provision of the Revised Code. The requirements of this division do not apply to amounts owed to a provider or pharmacy with whom the sickness and accident insurer, health insuring corporation, or multiple employer welfare arrangement has no applicable negotiated reimbursement rate.
Plaintiff also alleged a claim against DWA under Ohio Revised Code § 3923.81(A) because DWA had knowledge of the other plan and helped further the violation.
Plaintiff further claimed that OhioHealth and DWA refused to provide a copy of part or all of a medical record, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 3701.74(B) and (C). (ECF No. 2 at 10.) Plaintiff brought claims against OhioHealth and DWA under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01(A). (ECF No. 2 at 11 ¶ 63.)
Plaintiff brought a declaratory action against Premera Blue Cross under Ohio Revised Code § 2721.01. (ECF No. 2 at 13.) Plaintiff also alleged a breach of contract and bad faith claim against Premera Blue Cross. (ECF No. 2 at 13.) Plaintiff stated that Premera Blue Cross failed to perform its obligations under the terms of the insurance contract.
Premera Blue Cross removed this action to this Court on December 22, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) On January 7, 2015, Plaintiff and Defendant Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company settled their differences and entered into a Stipulation dismissing claims against Nationwide. (ECF No. 11.) On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff and Premera Blue Cross settled their differences and entered into a Stipulation dismissing claims against Premera Blue Cross. (ECF No. 14.) The only claims remaining in this case are against Defendants Michael Coyle, OhioHealth, and DWA.
On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand this action to state court. (ECF No. 15.) DWA and OhioHealth (collectively "Defendants")1 oppose Plaintiff's motion to remand, and each party filed a response to Plaintiff's motion. Defendants argue that the remaining claims in this case fall within the original jurisdiction of this Court.
The Court will first address DWA's Motion For Leave to File Sur-Reply. (ECF No. 25.) This Court must decide whether it should permit DWA to file a sur-reply, which would necessitate additional briefing before the Court could address the merits of Plaintiff's motion to remand. Rule 7.2(a)(2) of the Southern District of Ohio Local Civil Rules permits the filing of a motion and memorandum in support, a memorandum in opposition, and a reply memorandum. The Rule further states that, "[n]o additional memoranda beyond those enumerated will be permitted except upon leave of court for good cause shown." S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2). "While the Local Rules do not define 'good cause' for filing a sur-reply, 'this Court has consistently held that in order for a party to be given permission to file a sur-reply, the reply brief must raise new grounds that were not presented as part of the movant's initial motion."' Bush v. Sec'y of Dep't of Veterans Affairs, No. 1:13-CV-76, 2014 WL 127092, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2014) (quoting Comtide Holdings, LLC v. Booth Creek Mgmt. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-1190, 2010 WL 4117552, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct.19, 2010)).
DWA asserts that "good cause" exists because "the issue of whether this Court retains jurisdiction over this matter and should continue to retain jurisdiction has become obfuscated." (ECF No. 25 at 1.) Defendant DWA does not address new arguments raised by Plaintiff. DWAsimply rephrases the arguments it made previously.2 DWA states that it ""seeks only to submit to this Court a final, concise, and direct removal jurisdictional analysis." (ECF No. 25 at 2.) The Court concludes that Defendant DWA's proffered reasons to file the sur-reply do not constitute good cause. See White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 933, 944 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (). The Court is confident that it can discern the relevant information and properly decide the issues presented in this case. The Court therefore DENIES Defendant DWA's Motion.
The Court now turns to the issue of remand. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff asks this Court to remand the instant action to the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio. As a threshold matter, the Court must first determine whether Premera Blue Cross properly removed this action when it filed the Notice of Removal.
"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441. "The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction." Driscoll v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., No. CIV.A. 2:09-CV-00154, 2009 WL 2169134, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2009) (citing Jerome-Duncan Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L .L.C., 176 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1999)). "Doubts regarding federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand." Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1996)). "The existence ofsubject matter jurisdiction is determined by examining the complaint as it existed at the time of removal." Harper v. AutoAlliance Int'l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004) ().
The primary sources of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts are diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Douklias v. Teacher's Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 35 F. Supp. 2d 612, 614 (W.D. Tenn. 1999); see e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81 (2005) (discussing diversity jurisdiction); and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (...
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